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I. Introduction: Social Cohesion in Diverse Settings – 
Time for a Dynamic Research Agenda 
 
I.1 Introduction and Motivation 
In the past years, debates among researchers, pundits, journalists and politicians 
on the consequences of immigration to Europe became increasingly prevalent. One 
could say they became prevalent again, since the topic always was controversial. 
The best examples are the debates during and after the refugee crisis on how much 
immigration a nation can bear and the political disputes that followed. As an 
illustrative example, Horst Seehofer, the current German Minister of the Interior, 
Building and Community, recently claimed that the migration question is “the 
mother of all political problems” after images of extreme right-wing demonstrations 
featured prominently in the German news.1 
In the social sciences, a growing strand of research about the consequences of 
immigration was stimulated by Putnam (2007), who empirically demonstrates that 
social trust and other indicators of social cohesion are lower in ethnically diverse 
U.S. localities. This negative association between ethnic diversity and different 
measures of cohesion has since Putnam’s seminal paper reached the status of what 
can adequately be called a “stylized fact” (Hirschman 2016), an empirical regularity 
that lays foundations for and stimulates a host of empirical and theoretical work 
which tries to explain, contest and replicate the association (Hirschman 2016).  
Putnam’s (2007) claim is not only about localities and their cohesiveness. He also 
links his empirical findings about local ethnic diversity to the question of whether 
                                      
1https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2018-09/chemnitz-horst-seehofer-stellungnahme-
kommentar (accessed September 9, 2018). 
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immigration affects societal integration, and thus to a topic that is of interest to 
sociologists since the early beginning of the discipline (Durkheim 1972; Lockwood 
1999; Portes and Vickstrom 2011).  
Against the backdrop of this larger scholarly debate, the three studies that comprise 
this thesis provide fresh theoretical and empirical perspectives on the relationship 
between immigration, local ethnic diversity and social cohesion in the wake of 
Putnam (2007). The thesis can be seen as part of a broader research agenda that 
not only empirically investigates the association between neighborhood diversity 
and social cohesion itself (as in study III), but focuses on the processes that 
“surround” this association. One pillar of this agenda is a focus on processes of 
ethnic segregation and individual residential choice which create what is later 
measured as neighborhood ethnic composition (see study II). A second pillar moves 
the debate on social cohesion to higher levels of analysis by focusing on macro-level 
sources of group threat such as the national media (see study I).  
This introduction provides a broad theoretical background for the three studies 
that comprise this thesis and sums up their main findings. In the remainder, I first 
define the most crucial concepts that appear in all three studies in sections I.2.1. In 
section I.2.2, I lay out a framework that distinguishes sources of group threat at 
different contextual levels. In I.2.3, I theorize on interactions between individuals 
in ethnically diverse neighborhoods, building on previous theoretical accounts from 
prior research. Section I.3 summarizes the three studies that make up the main part 
of this PhD thesis and shows how they build on one another, how they intersect, 
and where they deviate from one another. In my concluding discussion in section 
I.4, I lay out how to further pursue the outlined research agenda. 
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I.2 Theory and Concepts 
This section provides a broad theoretical framework that serves both to structure 
the three studies comprising this thesis and to refine theoretical accounts that are 
prominent in research on the effects of ethnic diversity. I will first clarify the main 
concepts that will be used throughout this thesis. Then, I will analytically separate 
macro-level origins of group conflict from local level threats. I hope that this 
distinction allows researchers to specify theoretical mechanisms within group 
conflict accounts for specific geographical levels more clearly. In the third part of 
this section, I interpret already existing accounts on the association between 
diversity and cohesion on the neighborhood level by focusing on the type of 
interactions between neighbors these accounts imply.  
Throughout this chapter I will refer to figure I.1., which gives an overview over the 
different studies in this thesis, how they relate to the different concepts used in the 
single studies and to the bigger questions raised in this introductory chapter. 
 
I.2.1 Main concepts: Social Cohesion and Immigration Related 
Ethnic Diversity 
Social Cohesion: Explaining the cohesion of societies is the holy grail of sociology 
from the very early beginning (Durkheim 1972; Lockwood 1999). Thus, it is no 
surprise that this topic still features prominently in current sociology (Chan, To, 
and Chan 2006; Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). This is also apparent in the more 
specific debate on social cohesion and immigration that presents the backdrop of 
this thesis (Portes and Vickstrom 2011). Here, I want to briefly clarify my 
conception of social cohesion. 
I mostly follow Schiefer and van der Noll (2017: 592) in their definition of social 
cohesion: “The essential elements of social cohesion are social relations, 
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identification, and orientation towards the common good. Subsequently, we define 
social cohesion as a descriptive attribute of a collective, indicating the quality of 
collective togetherness”.  
Social cohesion might be distinguished by the relevant actors that form the 
“collective” that is more or less cohesive, and the collective’s geographical scale. 
First, I use the term societal integration to refer to cohesion on the level of nations 
or societies. I use this rather abstract conceptualization of social cohesion mostly in 
the theoretical elaboration here in chapter I. Second, I refer to neighborhood social 
cohesion when I discuss theoretical approaches or research findings that pertain to 
neighborhoods or regions in particular or local social cohesion for geographical 
contexts that also include bigger contexts such as districts. To some degree this 
distinction matches with the more elaborate distinction between social integration 
and system integration by Lockwood (1999). 
I conceive of societal integration as a macro-level emergent property that results 
from interactions between individuals (Mäs 2018) in small scale contexts and 
between societal sub-systems (Lockwood 1999). The notion of emergence implies 
that it is not possible to infer the state of integration of a society by merely looking 
at its single members, but it develops out of their interactions (Mäs 2018). As an 
example, consider Durkheim's (1972) idea of organic solidarity, one influential 
attempt to capture what is behind societal integration. It is sustained by the 
dependencies between individuals who engage in more and more fine-grained 
division of labor. That is, it emerges from the interactions and expectations between 
individuals.  
In study I, my colleague Christian S. Czymara and I investigate how concerns about 
immigration change over periods with differing media coverage on immigration. 
Study I can thus be seen as an investigation of one specific element of societal 
cohesion, namely tolerance towards minorities (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017), 
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given that concerns about immigration are indicative of attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities to some degree. 
The process of emergence that leads to neighborhood or local social cohesion might 
be more tangible, as it depends on direct face-to-face interactions and thus is closer 
related to the relational element of social cohesion (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). 
The effects and nature of interactions on the local level will be a re-occurring topic 
within this introduction. 
Study II and III analyze outcomes that relate to the individual attachment to the 
neighborhood. For example, study III measures one aspect of neighborhood social 
cohesion directly: contact with neighbors and an assessment of the overall network 
between neighbors. Study II indirectly deal with the attachment of households to 
neighborhoods by investigating their probability to leave a neighborhood. 
As a word of caution, I would like to note that social scientists might be able to 
measure variables that relate to the state of social cohesion at several levels (Chan 
et al. 2006; Janmaat 2011), but given the notion of cohesion as an emergent 
property, statistical measures of individual integration into specific units will only 
give tentative indications of the overall integration without capturing the relevant 
interactions that are behind societal integration. I will pick this issue up in the last 
section of the introduction. 
 
Ethnic diversity: I use the term ethnic diversity, or just diversity, to refer to the 
composition of ethnic groups within a geographically confined region. Ethnicity is 
defined following the Weberian definition by Wimmer (2013: 7): “ethnicity is 
understood as a subjectively felt belonging to a group that is distinguished by a 
shared culture and by common ancestry”.  
The motivation to explore the effects of contextual characteristics such as the ethnic 
composition is that they describe the social environment of individuals. This 
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environment is then expected to affect outcomes like individual prejudice or social 
cohesion through a variety of mechanisms. On the contextual level of 
neighborhoods, ethnic diversity is likely to capture mechanisms such as everyday 
exposure, competition or contact with other groups (see section I.2.3). These can 
be subsumed under the heading of “social-interactive mechanisms” of neighborhood 
effects (Galster 2012: 25). 
One issue that arises when operationalizing ethnic diversity is whether statistical 
group compositions match with the everyday experiences of individuals.  
For the purposes of many statistical analyses, including this thesis, the 
operationalization of ethnic diversity relies on “objective” group size measures of 
ethnic groups which are defined by either official statistical offices (for example 
based on citizenship from official administrative statistics as in study I), or on other 
external agents like private companies (as in study II and III). This implies that 
the categorization into different ethnic groups is in essence done by the actor who 
compiled the data.  
To assess the consequences of local ethnic composition, it is useful to think in terms 
of ethnic boundaries (Wimmer 2013). An ethnic boundary is based on both, a 
classification into a certain ethnic group, that is perceptions of belonging or not 
belonging, and the fact that this classification involves behavioral consequences 
(Wimmer 2013: 9). In Wimmer’s ethnic boundary making approach, ethnic 
boundaries are amendable to change through a complex interplay of actions by 
individuals and collective actors and their opportunity structures (Wimmer 2013). 
That is, in contrast to the objective group size measures, ethnic boundaries within 
contextual units might change over time. 
Under the assumption that a mechanism based on ethnicity is at work within a 
certain context, statistical diversity measures that rely on pre-defined ethnic 
categorizations are more likely to capture this mechanism when the ethnic groups 
for which population size is available are groups that exhibit strong ethnic 
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boundaries in real life. In other words, the more the statistical measure of diversity 
and the subjective perceptions of salient group boundaries in everyday life align, 
the more the statistical measure can be expected to yield an effect in line with a 
mechanism that is based on perceptions of ethnic differences.  
For the purpose of this introductory paper, I subsume different operationalizations 
of ethnic composition under the heading of ethnic diversity. In many of the reviewed 
studies that resemble that of Putnam (2007), “ethnic diversity” is often measured 
with the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Hirschman 1964). This index takes both the 
proportion of groups in a population and the number of groups into account. In the 
three studies that comprise this thesis, I instead rely on ratios of some ethnic 
minorities to the overall population within the geographic unit. I do so mostly to 
capture adequately the out-group contact opportunities of the native group, instead 
of relying on the “color-blind” diversity index (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015). 
However, it should be noted that indices of diversity and mere group share 
measures, as I use them, strongly overlap in the German case (Schaeffer 2013a). 
Furthermore, the scale of the geographical unit where diversity is measured is 
central to the mechanisms that can be assumed to follow from this variable. The 
three studies in this thesis vary in the contextual unit at which diversity is measured 
from the neighborhood level (study II and III) to the regional/district level (study 
I). The neighborhood level might be particularly well suited to study everyday 
exposure or encounters between ethnic groups. However, selectivity through 
residential mobility might be pronounced, and must be carefully investigated before 
turning to the estimation of neighborhood diversity effects (see study II). 
On higher contextual levels than the neighborhood, such as wider regions, selection 
effects might be lower, but diversity measured at such contexts might conflate 
different mechanisms that add to those of everyday exposure. For example, if ethnic 
diversity is high but the ethnic groups are highly spatially segregated, we cannot 
easily assume everyday contact between ethnic groups as one mechanism leading 
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from regional diversity to local cohesion (Sturgis et al. 2014; Uslaner 2011). On 
even higher levels, like the nation state, a measure of ethnic diversity might not 
capture everyday experiences between ethnic groups at all and group size might 
lose its theoretical appeal (see section I.2.2). 
 
I.2.2 The Contextual Layers of Group Conflict 
A large stream of social scientific research on prejudice against ethnic minorities or 
local social cohesion is centered around the hypothesis that the larger the relative 
group share of ethnic minorities in an area, the more the ethnic majority reacts 
with prejudice which might further translate into acts of discrimination against 
ethnic minorities. This is what I will call the “local conflict hypothesis”.  
This hypothesis is rooted in theoretical frameworks which go under the names of 
racial threat or power threat (Hopkins 2010), conflict theory (van der Meer and 
Tolsma 2014) or competition and group threat theories (Schaeffer, 2014: 38). In the 
sociological tradition, this line of studies can be traced back to early work by 
Blalock (1957, 1967), who stressed the importance of minority group size to explain 
anti-minority prejudice. Generally, the theoretical argument of these sociological 
studies is strongly related to theories in the tradition of realistic group conflict from 
social psychology (Esses, Jackson, and Armstrong 1998; Stephan, Renfro, and Davis 
2009), because they explain prejudice towards certain groups, or its consequences, 
by referring to feelings of threat which are triggered by perceptions of zero-sum 
competition between groups for valued resources (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).2 
Originally developed to explain prejudice and discrimination, these theoretical 
                                      
2 Blumer (1958) is also often cited in this regard, presumably because he stressed proprietary claims 
on part of the ethnic majority and the perceived threats posed by the ethnic minority concerning 
these claims. These claims might indeed be assumed to be threatened by group size, though as I 
will note below, Blumers scope was generally more broad and not focused on local demographics 
and interactions. 
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assumptions have been extended to explain lower local social cohesion in diverse 
areas of various sizes (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2014). 
In fact, there are good reasons to expect realistic group competition between ethnic 
groups at the local level such as the neighborhood. For example, the early 
experiments that had a strong influence on the development of theories of realistic 
group conflict were conducted in small scale localities (Sherif et al. 1988) and also 
recent experimental or quasi-experimental studies show results in line with the local 
group conflict account in small scale contexts (Enos 2014, 2016).  In the next 
section, I will take up this account in an attempt to more clearly specify the 
mechanisms at work at the neighborhood level.  
Here, I propose to distinguish this local conflict account from a higher order threat 
account that focuses on determinants that are beyond characteristics of local 
environments such as the neighborhood (see also Pettigrew, Wagner, and Christ 
2010). These determinants are not only found on higher contextual levels than 
regions or neighborhoods, but, as I will argue, they are also less likely to be captured 
by variables of ethnic composition. 
Stressing such higher order sources of tensions between groups or within ethnic 
groups is important for two strands of research: Research that asks for the links 
between increasing immigration and societal integration and research within the 
local group conflict paradigm. Concerning the first strand, taking into account 
macro-level sources of group conflict is important because these sources affect those 
who are not exposed to ethnic diversity themselves. Thus, the dynamics triggered 
by higher order sources of group conflict might be of more relevance for societal 
integration than the experiences of those ethnic majority members that actually 
live in diverse localities. Research arguing within the group conflict account to 
explain prejudice or lower local cohesion could benefit from a focus on higher order 
sources of threat to explain where collective feelings of threat, or “group threats” 
as opposed to “individual threats” (Stephan et al. 2009) originate from.  
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These higher order sources of threat can be either found in historically formed 
macro-level group relations or meso-level societal sub-systems like national media 
coverage or political actors. The notions discussed within this section can also be 
found on the left side of figure I.1, which illustrates the main concepts and 
contextual levels of the three studies in this thesis and serves as a guide through 
the thesis.   
That group relations are complex product of past aggregate experiences is 
acknowledged in Blumer’s (1958) theory of race relations (see also Bobo and 
Hutchings [1996]). The “sense of group position” that according to Blumer drives 
prejudice and discrimination against ethnic minorities is a “historical product” 
(Blumer 1958: 5). It exists on the group level and relatively independent of 
individual sentiments and experiences. One example of such historical circumstance 
could be group histories marked by exclusion and ethnic closure which create strong 
ethnic boundaries in terms of value differences (Wimmer 2013: 174ff). “Big and 
slow moving” social phenomena, like these historically grown group relations, are 
difficult to grasp with current methods in social science (Pierson 2003). In empirical 
research, they are thus often treated as exogenous factors. For example, the choice 
of specific group share measures such as in study II and III could be justified by 
arguing that they match historically grown ethnic boundaries that guide behavior 
in everyday life. This is indicated in the left part of figure I.1: The historical roots 
of group relations are shown in grey, because they are assumed as exogenous and 
are expected to influence all other concepts in the graph. 
The second, more variable higher order factors in turn include salient political 
rhetoric (Hopkins 2010, 2011) or the media (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). 
Blumer (1958) recognized both as crucial factors in the formation of collective group 
positions. These influences stem from the meso-level, that is, specific subsystems 
within society, which impact individuals in their everyday life. For example, the 
realm of journalists can be considered a separate system from everyday interactions, 
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following its own logic (Windzio and Kleimann 2009). In study I, Christian S. 
Czymara and I show that the national media indeed presents a viable source of 
concerns about immigration, though with very different implications for different 
individuals (see left part of figure I.1). Another subsystem that affects public threats 
is the political realm. By speaking to a large audience, political elites also play a 
crucial role in this process of defining group positions (Blumer 1958; Hopkins 2011; 
Pettigrew et al. 2010).  
Furthermore, I also argue that the prime sources of collective threat are not likely 
to be manifest in ethnic composition variables. In other words, assessing ethnic 
diversity at higher levels such as the nation state is not enough to measure the type 
of macro-level factors that I just described. Rather, I claim that objectively 
measured ethnic diversity becomes more and more theoretically negligible as a 
source of perceived collective threat the larger the geographical context. This is 
because the higher the level in the geographical contextual hierarchy, the less 
directly ethnic composition on this level translates into direct experiences of ethnic 
majority individuals, and additional information channels such as the media become 
necessary to explain sources of threat. Some evidence for this proposition is that 
individuals are quite good in estimating on average the share of minorities in the 
region they live in (Koopmans and Schaeffer 2015), but overestimate the share of 
minorities on the national level (Herda 2010). Further arguments in a similar vein 
are provided in study I. 
Apart from systematizing research by the contextual level, the idea of higher order 
threats offers new perspectives on research on prejudice and social cohesion. Instead 
of assuming that demographic environments shape individual attitudes like the 
local conflict account, the macro- and meso-level sources of group threat affect all 
ethnic majority members including those who are not exposed to ethnic minorities. 
Such a perspective is needed as discourses about migration can impact and mobilize 
members within the society at large, not only those exposed to diversity. This steers 
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our focus towards group formation processes within the ethnic majority through 
perceptions of collective threat that affect migration attitudes and ultimately 
societal integration.  
One further drawback of the local conflict thesis is that individuals need to perceive 
of other ethnic groups as competitors in the first place in order to be able to explain 
why local ethnic composition affects attitudes towards immigrants (Hopkins 2010, 
2011). It is indeed difficult to conceive of local encounters, such as those under the 
local conflict thesis, as something that happens on the group level without 
additional background assumptions about group boundaries. One could imagine 
many situations that trigger “individual realistic threats” (Stephan et al. 2009) 
through negative encounters with members of certain groups that in turn cause fear 
for one’s safety. However, these are foremost individual experiences. To perceive 
such negative encounters as group threats or perceive group competition that 
threatens the privileges of the collective in-group as claimed by theories underlying 
the local conflict hypothesis, individuals need to have internalized frames that let 
them interpret the situation as one that is related to ethnic boundaries, not 
individual experiences (Hopkins 2011: 506). This again shows the importance to 
take higher order sources of group threat into account. 
The latter point was also recognized by Blalock, who notes that intergroup 
competition can only be high when “competitors perceive and act as though a 
coalition has been formed, so that potential competitors from one group are aligned 
against competitors from another, with rewards being allocated so of greater 
rewards than if the belonged to the losing coalition” (Blalock, 1967: 74). In other 
words, without existing ethnic boundaries that bound together “coalitions” of 
individuals, group competition and threat are unlikely to exist.  
The aim of this section was to show that scholars interested in prejudice and social 
cohesion should also focus on macro- or meso-level dynamics that might explain 
why collective attitudes change over time (Blumer 1958). This is one reason I 
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include study I in this thesis, which deals with the effects of media coverage about 
immigration on concerns about immigration.  
That being said, I do not agree with Blumer on “the relative unimportance of the 
huge bulk of experiences coming from daily contact with individuals of the 
subordinate group” (Blumer 1958: 6). Quite the contrary, I believe that analyzing 
the effects of neighborhood diversity adds much to our knowledge on living together 
in ethnically diverse settings. The goal of the next section is thus to carve out 
theoretical schemes to capture interactions in diverse neighborhoods. I will also 
come back to the local ethnic conflict accounts that I introduced in this section. 
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Figure I.1: Reduced representation of the thesis: Contextual levels, main concepts and theoretical relations (arrows) between the three studies.  
Note: Group relations are expected to affect all other concepts.
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I.2.3 Theorizing Interactions in Diverse Neighborhoods 
In the previous section, I primarily focused on threat perceptions that stem from 
the macro- or meso-level, such as the national media (left part of figure I.1). In this 
section, I turn to the site of my studies II and III which is the neighborhood (right 
part of figure I.1).  
The following theoretical elaboration will mostly interpret prior theoretical 
approaches that aim at explaining the negative association between diversity and 
social cohesion. I have two aims: first, I want to specify how the interactions 
between ethnicities in neighborhoods under different theoretical approaches can be 
conceived in game theoretical terms. Second, I want to theorize on the consequences 
in terms of shared norms (e.g. collective efficacy) and networks within 
neighborhoods that these interactions likely have. I will also refer to literature from 
the long tradition of economic and sociological research about the emergence of 
social norms and conventions (Coleman 1990; Voss 2001). When discussing the last 
explanation, coordination dilemmas between ethnicities, I also introduce the notion 
of a “norm of indifference” in ethnically diverse neighborhoods. I refrain from 
making empirical assessments of different explanations because this has already 
been tackled by Schaeffer (2014) and Dinesen and Sønderskov (2018) and focus on 
theoretical implications. 
A concept that matches with an everyday conception of what constitutes a “decent” 
neighborhood is Sampson's (2004) “collective efficacy”. It describes shared 
expectations about the possibility of collective action on part of the neighbors to 
provide certain public goods or to intervene in case of certain neighborhood 
problems. Collective efficacy is task specific (Sampson 2004: 160), and when I use 
the term neighborhood collective efficacy I mean a bundle of norms towards certain 
actions (by neighbors or third parties) that are shared by all neighbors. For 
example, one norm within that bundle could be that neighbors intervene in case 
they see a person litter the street.  
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Sociologists usually deem dense networks an important facilitator of the emergence 
of norms (Coleman 1990; Voss 2001). According to Sampson, a neighborhood must 
not be densely connected at all times to have high levels of collective efficacy. 
Rather, neighborhood networks can be activated in case they are needed for certain 
collective goals. However, collective efficacy still requires a certain degree of working 
trust and thus a certain degree of connectedness (Sampson 2004: 161). It certainly 
also requires a consensus on what the relevant problems of a neighborhood are (as 
I will argue when talking about ethnic preferences and anomie). In the following, I 
am interested in how norms towards certain tasks (in the sense of collective efficacy) 
emerge, and how neighbors form social ties with each other under different 
theoretical constellations.  
The local conflict hypothesis (see I.2.2) basically assumes that individuals between 
different groups perceive a zero-sum game when interacting with another group 
(Bobo and Hutchings 1996). For conflict to develop within neighborhoods, the 
source of this competition should be found on the neighborhood level (Galster 2012: 
25). Thus, in comparison to the higher order threat account introduced above, the 
local group conflict account assumes that feelings of collective threat endogenously 
follow from neighborhood ethnic composition. For example, the neighborhood could 
be seen as an arena of competition for housing or public space. One further resource 
that might also be subject to group competition from the view of the majority 
population is exclusive access to schools, which is often considered as one reason of 
“White Flight” (see study III).  
This implies that neighbors should be generally unwilling to engage in social 
exchange or build ties with persons of another ethnicity, because gains of the other 
ethnic group are perceived as losses for the own group. According to group threat 
theories, already existing ethnic boundaries should get stronger because of the 
prejudice that arises from perceptions of threat due to competition (Bobo and 
Hutchings 1996). Newcomers would encounter a neighborhood marked by these 
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sharp boundaries and thus be unable to engage in inter-group interactions. For long 
term stayers it could even mean that they are less integrated in the neighborhood 
than newcomers because they have gone through a downward spiral of conflict, 
where both groups feel more and more disadvantaged (for qualitative evidence, 
Hanhörster [2000]). Neighborhood networks are expected to be ethnically 
segregated. It could even be that contact with the own in-group is higher in diverse 
neighborhoods than in less diverse areas (Sluiter, Tolsma, and Scheepers 2015). But 
despite the possibility of ethnically clustered, and probably dense, networks, the 
overall social cohesion would still be lower in diverse areas as in less diverse 
neighborhoods. This situation might lead to disassociation from the neighborhood 
in general, including the own in-group, because of lower neighborhood attachment 
and trust in all neighbors that results from overall disorganization in the 
neighborhood (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014).3 
Research has shown that threat reactions to local minority composition depend on 
a variety of conditions, for example the location of the neighborhood in the ethnic 
topography of a city (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016) or rapid increases in short time 
periods coupled with political rhetoric that draws attention to these changes 
(Hopkins 2010). Furthermore, certain individuals are more likely to show threat 
reactions than others, for example depending on whether individuals have inter-
group contact (Stolle et al. 2013). Qualitative evidence shows that native German 
established long term inhabitants express reactions in line with threat theory when 
their neighborhood undergoes changes due to the in-mobility of certain immigrant 
groups (Hanhörster 2000). However, despite the possibility of threat reactions due 
                                      
3 In addition to local group competition proper, sometimes another mechanism that links local 
diversity to threat perceptions is mentioned that refers to the mere presence of the out-group, which 
might activate negative stereotypes (Enos 2014: 3700). This is indeed likely but prompts the 
question where these stereotypes come from: are they produced by interaction with ethnic others or 
do they originate from other sources? This might not matter for certain empirical investigations, 
but is certainly important as soon as one theorizes on the origins of neighborhood diversity effects. 
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to ethnic composition in neighborhoods under specific circumstances, it should be 
noted that, for the German case, the overall prevalence of threat is higher in regions 
with lower numbers of foreign citizens (Wagner et al. 2003; Weins 2011).  
Another account of lower social cohesion in diverse areas focuses on cultural 
differences between groups: Through culturally determined and asymmetrically 
distributed preferences about neighborhood norms or behavior, cooperation is 
hindered (Schaeffer 2014: 43f). In my reading this is closely related to the anomie 
account which argues that through the diversity in cultural norms and other 
cultural differences in ethnically diverse settings, uncertainty about the way to 
appropriately behave between neighbors arises (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). 
The similarity between the two accounts is that they both imagine situations where 
neighbors are unable to find a common normative consensus towards certain 
neighborhood tasks, let alone, on how the neighborhood community should look 
like.  
From a game theoretical perspective, a good description for this type of situation 
is a cooperation dilemma, such as in the prisoner’s dilemma. Here, the individual 
best response is not a consensus about preferable behavior with members of the 
other group (both cooperate), but rather to stick to the own cultural preferences or 
behavior (both defect). The cooperation dilemma is due to the fact that the 
perceived benefit from the own cultural behavior or norms is preferred over a 
cultural consensus with the other party and giving up one’s cultural behavior when 
the other group does not is perceived as the worst outcome. This leads to a dilemma 
where everybody sticks to her own preferred cultural behavior, even if a cultural 
consensus on shared neighborhood norms would be better for all ethnic groups.  
In a neighborhood characterized by this type of interactions, neighbors cannot find 
a consensus on how to behave towards certain neighborhood problems. This leads 
to a multitude of norms that are displayed by certain ethnic groups and a lack of 
shared norms on the neighborhood level. Thus, anomie (van der Meer and Tolsma 
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2014) as a situation of normlessness is an appropriate description for this situation. 
In such an uncertain environment it is likely that individuals retreat into their 
private sphere as suggested by Putnam (2007). This uncertainty should also spill 
over to individuals who recently moved in. 
Note that this account obviously only holds for strong and essential cultural 
preferences that individuals hold more dear than a cultural consensus with the other 
ethnicity, and giving up these preferences is associated with higher costs than to 
cooperate by curling down one’s preferences. Otherwise the dilemma situation 
would give way to something more like a coordination game. In these games there 
might still be differing preferences, but the situation is less “stuck” as in the 
cooperation dilemma situation (McAdams 2009).  
A third possible explanation for lower social cohesion in ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods are coordination problems across ethnic boundaries due to cultural 
differences, for example differences in language or symbolic behavior (Schaeffer 
2014: 45).  
The logic of a pure coordination problem in game theory (Diekmann and Przepiorka 
2016: 1312) implies that neighbors of different ethnicities do have shared interests, 
for example in providing support for neighbors in everyday life or building up 
relationships which could on aggregate result in rising collective efficacy. In some 
cases these interests might not perfectly align, like in a “battle of the sexes” game, 
but there still exist equilibria that are better for both parties than if they would 
not coordinate (McAdams 2009). When interacting with ethnic others, coordinating 
on a possible equilibrium might fail in a coordination game because, for example 
due to misunderstandings, at least one player might play the wrong strategy.  
If we change from a one-shot situation to a scenario where the same individuals 
interact over time, classical game theory would predict that these neighbors should 
be able to solve the coordination problem with repeated interactions (Diekmann 
and Przepiorka 2016; Voss 2001). This is because once a Nash-equilibrium is 
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reached in the ongoing interactions, this solution becomes focal and thus the 
standard option in future interactions (Voss 2001). Unlike the cooperation dilemma 
situation there also exists no temptation to deviate from this equilibrium. Thus, 
conventions that solve coordination problems are path dependent on former 
interactions and their outcomes within the neighborhood (Voss 2001). 
This raises questions about the conditions in ethnically diverse neighborhoods that 
might lead to an abruption of the coordination process so that no stable conventions 
can be reached. I propose to search for an explanation for the abruption of 
coordination by introducing a second type of actors who either have no interest in 
investing in neighborhood ties, or have high probability to move out of the 
neighborhood and thus can “leave the game”. I will call these individuals “short 
term stayers”. Thus, I assume not only heterogeneity in ethnicity, but also in the 
interest of investing in neighborhood ties, irrespective of ethnic group membership. 
In the language of game theory, short term stayers differ in their discount 
parameters from long term stayers (Voss 2001). Their incentive to not reciprocate 
ties, to not engage in neighborhood activities or not investing in collective efficacy 
is relatively high. This might be a common situation in urban environments, for 
example because households stay for a short period only, have no resources to 
engage in neighborhood contact or value the anonymity of the city over contact 
with their neighbors. Attempts of building up ties and coordinating interests with 
short term stayers fail or are not lasting very long.  
The main idea behind the theoretical mechanism proposed here is that the presence 
of short term stayers is especially detrimental for coordination in ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods. Whereas in the homogenous neighborhood, a network among the 
long term stayers develops, the loss of neighbors through out-mobility or the non-
reciprocation of ties weighs larger for the development of the neighborhood network 
in ethnically diverse neighborhoods. This is because there it is in general more 
difficult to build up, and thus to replace ties (Windzio 2018). That is, a loss of a 
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neighbor or an unsuccessful attempt of coordination is not easily replaced and the 
holes through unsuccessful tie formation in the neighborhood network stay longer. 
Game theoretical experiments show that even strong players who benefit from 
providing a public good curl down their efforts when other players are not taking 
part (Diekmann and Przepiorka 2016). Such a phenomenon of resignation among 
neighbors is what I also expect in the case of diverse neighborhoods. Over time 
individuals get used to this feeling of resignation and react with what might best 
be described as indifference towards the neighborhood.  
In contrast to anomie, I assume that this indifference does not lead individuals to 
hunker down into their own private sphere through uncertainty due to 
normlessness, but leads them to curl down efforts that might benefit the 
neighborhood at large. Thus, a norm of indifference arises in ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods: a lack of shared responsibility for the public goods within 
neighborhoods.  
Let me finish this section by noting that the coupling of research on neighborhood 
ethnic diversity effects and game theoretical foundations is a promising venture and 
should be further developed. The elaboration provided in this section might serve 
as a starting point. 
 
I.3 Three Studies of Social Cohesion: A Brief Guide 
In the following, I summarize the three studies that comprise this thesis. I will point 
to similarities and differences between them and relate them to the overall 
schematic theoretical framework suggested above. I start by noting the most 
important commonalities and core aspects of the single studies. These will re-occur 
when I go into further detail by describing each study in turn.  
First, all studies are longitudinal in nature in different aspects and thus “dynamic” 
as the title of this thesis suggests. Concerning the data used, they all make use of 
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individual or household level panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
study (SOEP). This longitudinal nature is a unique feature and constitutes one of 
the main contributions in all studies. 
Second, study I and III share a focus on one specific ethnic group, namely native 
Germans, and their reaction to immigration related diversity. This focus is 
prompted by the fact that the ethnic majority is still central to the political 
processes within nation states (Wimmer 2013: 135), so questions of societal 
integration depend primarily on the actions of the ethnic majority and their reaction 
to immigration. In study II, I compare the residential mobility of German native 
and immigrant households in order to assess possible effects on residential ethnic 
segregation. 
Third, all studies focus on different aspects of social cohesion. Study I can be best 
described as linking to societal integration by analyzing an outcome indicative of 
tolerance towards minority ethnic groups and thus a part of the concept of social 
cohesion (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017), and by showing that strong attitudinal 
divides in the population are created through mass media coverage on immigration. 
Study II relates to local social cohesion through the tendency of native German 
parents to act in ways that might be detrimental to neighborhood cohesion. The 
third study directly analyzes neighborhood embeddedness, and thus an aspect of 
local social cohesion. 
Fourth, all studies include local ethnic diversity as one important independent 
variable. Note however that in the three studies this contextual characteristic is 
used very differently. In the first study, it acts as an important moderator for the 
effects of media salience on attitudes towards immigration. In the second study, it 
acts as a background factor that provides different incentives for action once a 
relevant life course event sets in. In the third study it is used as a main independent 
variable, together with time, in the statistical models developed. 
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Table I.1 shows all studies and their main characteristics on several aspects that 
are of relevance. Figure I.1 shows a schematic illustration of where the single studies 
can be located in the broader framework of this introduction.
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Table I.1: Table of studies included in dissertation. 
Study no. Study I Study II Study III 
Title Mass Media and Concerns about 
Immigration in Germany in the 21st 
Century: Individual-Level Evidence over 
15 Years 
Parental White Flight? Neighborhood 
Ethnic Composition, Children and 
Residential Mobility in Germany 
Neighborhood Ethnic Composition and 
Individual Neighborhood Embeddedness: 
The Role of Length of Residence 
Authorship Co-authored by Christian Czymara Single authored Single authored 
Research question Does exposure to media coverage of 
immigration related issues lead to higher 
worries about immigration in the general 
population? Which groups are especially 
prone to media effects? 
Does having children lead ethnic majority 
Germans to leave diverse neighborhoods?  
How does neighborhood embeddedness 
develop with the length of residence in 
neighborhoods of different diversity? 
Findings Media salience of migration related issues 
is strongly related to higher concerns 
about immigration.  
This relationship is strongly moderated by 
party preferences, education and the 
regional share of foreigners. 
Having children increases the probability 
to move out of neighborhoods 
substantially more in diverse than in non-
diverse areas. 
Households with migration background do 
not show such a tendency. 
Households form relationships in diverse 
neighborhoods over time, but are less 
likely to perceive a close-knit community 
in diverse areas even after five years of 
residence. 
Significance within 
thesis/ interpretation of 
results with regard to 
cohesion 
Shows that meso-level background factors 
like media coverage are important drivers 
of migration worries, beyond objective 
demographic developments. 
Shows that life course events on part of 
the majority population might have 
impacts on neighborhood cohesion. 
Also: Investigates sources of selective 
mobility and thus informs design of 
further studies of neighborhood diversity 
effects (e.g. study III) 
Shows that Putnam’s (2007) hunkering 
down claim might not be an appropriate 
description, but also that networks 
among neighbors in diverse are more 
anonymous.  
When taken together with prior studies: 
shows importance of distinguishing 
different cohorts of diversity dwellers 
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and what happened in the 
neighborhood’s past. 
Outcome Concerns about immigration Probability to leave a neighborhood, share 
of minorities in the destination 
neighborhood 
Neighborhood social embeddedness in 
the form of contacts with neighbors and 
relations among neighbors 
Main explanatory 
variables 
Media salience as measured by the number 
of articles on specific topics in German 
newspapers 
Presence of new born children in the 
household and neighborhood ethnic 
minority share 
Neighborhood ethnic minority share in 
interaction with time 
Data SOEP (2001-2015) + quantitative content 
analysis + official statistics on district 
level + statistics on immigration to 
Germany 
SOEP (2007-2015) + microm 
neighborhood data 
SOEP (2009-2014) + microm 
neighborhood data 
Strengths and 
Contributions 
First study employing a fixed-effects 
design for showing within-individual 
change due to media coverage. 
Harmonized data over a long time period. 
Periodically fine grained media salience 
measure.  
Fixed-effects design with explicit sample 
restrictions targeted towards the effect of 
children. Analysis of potential timing of 
moves (newborn or pre-school age). 
Analysis of both migrant and native 
perspective. 
One of the few longitudinal studies in 
the field. Focus on growth of 
embeddedness instead of static 
conception. 
Limitations Broad measures of media salience and 
attitudes, despite several robustness 
checks there might be issues of reverse 
causality between concerns and media 
Small, undifferentiated sample of 
immigrant households, having children not 
a clear cut event  
Short time frame: no analysis of long 
term stayers 
Publication status Published in European Sociological 
Review: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcy019 
Working paper, prepared for soon 
submission 
Working paper, prepared for soon 
submission 
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I.3.1 Study I: Mass Media and Concerns about Immigration  
In Study I, “Mass Media and Concerns about Immigration in Germany in the 21st 
Century: Individual-Level Evidence over 15 Years”, Christian S. Czymara and I 
use panel data to predict how within individual changes in concerns about 
immigration from 2001 to 2015 are predicted by the attention that the topic of 
migration was given by the media shortly before an individual was interviewed. 
This media attention is what we refer to as “media salience”. 
We take a macro contextual perspective in terms of regional context. The media 
reports we study are from media outlets that are active all over Germany. We 
assume that they generate an information environment which reaches all 
individuals within Germany at a certain time (see also Hopkins [2011]). This means 
that the context which affects individual attitudes is much larger than in the 
following two studies which focus on the neighborhood. 
Such macro-level sources of group conflict are often discussed in past and present 
work on prejudice (Allport 1979; Pettigrew et al. 2010), but scholars only recently 
began to analyze the link between media reporting about immigration and attitudes 
in detail (Hopkins 2011; van Klingeren et al. 2015; Schlueter and Davidov 2013). 
Our study contributes to the larger literature on the effects of media salience on 
individual attitudes by analyzing changes within the same individuals over time 
and employing a more fine-grained measure for the current information 
environment that is produced by the media. 
Furthermore, we study media effects over a period of more than a decade. Debates 
featured in the media in this period comprise terror attacks, discussion of European 
migration law, controversial book publications, statements by political actors and 
the refugee crisis, among others. We thus aim at a generalizable estimate of the 
association between media salience and individual concerns about immigration. 
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Our results show a stable and robust effect of media salience on individual concerns 
about immigration to Germany. Moreover, we find strong interactions of media 
salience with political party preference, educational degree and the share of 
foreigners in the region a respondent lives.  
Immigration rates increased steadily over the period of the study, yet concerns 
about immigration fluctuated highly over time and are better explained by media 
salience than by actual in-migration rates. This fact is difficult to square with an 
account that stresses national out-group size as an important determinant of threat. 
Furthermore, we interacted the regional share of immigrants with media salience 
and found that those individuals living in regions with higher numbers of foreigners 
are less susceptible to the concerns inducing effect of the media. This shows that 
the implications of immigration on attitudes towards immigration are not in the 
direction that a local conflict account would suggest.  
For scholars concerned with societal integration, our results also show that the 
discourse surrounding immigration can deeply divide the population. The 
association between media salience and individual concerns is moderated by a 
number of individual and context level characteristics. For example, we found a 
large discrepancy in the reception of media salience between voters of the Green 
Party and the more Conservative CDU where the latter are substantially more 
affected by media salience. This stresses the fact that immigration and its 
surrounding discourses might not only create divisions between immigrants and 
natives, but also between groups within the majority population. One might argue 
that these within majority processes are even more important for societal 
integration, given that the ethnic majority is still central to the political processes 
within nation states (Wimmer 2013: 135). As recent experiences show, divides 
triggered by immigration discourses within the majority population of EU countries 
along the lines of immigration related issues are strong and politicized.  
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Such threat perceptions might influence how individuals behave when they 
encounter certain minority groups in their local social environment (Hopkins 2010, 
2011), which links this study to the next two studies. This effect of macro-level 
media coverage on local behavior can happen through two channels. First, reporting 
on migration related issues activates already existing stereotypes and more stable 
attitudes in individual minds towards certain ethnic groups or the group of 
immigrants in general. This is also in line with our finding that the media salience-
concerns association is strongly moderated by political party preferences, which 
indicates that media salience increases worries in those who already have certain 
political attitudes. Once these stereotypes are activated, behavior towards ethnic 
minorities might be adapted accordingly. Second, in case of repeated and durable 
exposure to certain media framings of certain topics, the media can create threat 
perceptions of their own and thus impact rather stable attitudes in the long run. 
Our study shows that immigration is a re-occurring theme and other studies showed 
that certain frames are often used repeatedly to describe immigration related topics 
(Bauder 2008). In the long run repeated media exposure to similar framings of 
immigration might create stereotypes and certain behavioral reactions towards out-
groups (Esses, Medianu, and Lawson 2013). That is, the mass media can create and 
make salient ethnic boundaries, as indicated by the left part of figure I.1. 
 
I.3.2 Study II: Parental White Flight?  
In study II, I analyze a phenomenon that is widely known in the U.S. American 
literature and general debates on ethnic segregation. “White Flight” describes 
mobility flows of White majority individuals out of neighborhoods which are 
undergoing ethno-demographic changes. In particular, I focus on one plausible 
mechanism for White Flight, which did not receive much scholarly attention yet: 
having children (e.g. Skifter Andersen 2017: 298f).  
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In contrast to study I, study II zooms in on the neighborhood level and analyzes 
selection processes out of neighborhoods. Such selection processes are of utmost 
importance for our understanding of neighborhood diversity effects. In this case, 
the out-mobility of households with children might present an important 
explanation for lower social cohesion in diverse neighborhoods because children 
have been found to be important for neighborhood networks which prevent 
households from leaving the neighborhood (Dawkins 2006) and intergroup contact 
(Schaeffer 2013b). 
Previous studies indirectly lend evidence to the “Parental White Flight” proposition 
by investigating the relationship between ethnic diversity and children in an area 
(Drever 2008; Iceland et al. 2010), but the effect of having children on moving out 
within household panels has, to my knowledge, only been studied by Goyette and 
colleagues (2014). This is where this study steps in. Methodologically, I employ a 
panel fixed-effects design which controls for all time-invariant stable characteristics 
of households and the neighborhood.  
I find substantive increases in the probability to leave a neighborhood when having 
children with higher share of ethnic minorities for German native households. What 
makes these results even more intriguing is that I do not find this effect for 
households in which members have migration background, which gives evidence for 
a Parental White Flight pattern of mobility. In addition, native households that 
leave ethnically diverse neighborhoods are likely to settle in less diverse areas which 
points towards tendencies of ethnic segregation. 
These results can be related to social cohesion in the neighborhood and ethnic 
residential segregation. Parental White Flight could prevent the development of 
neighborhood level cohesiveness through increased turnover and the resulting 
lowered stability stable of neighborhood networks. Furthermore, a reduction in the 
number of children in diverse areas could diminish neighborhood contact between 
ethnic groups (Schaeffer 2013b).  
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Focusing on changes in the living conditions of majority households is of crucial 
importance when studying mobility behavior that is related to neighborhood 
diversity. The reason is that if we take a dynamic perspective on neighborhood 
choice, it becomes apparent that these households mostly choose to live in or did 
not move out of these neighborhoods before. That is, it is difficult to explain out-
mobility merely based on ethnic preferences and changes of contextual diversity, 
particularly over short time periods. Instead of analyzing an effect of diversity per 
se, I thus ask what the more dynamic factors behind White Flight are. Children 
are one such dynamic factor because they change either preferences for neighbors 
of certain ethnicity or the needs for certain neighborhood amenities abruptly.  
The avoidance of other ethnic groups by moving out of a neighborhood might to 
some degree be the result of ethnic stereotypes or ethnic preferences. This links this 
study to the previous one which investigates how macro-contextual characteristics 
shape individuals opinions and salience. However, it should be kept in mind that 
moving decisions are the results of a mix of opportunities, restrictions and (ethnic) 
preferences that households face when they make moving decisions. I will discuss 
factors which affect the probability to move when having children in more detail in 
the theory section and conclusion of study II. 
Study II is relevant for the general literature on neighborhood diversity effects on 
local social cohesion, because it explicitly investigates selection processes out of 
diverse neighborhoods. Figure I.1 depicts this by placing study II before study III. 
Often, assumptions about the kind of selection processes are made (Dawkins 2008; 
Putnam 2007), but they are rarely studied in detail (one exception is Kaufmann 
and Harris [2015]). My results clearly show that in studies that investigate the 
association between diversity and any variable that might be affected by children 
out-mobility must be carefully modelled (as in study III). 
The results of study II can thus also be related to societal integration through 
ethnic segregation. The political importance of residential segregation rests on the 
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assumption that proximity fosters familiarization and contact between groups 
which are essential for ethnically diverse societies. For example, proximity is an 
important pre-condition for intergroup contact which reduces negative sentiments 
towards the out-group (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008; Pettigrew et al. 2010). 
 
I.3.3 Study III: Neighborhood Ethnic Composition and Individual 
Neighborhood Embeddedness 
Study III touches a core element of social cohesion: individual social connections 
(Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). I analyze how households that recently moved 
into a new neighborhood develop contacts with their neighbors and perceive the 
density of neighborhood networks over time dependent on the ethnic diversity of 
the neighborhood.  
Extending prior research, I add a dynamic element to the analysis: the length of 
residence in a neighborhood. Previous studies on the association between ethnic 
diversity and local social cohesion are mostly cross-sectional. However, an 
investigation of the development of neighborhood embeddedness over time is 
prompted by two observations. First, the probability to leave diverse neighborhoods 
is usually higher than moving away from less diverse neighborhoods (see for 
example the descriptive statistics in study II) and initiating ties with ethnic others 
requires more time than building up ties with co-ethnics because ethnic boundaries 
need to be crossed (Windzio 2018). Research that does not differentiate individuals 
by their length of stay, for example by failing to include an interaction between 
length of residence and diversity, might thus overestimate the effect of 
neighborhood diversity. This is because the sample in diverse areas consists of many 
individuals who only stayed a short period and did not have time to build up 
neighborhood ties.  
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Second, in order to take into account selection bias due to out-mobility, we require 
data about the probability to move out of the neighborhood from the very beginning 
of the time of residence. This allows us to adjust for residential histories, dependent 
on the most important variables that drive both local embeddedness and out-
mobility. This is where I make my main methodological contribution: I propose a 
method for dealing with selection bias due to dynamic out-mobility that is affected 
by past ethnic diversity and neighborhood contacts and time-varying covariates, 
based on the logic of inverse probability of censoring weighting (Robins, Hernán, 
and Brumback 2000). Here I build cumulatively on knowledge gained from study 
II to inform my selection models in study III, which include children as an important 
predictor.  
I find that in both diverse and non-diverse areas, embeddedness increases after 
staying five years in both diverse and non-diverse areas. However, the probability 
to perceive the neighborhoods as having close-knit relations among neighbors stays 
at a relatively low level in diverse areas even after five years of residence. This 
suggests that households are able to build up individual local ties in diverse areas, 
but also that these attempts are not sufficient to perceive the neighborhood as a 
dense community. 
These trajectories of embeddedness give us interesting insights about the 
mechanisms that underlie the local diversity-social cohesion association. The local 
conflict and anomie account would not suggest that social embeddedness rises in 
diverse neighborhoods over time to similar levels as in less diverse neighborhoods. 
This is because if households moved into ethnically diverse neighborhoods, they 
would be confronted with either a conflict ridden environment or neighborhoods 
characterized by anomie. Both would lead them to have lower social embeddedness 
than in homogeneous areas, even after five years of stay. Thus, for the cohort of 
recent in-movers that make up the sample of this study, I find that these 
mechanisms are not at work.  
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I.4 Conclusion, Open Questions and Suggestions for a 
Dynamic Research Agenda 
Conclusion. From this rather diverse set of studies, three conclusions might be 
drawn about different theoretical approaches to ethnic diversity effects on social 
cohesion.  
A first conclusion pertains to perceptions of group threat as a theoretical 
mechanisms for the effects of ethnic composition in different contextual units. 
Taken together, my findings are in contrast to several aspects of the local group 
conflict account. Study III shows that there is no decline or stagnation of individual 
embeddedness in ethnically diverse neighborhoods over time for households that 
recently moved into diverse neighborhoods. Furthermore, concerns about 
immigration fluctuate much more over time than we would expect given mere local 
demographics or larger migration in-flows, and individuals in diverse regions are 
less likely of being concerned about immigration when media salience is high (study 
I). Study II in itself is less informative of whether group threat or other mechanisms 
are active in ethnically diverse areas. However, it should be noted that if we assume 
that perceptions of threat can explain why parents leave ethnically diverse 
neighborhoods, study II also suggests that these perceptions are triggered by the 
life-course event of having children. Whether this is likely depends on the stability 
of threat perceptions and how much they depend on prior attitudes towards ethnic 
diversity. If we assume that attitudes are rather stable characteristics, other 
explanations such as the search for appropriate neighborhood amenities for one’s 
children become a more likely explanation than perceptions of group-threat. 
This conclusion is in line with other research on the association between local ethnic 
diversity and local social cohesion (e.g. Laurence, Schmid, and Hewstone 2018: 4f; 
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van der Meer and Tolsma 2014: 464). Laurence et al. (2018) argue that group threat 
should be seen as a moderator of the diversity-local cohesion association rather than 
as a mediator. This suggests that group threat does not directly follow from 
exposure to diversity, but rather from other sources in society (Laurence et al. 2018: 
5), as also suggested in section I.2.2. Furthermore, Oliver (2010) shows that there 
is lower community engagement of White U.S. Americans in neighborhoods with 
large out-group shares, but also that this share is negatively associated with 
prejudice. This speaks for other reasons than group conflict for lower cohesion on 
the neighborhood level, even in the context of marked ethnic categories as in the 
U.S.  
However, it is important to recognize the conditionality of threat reactions to local 
diversity (Legewie and Schaeffer 2016; Stolle et al. 2013). For example, even though 
the cohort of diversity dwellers that I analyzed in study III are able to build up ties 
in diverse areas, there might also be established native inhabitants that experience 
threat through rising ethnic diversity because they fear to “lose their neighborhood” 
(Hanhörster 2000).  
My second conclusion pertains to the scope and level of research questions on how 
immigration relates to social cohesion. Within the fields that work on these queston, 
scholars should not only consider the effects of local diversity, but also take into 
consideration that the majority population builds up perceptions of immigration 
through other macro-level channels. These can be disintegrative as they strongly 
divide the majority population, as study I shows.  
From a philosophy of science perspective, this is important because stylized facts 
like “local diversity is associated with low local cohesion” and “a higher share of 
out-group members in the area increases threat” are not only positive claims, they 
also emphasize what is worth studying and are thus normative (Hirschman 2017). 
The substantial associations in study I show that macro-contextual determinants 
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of threat beyond demographic shifts and local ethnic environments deserve more 
scrutiny. 
Third, studies II and III are in line with the idea that local diversity is associated 
with reactions on part of the native majority that might described as “indifference” 
towards the neighborhood as a whole. Study II shows that parents are ready to 
leave ethnically diverse areas once they have children. Study III shows that 
ethnically diverse areas are unlikely to develop a close-knit community, even though 
individual households form contacts similar to households in homogenous 
neighborhoods. These results might not be due to prejudice or stereotypes, but 
rather to a general unwillingness to engage in neighborhood affairs and networks in 
diverse neighborhoods (see also Blokland and van Eijk [2010]). This phenomenon 
deserves more attention in future research. 
 
Open questions and further research. From the dynamic perspective taken in 
this thesis, a number of critical issues become apparent for the broader research on 
the effects of local ethnic diversity.  
First of all, we should consider the history of neighborhoods more prominently to 
arrive at predictions for the long term stayers in neighborhoods. Often no 
quantitative data is available for long historical periods. However, Agent Based 
Models (Squazzoni 2010) could help to study how different initial conditions and 
assumptions about the behavior of individuals (such as those I laid out in I.2) could 
explain the current state of a neighborhood in terms of neighborhood fluctuation 
(Schelling 1971) or networks. Ideally, such simulation studies would be informed 
by historical data on the establishment and build environment of neighborhoods 
and the relevant in- and out-mobility of certain inhabitant groups in certain 
periods. 
36 
 
The latter issue is connected to striving for an exact definition of the causal effect 
of diversity by clearly defining the “treatment” (Hernán 2005; Hernán and 
Taubman 2008; Holland 1986). This may sound like a methodological issue, but the 
precision of the causal questions we ask refers to the very heart of science (Hernán 
2005). One problem is that there are many ways to hypothetically “intervene” on 
the variable ethnic diversity, and the mechanism for intervention, not diversity 
itself, might change the outcomes. I want to stress two basic hypothetical 
interventions that also play a role in this thesis: One could either randomly put 
individuals into neighborhoods of different diversity or one could change the ethnic 
composition around them while they stay put (see also Oakes et al. 2015). Even if 
both mechanisms would set diversity randomly to the same level, they would 
probably yield different results. This is obvious when the outcome was 
neighborhood networks: if people stay put, individuals already might have a 
network in the neighborhood, if they move they have to build neighborhood ties 
from scratch. The issue with this example is that neighborhood networks look 
different depending on the assignment process, not through the value of diversity 
itself, and thus the causal effect of ethnic diversity is ill-defined (Hernán and 
Taubman 2008). Taking a dynamic perspective as in this thesis might be a way to 
arrive at more precise questions about the causal role of ethnic diversity (see also 
Laurence and Bentley 2016). However, taking such a view also shows how complex 
the interplay between neighborhood composition and neighborhood effects is. In the 
end we require models that incorporate both mobility flows of individuals (to model 
the composition of neighborhoods), as well as the cumulative effects of individual 
interactions within the neighborhood (to model the context effect) to grasp how 
neighborhood diversity affect individuals (e.g. Oakes et al. 2015).  
Finally, much sociological work needs to be done on how local interactions and 
attachment to small scale units like the neighborhood translate into macro-level 
cohesion. Note that when scholars like Putnam (2007) make claims about societal 
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integration, they assume either that local experiences with diversity translate to 
the macro context, or extrapolate their findings into the future when migration 
related diversity increases. Considering the state of theory building and empirical 
possibilities that are prevalent in sociology at the time being, it might be preferable 
to pursue studies on small units of analysis like the neighborhood before turning to 
the societal level. Neighborhoods might be suited to study norm development in 
diverse settings without strong institutional influence. However, given pleas to 
center sociological research around the macro-level emerging properties that are 
created by individual interactions (e.g. recently, Mäs 2018), future work should 
consider how interactions in small scale units affect societal integration (Lawler, 
Thye, and Yoon 2015). 
The latter issue connects to a debate within the diversity-cohesion literature in 
sociology and political sciences. Some researchers argue that societal integration in 
modern societies does not require strong dense and local networks and trust 
relationships (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015; Portes and Vickstrom 2011). From a 
Durkheimian perspective, it is claimed that arguments such as put forward by 
Putnam miss the great picture by focusing on local networks and attachment that 
are neither required nor functional in modern societies. The main line of this 
argument is vividly expressed by Abscal and Baldassarri (2015: 758), who note that 
“given the complexity of modern societies, we would do well to move beyond a 
bucolic communitarian conceptualization of social capital that relies on mechanisms 
of mechanical solidarity rooted in similarity and homogeneity”. Three years later, 
with the rise of far right parties all over Europe and Donald Trump in the U.S., 
both fueled by the topic of immigration, such a view seems too optimistic. 
Apparently, modern societies are far from stable, despite their growing division of 
labor from which “organic solidarity”, the counterpart of mechanical solidarity, 
originates (Durkheim 1972).  
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The question that this debate raises is in how far societies and their integration 
hinge upon individual integration into small level social structures. If we accept the 
notion that positive interactions in small contexts lead to stability of relations and 
positive emotions towards the greater unit (Lawler et al. 2015), we are well advised 
to pay attention to the cohesion in those units. Neighborhoods have the potential 
to bring together groups of different social background, which is a great potential 
in comparison to other foci of social life like the family or the job, where homophily 
is likely to be higher. Much of this potential seems still unused. 
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II. Study I: Mass Media and Concerns about 
Immigration in Germany in the 21st Century: 
Individual-Level Evidence over 15 Years4,5 
With Christian S. Czymara (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) 
Published in the European Sociological Review, issue 34, volume 4: pages 381-401.  
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcy019, reproduced by permission of 
Oxford University Press 
The online appendix is also attached at the end of this chapter (section II.10), 
because it provides important additional analyses. 
 
II.1 Abstract 
Mass media has long been discussed as an essential determinant of the threat 
perceptions leading to anti-immigration attitudes. The field of empirical research 
on such media effects is still comparatively young, however, and lacks studies 
examining precise measures of the media environment an individual is likely to be 
actually exposed to. We employ a nuanced research design which analyses 
individual differences in the yearly levels of both media salience and attitudes in 
panel data of 25,000 persons, who were at least interviewed twice, and a time span 
over 15years, from 2001 to 2015. We find a substantive and stable positive effect: 
comparing periods of vivid discussions with times where the issue was hardly 
discussed in the German media results in an increase in the predicted probability 
of being very concerned by about 13 percentage points. Deeper investigations reveal 
that the media effect is most potent for individuals living in areas with lower share 
of ethnic minorities and for those with lower education or conservative ideology, 
stressing the importance of individual receptiveness. In sum, our findings strengthen 
the line of reasoning stressing the importance of discursive influences on public 
                                      
4 This chapter has been co-authored with Christian S. Czymara. Please refer to the chapter 
“Declarations” at the end for a list of the contributions of the single authors to this work. 
5 Acknowledgments: The authors thank Marijn van Klingeren, Merlin Schaeffer, and Moshe 
Semyonov, the PhD supervisors (in alphabetical order): Hans-Jürgen Andreß, Eldad Davidov, Céline 
Teney, and Michael Windzio, as well as the anonymous reviewers, and colleagues for useful 
suggestions and feedback, and Lewis Taylor for proofreading. All remaining errors are, of course, 
the authors’. Moreover, the authors express their thanks to their graduate schools, the BIGSSS, and 
the CGS for their support. 
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opinion and cast doubt on the argument that threat perceptions stem primarily 
from the size of ethnic out-groups. 
 
II.2 Introduction 
Immigration is a re-occurring, hotly debated topic in most European countries. The 
past 2 years are examples with lively debates on rising numbers of migrants and 
refugees, immigrant integration, and terror attacks, accompanied by various, large-
scale anti-immigration protests. We investigate the fluctuations of media reporting 
on immigration and its impact on individual concerns about this issue on the 
example of Germany, investigating very extensive and rich data. We combine about 
26,000 news articles from four major German newspapers and news magazines with 
panel data of 25,773 unique individuals in total and a time span of 15 years. Because 
we rely on yearly measures over a long time span, our period of investigation covers 
individual attitudinal reactions to various and diverse discursive triggers, enabling 
us to make more generalizable inferences about the relationship between media 
reporting and public opinion. 
In search for contextual explanations of immigration attitudes, many sociological 
studies in the tradition of the group threat-paradigm (Quillian 1995) explain 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities and immigration with objective demographics 
like the share of immigrants in a country, arguing that the presence of a sizeable 
ethnic minority leads to competition for different resources which, in turn, leads to 
negative sentiments towards this out-group (for an overview, see Ceobsanu and 
Escandell 2010). However, this reasoning has been challenged by scholars who found 
that threat perceptions are only loosely connected to objective immigration rates 
(Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes 2017; Semyonov et al. 2004; Sides and Citrin 2007). 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that objective demographics often fail to 
be reliable predictors of migration-related attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014: 
231). 
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Therefore, it is important to empirically assess other contextual explanations for 
the fluctuation of threat perceptions, and ultimately of anti-immigration attitudes 
(Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 318). A potent explanation is concerned with the 
coverage of immigration-related issues in mass media (e.g. Allport [1954] 1979: 
200ff; Blumer 1958). In the lion’s share of social science literature on the formation 
of attitudes towards immigrants, however, the importance of mass media is often 
simply assumed. But with the increasing availability of large-scale quantitative 
media and survey data, the role of mass media has increasingly come into focus of 
empirical research in recent years (e.g. Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; van 
Klingeren et al. 2015; Schlueter and Davidov 2013).  
We contribute to this growing field by employing a design which offers a very fine-
grained view on the relationship between mass media and individual attitudes. To 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate how the same ethnic 
majority individuals change their opinion when going through periods of differing 
levels of media attention on the immigration issue (media salience), fluctuating on 
a daily level. In contrast to previous research, our design also accounts for individual 
unobserved heterogeneity which might bias the relationship between media 
presence of immigration related news and concerns about immigration. 
Subsequently, we also investigate under which conditions effects of frequent media 
reporting are particularly potent. We distinguish two sets of moderators: (i) 
contextual aspects, stressing the importance of the local opportunity structure for 
first-hand experiences (Voci and Hewstone 2003) and (ii) personal characteristics, 
identifying who is more prone to media effects (cf. Ward and Masgoret 2006). 
Germany is a very interesting case to study because it has been among the most 
popular destination countries in Europe since the turn of the millennium6 and, 
                                      
6 According to the International migrant stock 2015 database of the UN as well as the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Statistics, both retrieved 6 January 2018. 
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accordingly, has an increasingly diverse ethnic composition.7 The media attention 
on immigration and integration, on the other hand, has fluctuated considerably 
(Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). This is related to certain events such as the 
reform of the German immigration policy in 2005 (Bauder 2008), several Islamist 
terrorist attacks in Europe (Legewie 2013), and the emergence of the anti-
immigration PEGIDA protests in 2014. Moreover, Germany has been the most 
important country of destination for refugees in Europe in the course of the so-
called immigration crisis (Connor 2016). Violent acts performed by individuals 
reported as refugees (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017) as well as performed 
against refugees (Jäckle and König 2017) both lead to significant levels of media 
attention and started extensive national debates. Mass media will hence continue 
to play an important role in the formation of public opinion on immigration in the 
in the foreseeable future. 
 
II.3 Mass Media as a Source of Perceived Threat: Theory 
and Previous Research 
International migration, immigrant integration, and their social consequences are 
complex, multifaceted phenomena, hardly assessable by single individuals. This 
gives mass media considerable leeway in shaping individual opinion because they 
are one of the main sources providing information exceeding personal experiences 
(Blumer 1958; McLaren, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart 2017). Moreover, the 
media can potentially transform the uncertainty surrounding immigration related 
issues into threatening stereotypes (Esses et al. 2013).8 Even without directly 
                                      
7 https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/28347/umfrage/zuwanderung-nach-deutschland/ 
(retrieved 16 August 2017). 
8 Mass media may affect the political public negatively through primarily focusing on negative news 
(Robinson 1976). However, whether Western media indeed reported immigration-related news more 
often in a negative tone (ter Wal, D’Haenens, and Koeman 2005) or in a rather balanced one (Lawlor 
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evoking negative stereotypes, increasing the visibility of immigration topics in 
public discourse heightens the attention given to such topics and makes information 
related to migration accessible in people’s minds. Issue salience hence sets the terms 
by which the topic is evaluated, a process called priming in communication sciences 
(Iyengar and Kinder 2010: 63ff) (also see Zaller 1992). Similarly, the agenda-setting 
approach argues that issue salience transfers “from the mass media’s pictures of the 
world to those in our heads” (McCombs and Ghanem 2001: 67). In other words, 
what is prominent and important in the media becomes prominent in the audience. 
This can be reinforced further when different media outlets decide to copy what is 
newsworthy and what is not, also referred to as intermedia agenda-setting 
(McCombs and Ghanem 2001). Both priming and agenda setting should lead to an 
increased awareness of the immigration topic for natives, which can raise anti-
migration sentiments or feelings of anxiety in the individual. 
Moreover, effects of media reports are not limited to direct consumers. Rather, mass 
media shape the information environment and the public discourses at large. The 
information reported in certain outlets is not only picked up by other outlets but 
also disseminates within the public through indirect channels such as interpersonal 
communication (Schmitt-Beck 2003) (also see Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009; 
van Klingeren et al. 2015; Schlueter and Davidov 2013). 
Previous research on various West and Central European countries found mixed 
evidence regarding the relationship between mass media, actual demographic and 
economic conditions, and different aspects of (anti)immigration attitudes. Schlueter 
and Davidov (2013) show that negative news about immigration correlated with 
more negative attitudes in Spain, and that this relationship was especially strong 
in contexts with low shares of migrants. In contrast, the comparison of The 
Netherlands and Denmark conducted by van Klingeren et al. (2015) suggests that 
                                      
2015) is far from clear. Since our study covers a large time span, it is very likely to include very 
different debates, topics, and sentiments. 
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different toning of news seemed to have mattered only regarding positive news and 
only in The Netherlands. Once the effect of immigrant inflow is statistically 
controlled, however, mere issue salience was associated with more negative attitudes 
in The Netherlands, which have a relatively long history of immigration, while the 
same relationship was somewhat smaller in Denmark, where immigration became 
relevant not until the late 1990s (van Klingeren et al. 2015). Similarly, media 
salience correlated with the vote intention for anti-immigrant parties in The 
Netherlands (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2007). On the other hand, 
Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2009) find that salience itself was not connected 
to citizens’ concerns in Germany, but that the framing of immigrant actors in news 
reports mattered. This is in line with the results of Schemer (2012), who finds an 
increasing effect of negative news portrayals of immigrants on stereotypic attitudes 
based on a two-wave panel study before and after a political campaign about 
immigration in Switzerland. 
In sum, prior research suggests that the role of mass media remains rather 
ambivalent and context dependent. However, comparing results is somewhat 
complicated due to differing methodology, which is not only related to particular 
benefits but also to different drawbacks: studies either measured subjective media 
consumption habits without taking into account the actual content of mass media 
(e.g. Vergeer, Lubbers, and Scheepers 2000), covered only short periods of time 
(Schemer 2012), remained purely on the aggregate macro-level (Boomgaarden and 
Vliegenthart 2007, 2009; McLaren et al. 2017), or in experimental contexts (e.g. 
van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, and de Vreese 2017). Some recent studies tackled 
these issues by combining data on media coverage with cross-sectional individual-
level data from surveys pooled over several years (Hopkins 2010; van Klingeren et 
al. 2015; Schlueter and Davidov 2013). This is an important step towards ensuring 
external validity of media effects outside artificial or short-term contexts. These 
studies, however, observed different individuals in different survey waves and 
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modelled media characteristics as varying only between but not within waves. In 
contrast, we investigate the same individuals each year and employ a fine-grained, 
day-specific measure of media salience. We thus aim to advance the state of research 
on mass media effects on individual perceptions and attitudes by employing a more 
nuanced design than previous studies with similar scope (also see below). 
Subsequently, we test the conditionality of the effect of media salience. It seems 
reasonable that the influence of media is more powerful under certain circumstances 
and that not everyone is equally affected by the media. 
First, media information can fall on more fruitful ground if natives have less 
opportunity to collect information on immigrants based on own first-hand 
experience. This is the case for individuals living in areas where regular exposure 
or interpersonal contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) with ethnic minorities is 
unlikely. In the case of Germany, districts have been shown to be potent contexts 
in which individuals are likely to act regularly (e.g. Wagner et al. 2006). A high 
share of migrants in these contexts is likely to lead to inter-ethnic exposure during 
daily routines like work, shopping, and leisure time (Weber 2015). Studies have 
shown that a high share of migrants in these contexts is associated with less 
exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants (Pettigrew et al. 2010; Wagner et al. 
2006). We hence expect that the media salience effect is weaker for respondents 
living in districts where ethnic minorities are relatively prominent, since there are 
more opportunities for first-hand information (Schlueter and Davidov 2013) (also 
see Zucker 1978).9 
Second, the impact of media reports also depends on individual receptiveness and 
political sophistication (cf. Zaller 1992). We test if the media salience effect differs 
                                      
9 Based on US data, Hopkins (2010) argues that media salience is more potent under strong changes 
of the ethnic environment. However, given that the ethnic composition of districts in Germany is 
rather stable during our period of investigation, this mechanism should be less important in our 
case. 
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across individual party preference and education. Both characteristics have 
repeatedly shown to be strong predictors of immigration attitudes (for party 
preference in the German case, see, e.g., Blinder, Ford, and Ivarsflaten  [2013]; for 
education see, e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox [2007]). Party affiliation is directly 
connected to liberal and conservative ideology on which grounds information is 
processed. Voters are more open for information that is in line with their existing 
beliefs because they aim to uphold their long term values (Bechtel et al. 2015). 
Education correlates with political knowledge which, in turn, determines how open 
individuals are towards political information (Schemer 2012; Zaller 1992). This is 
because those who are less informed are likely to have less stable attitudes, are less 
likely to have been exposed to similar political messages before, and have less 
informational resources to counter arguments (Bechtel et al. 2015: 687). These 
individuals should hence be more prone to effects of media reporting. 
II.4 Hypotheses 
We expect that higher levels of media attention on immigration issues (media 
salience) increase the accessibility of related information in people’s minds and 
consequently raises individual concerns about these issues (Iyengar and Kinder 
2010; Zaller 1992): 
Hypothesis 1: High visibility of immigration issues in the media triggers individual 
concerns. (Salience Hypothesis) 
We furthermore expect that individuals in ethnically more diverse contexts perceive 
news about immigration as less threatening due to regular exposure to ethnic 
outgroups (Schlueter and Davidov 2013): 
Hypothesis 2: The negative effect of media salience as postulated in Hypothesis 1 
is stronger (weaker) for individuals who live in districts with a lower (higher) share 
of foreigners. (Information Substitution Hypothesis) 
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We furthermore hypothesize that the effect of media salience depends on personal 
characteristics. First, preferences of certain parties signal a more liberal or a more 
conservative ideological disposition, affecting the receptiveness to certain political 
information. Because of their political predisposition, natives who prefer more 
liberal parties should be less receptive to negative discursive triggers than those 
who prefer more conservative parties. In the German parliament, the Green and, 
arguably, the Left Party are more liberal, the Social Democrats are centre-liberal, 
and the Free Democrats as well as the Christian Democrats are centre-conservative. 
Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of media salience postulated in Hypothesis 1 is 
weaker (stronger) for natives who identify with more liberal (conservative) parties. 
(Party-Hypothesis) 
Finally, we hypothesize that natives with higher education are less vulnerable to 
media effects. This is because we assume that natives with higher education not 
only exhibit a more differentiated worldview in general (cf. Hainmueller and Hiscox 
2007) but that they are also more likely to take the ambivalence and complexity of 
most political information into account. Assuming that education is a proxy for 
political knowledge, it furthermore determines motivation and ability to evaluate 
political information against previously stored information (Bechtel et al. 2015; 
Schemer 2012; Zaller 1992). 
Hypothesis 4: The negative effect of media salience postulated in hypothesis 1 is 
weaker (stronger) for natives with higher (lower) education. (Education 
Hypothesis) 
 
II.5 Data 
We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), an annual, household-based 
long-term panel study (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007) for yearly information on 
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individual characteristics from 2001 to 2015. To focus on the ethnic majority, we 
drop respondents with migration background. 
II.5.1  Dependent Variable: Concerns about Immigration 
Respondents are asked to rate how much they are concerned about certain topics 
in each year, including immigration to Germany on a three-point scale. We use a 
dichotomized version for our main analyses (0: “not concerned” or “somewhat 
concerned”, 1: “very concerned”; for similar procedure see, e.g., Lancee and Pardos-
Prado 2013; Lancee and Schaeffer 2015) and the ordinal variable for robustness 
checks. This item is likely to capture a combination of two things: a negative 
evaluation of immigration and individual salience of immigration issue. According 
to Wlezien (2005), concern measures capture the importance of issues as well as 
whether these issues are perceived as problematic (also see Lancee and Pardos-
Prado 2013: 116; Lancee and Schaeffer 2015: 43f; Pardos-Prado, Lancee, and 
Sagarzazu 2014: 855).  
Hence, our dependent variable measures whether respondents express an opinion 
that is both negative and salient. Since our main explanatory variable is capturing 
macro-level issue salience, the relationship between our treatment and our outcome 
can theoretically be decomposed into the associations between, first, salience in the 
media and salience for (direct or indirect) consumers and, second, into the effect of 
media salience on negative opinions. While the latter, in our view, is especially 
interesting, the GSOEP unfortunately does not offer the possibility to disentangle 
both concepts empirically. However, the outcome is related to well-established 
predictors of negative attitudes towards immigration (see Online Appendix II.O1). 
Independent of the conceptual shortcoming, we understand threat perceptions to 
be the theoretical mechanism relating media salience and individual concerns, 
analogous to Lancee and Pardos-Prado (2013).  
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II.5.2  Media Salience of Immigration-related Issues  
We combine the GSOEP with data from a quantitative content analysis of German 
newspapers and news magazines to measure the presence of issues related to 
immigration at a given day. To this end, we use digital full texts of the two weekly 
news magazines with the highest circulation in Germany: Der Spiegel and Stern, as 
well as one of the most highly circulated daily, non-tabloid national newspapers: 
the conservative Die Welt and the left taz.die tageszeitung. In combination, these 
outlets reach a large audience and have a balanced ideological position, likely to 
capture the broader national information environment. The full texts were provided 
by Nexis.10 
We scanned the content of all newspaper articles in our period of investigation with 
a search string based on a keyword list of immigration-related terms based on 
reoccurring content from random newspaper articles and previous literature (e.g. 
van Klingeren et al. 2015; Schlueter and Davidov 2013). This search string identifies 
articles which simultaneously include (i) at least one of several terms directly 
referring to immigration, (ii) the term “Germany” or synonyms, and (iii) at least 
one of several terms more broadly connected to immigration.11 We manually 
checked the validity of the sample by investigating the content of randomly chosen 
articles. We deleted duplicates, letters from readers, table of contents, and short 
news. 
                                      
10 https://www.nexis.com/ 
11 The search string reads as follows (! are wildcards): (!wander! OR !migration! OR !migrant! OR 
!flücht! OR !flucht! OR !ausländer! OR !asyl!) AND (deutschland OR bundesrepublik OR brd) AND 
(!integration! OR !abschieb! OR abgeschob! OR !einbürgerung! OR aufenthaltsgenehm! OR 
ausländerkriminalität OR (!kriminalität! w/5 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) 
OR (!kriminell! w/5 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR !fachkr! OR (!qualifi! 
w/3 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR (arbeit! w/3 (!wander! OR !migration! 
OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR (!erwerbs! w/3 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR 
!ausländer!)) OR (!beruf! w/3 (!wander! OR !migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR ((!terror! 
OR !anschlag!) w/5 !islam!) OR zwangshochzeit OR zwangsheiratOR !parallelgesellschaft! OR 
!kopftuch! OR ehrenmord OR hasspredigerOR !burka! OR (!islam! OR !muslim! w/5 (!wander! OR 
!migrant! OR !flücht! OR !ausländer!)) OR mohammedkarikatur OR (mohammed w/3 karikatur!)). 
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For our final media salience measure, we ran an exploratory factor analysis with 
four count variables indicating the number of articles in each of the four outlets in 
the past 21 days12 with the single days as units of analysis and extracted the factor 
values. These values measure media salience on specific days, higher values implying 
higher media salience. The factor has an eigenvalue of 1.98. The factor loadings and 
uniqueness values (in brackets) of the media outlets are Die Welt: 0.78 (0.39), taz. 
die tageszeitung: 0.73 (0.46), Der Spiegel: 0.68 (0.54), Stern: 0.61 (0.62). 
Our period of investigation covers a heterogeneous set of debates. This means that 
our approach aims at showing the universal effect of salience rather than a 
particularistic effect of certain topics or tones. On the one hand, we do not want to 
conceal that this partly relates to the complexities associated with building a 
detailed, topic related measure of media over a long time. But on the other hand, 
we are convinced that investigating a universal effect of mere presence of issues is 
highly interesting itself because it tells something about the power of media 
independent of certain idiosyncratic debates. Finding a general effect of media 
salience on individual concerns is actually more striking than finding an effect of 
negative news only. At worst, we underestimate the maximum effect of mass media 
on public opinion. 
II.5.3  Contextual Variables 
In the models interacting media salience and the local ethnic composition 
(Hypothesis 2), we also include several local context variables on the district level 
(Kreise, NUTS 3 level) provided by the German Federal Institute for Building, 
                                      
12 While the time span of 21 days is somewhat arbitrary, it ensures that the topic was salient for 
long enough to be a discussed topic but short enough to be remembered at the time the interview 
took place. Generally, the results hold for different specifications of the chosen time span (see 
robustness checks). 
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Urban Affairs and Spatial Research.13 Most importantly, we include the share of 
individuals without German citizenship in a respondent’s district to test whether 
the effect of media salience varies with ethnic exposure. With 402 different districts, 
this is a fine grained yet efficacious measure of ethnic exposure (Wagner et al. 2006; 
Weber 2015). To control for economic conditions, we also add local unemployment 
rate, number of training positions, number of students, average household income, 
and population density to the models (all measured on the district level). 
We also include monthly immigration inflow to account for possible demographic 
developments that could confound the relationship under study.14 
II.5.4  Individual-Level Variables 
We include individual time-varying controls to adjust for confounding influences 
which are correlated with immigration concerns and possibly also influenced by 
macro level developments. For example, individual economic worries partly capture 
periods of economic deprivation taking place at a certain time in Germany. These 
variables encompass general interest in politics, age, employment status, 
satisfaction with own household income, concerns about the own economic 
situation, and concerns about the general economic situation in Germany. Table 
II.A1 contains descriptive statistics and the coding for all variables included in our 
models. 
II.6 Research Design and Statistical Models 
To capture individual exposure to media salience as precise as possible, we merge 
the public media salience measure with the GSOEP data based on the day each 
                                      
13 Source: http://inkar.de/. Values for 2015 were forwarded from 2014. We also run models with a 
time-stable share of foreigners to rule out that artificial fluctuations affect our results (e.g. through 
changes in measurement in certain districts). 
14 Data on monthly migration inflows from 2006 to 2015 stems from the German Statistical Office 
through email contact. We imputed monthly inflows from before 2006 by dividing the available 
yearly inflow by 12 for each year. 
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interview took place. Figure II.1 illustrates our design based on two hypothetical 
respondents being interviewed in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2012. The black dots 
represent the interview date and the two areas illustrate that we aggregate the 
numbers of articles from the four newspaper outlets 21 days before the interview 
for respondent 1 and respondent 2, respectively, in each year.  
This operationalization increases the likelihood that an individual has been exposed 
to the assigned level of media salience at the day of the interview, either directly 
through individual news consumption or indirectly though information diffusion via 
other types of communication. As discussed above, prior research with similar scope 
modelled media variables as stable characteristics within surveys waves (e.g. 
Hopkins 2010; van Klingeren et al. 2015; Schlueter and Davidov 2013). Assuming 
the same media environment for everyone within one wave can be critical, however, 
when media salience strongly fluctuates periodically in short-term intervals. Figure 
II.2 indicates that this is indeed the case in our data. It is hence reasonable to 
employ a measure of media salience which varies between individuals who were 
interviewed at different days within the same survey wave (see Figure II.1). 
 
Figure II.1: Stylized research design. 
The measure of media salience is most likely exogenous of respondent-specific 
characteristics in our models for two reasons. First, it is highly unlikely that the 
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national level of media salience is influenced by individual level characteristics that 
are also related to concerns about immigration. This is because the day of the 
interview, and thus the level of media salience a respondent is assigned to, is out of 
a respondent’s control. Even if respondents with certain characteristics time their 
interviews differently than others, it is very unlikely that these characteristics affect 
individual concerns about immigration. Neither is it plausible that these 
respondents set the dates for their interviews dependent on the amount of articles 
on immigration in the media.15 Second, we statistically account for all constant 
person specific confounding influences by analysing within variation only, such as 
stable prejudice, social class, race, sex, and culture.16 To this end, we estimate panel 
fixed-effects (FE) linear probability models (LPMs) which eliminate time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity (Andreß, Golsch, and Schmidt 2013).17 
 
                                      
15 If there is geographical variation in the timing of the interviews (for example between the regional 
sampling points that underlie the stratified GSOEP sampling procedure), it is highly unlikely that 
this geographical variation is related to the debate on immigration as captured by our media salience 
measure. 
16 However, there may still be confounding factors on the aggregate level, that is, unmeasured period 
effects. See the Online Appendix II.O2 for a variety of strategies how we dealt with these issues. 
17 We use Stata 13.1’s xtreg command for our RE and FE LPMs and xtlogit command the RE 
logistic regression models. The use of robust standard errors did not change our results in any 
substantive way. The analyses including district level variables were conducted with “SOEPremote”, 
a remote access possibility offered by the DIW Berlin. All do-files are available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/W8UZ9 
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II.7 Results 
II.7.1   Immigration Issues in Germany: Time Trends and Key 
Events 
The overall time trend in immigration-related news is shown in Figure II.2. The 
figure illustrates the weekly total numbers of all articles and periods of 21 days 
after certain immigration related key events (coloured dots).18 
In the beginning of the millennium, various Islamist terror attacks happened, which 
were unprecedented in terms of fatalities and impact for Western countries. This 
includes 9/11 (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009), the Madrid bombings in 11 
March 2004 (Legewie 2013), and the murder of Theo van Gogh 2 November 2004 
(Finseraas, Jakobsson, and Kotsadam 2011). Consequently, immigration and Islam 
were much debated during this time, although with quite some fluctuation, as 
Figure II.2 indicates. Moreover, politicians and the German public vividly discussed 
the new migration law (Zuwanderungsgesetz, cf. Pardos-Prado et al. 2014: 858), 
which became effective in January 2005. According to Bauder (2008), considerations 
about the “economic utility” of immigration were a rather stable topic in the 
German immigration discourse during the period from 2001 to 2005. 
  
                                      
18 For certain events, the coloured dots are not very likely to mark the actual time of the main 
public debate. For example, the Eastern Expansion of the EU was discussed before it legally became 
effective and the main debate on the Mohammed cartoons took place several months after their 
original publication. Moreover, we do not use these weekly totals in our statistical analysis but a 
measure on a daily basis. 
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Figure II.2: Total number of articles related to immigration per week, and immigration-
related key events.  
Note: Coloured dots indicate a period of 21 days after each event. 
In September 2005 until the beginning of 2006, media attention increased due to 
the Mohammed caricatures published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten and 
the subsequent protests in many Islamic countries. Further debates revolved around 
the two Eastern Enlargements of the European Union (EU), the first taking place 
in May 2004 (e.g. Boehnke et al. 2007) and the second in January 2007. Both EU 
expansions were debated in the press, dealing with the potential consequences 
regarding immigration-related crime, and economic costs and benefits. A third 
outstanding peak is around 2006. Note that two Islamist terrorist attacks do not 
seem to have led to major public debates on immigration, London in 2005 and the 
series of attacks in France in 2012. 
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Apart from economic and terror-related news, culturalistic discussions were 
repeatedly part of the immigration discourse in recent years. One trigger of these 
discussions was the former Federal President Christian Wulff’s statement that “The 
Islam belongs to Germany” in 3 October 2010. Almost simultaneously, Thilo 
Sarrazin’s bestseller book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” (“Germany is abolishing 
itself”) was released in 30 August 2010, in which highly controversial theses about 
the impact of immigration on German society are put forward. Both events make 
sense of the steep increase in 2010. Finally, the peak in 2014 coincides with the first 
PEGIDA demonstrations in Dresden which were primarily targeted against 
immigration from Muslim countries. 
From late summer 2015 on, Europe faced a strong increase in immigration and 
asylum rates with more than twice as many first-time asylum applications in the 
EU compared to the year before, including a disproportionate high share of 
individuals from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Connor 2016). From all European 
countries, Germany received more than a third of these asylum applications, 
making it by far the most popular destination for these refugees (ibd.). These 
turbulent times were accompanied by several acts of violence and terrorism. One 
of the most prominent events was the sexual assaults in various German cities on 
New Year’s Eve 2015/2016, where victims described the perpetrators as men of 
Arab or North African appearance, leading to a direct connection to the strong 
increase in asylum rates (Czymara and Schmidt-Catran 2017). Other events include 
fatal Islamist terror attacks on the staff of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo 
and on a Jewish supermarket (January 2015), the attacks on a cultural centre and 
a Synagogue in Copenhagen (February 2015), the series of attacks in Paris with 
130 fatalities (November 2015), and the cancellation of a football match in Germany 
due to a terror warning (November 2015). At the same time, violence against 
refugees and refugee shelters erupted during this time (Jäckle and König 2017). It 
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is hence hardly surprising that Figure II.2 shows it strongest increase during the 
time between 2015 and 2016. 
Hence, the information environment our media measure is meant to capture 
fluctuates strongly, encompassing a heterogeneous set of different discourses and 
aspects of the immigration issue. 
Looking at the association between our media salience factor and individual 
immigration concerns, we clearly see a similar trend, shown in Figure II.3: the 
trajectories of concerns about immigration (upper panel) and of our media salience 
factor (lower panel) apparently show similar patterns. This means that respondents 
were more likely to show higher concerns about immigration when they were 
interviewed on days with high media salience.19 This lends initial support to the 
Issue Salience-Hypothesis, although some debates (in terms of peaks in the time 
series) seem to be more influential than others. In the following, we put this 
relationship more rigorously to the test. 
The upper panel of Figure II.3 also shows the number of interviews per day. It 
clearly decreases over the year, with very few interviews taking place during the 
end of each year and in January. Hence, debates happening during these times are 
unfortunately hardly covered in our analysis. The light grey dots in the lower panel 
of Figure II.3 represent the raw media salience including days when no interviews 
took place to capture actual trends in media salience. 
                                      
19 Note that there are seasonal fluctuations with highest concerns in winter. This is in line with 
research on the seasonality of depression and other negative moods (Harmatz et al. 2000) and could 
further reflect the yearly summer slump. We control for seasonal effects in our regression models. 
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Figure II.3: Locally weighted regression trends of concerns about immigration (upper 
panel) and media salience (lower panel), and distribution of SOEP interviews over time. 
Note: Trend in lower panel shows the full trend going through all data points, those on 
which SOEP interviews took place (and make up the sample of analysis) and those where 
no SOEP interview took place. 
II.7.2   Media Salience Effects on Concerns about Immigration 
The association between media salience and worries about immigration in the FE 
models is substantial. The coefficient of media salience is 0.05 (Table II.1), implying 
that a one unit increase of our media salience factor predicts an increase in the 
probability of being very concerned by 5 percentage points. Respondents 
interviewed during periods when media salience was at its 95 per cent quantile 
value (1.65) have a 12.76 percentage points higher average predicted probability of 
being very concerned about immigration than those who were interviewed during 
times where immigration was not a salient issue (5 per cent quantile: 0.92). In 
comparison, preferring the conservative Christian Democrats increases this 
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probability by about 3 percentage points (relative to no party preference) and being 
very concerned about one’s own economic situation increases it by about 6 
percentage points (relative to not concerned). In addition, monthly immigration 
rates also have a statistically significant positive association with public concerns. 
To give a better interpretability of the results from our first model in Table II.1, 
we predict changes in concerns about immigration for changes in media salience 
related to a selection of important events discussed above. For example, our media 
salience factor increases by 2.57 units between 9/11 and 21days after 9/11. This 
predicts an increase in concerns about immigration of 12.81 percentage points 
according to our model. Similarly, the Madrid terror attacks lead to an increase of 
1.90 units in media salience predicting an increase of 9.44 percentage points in 
concerns. The publication of Sarazzins book “Deutschland schafft sich ab”, a major 
event influencing German wide debates on immigration, went along with an 
increase of media salience of 2.60 units which predicts an increase in concerns of 
12.91 percentage points. 
Mind that the substantial association between media salience and worries may 
partly reflect feedback mechanisms and unmeasured periodic shocks. Mass media 
may partly respond to changes in attitudes, although scholars have argued that, on 
average, journalist rarely directly take public opinion into account when evaluating 
what qualifies as “news” (Patterson 2008). We present various additional analyses 
in an attempt to rule out these alternative explanations in the Online Appendix 
Table II.O2. These analyses include measures of aggregate worries, general time 
trends, or restricting the analysis to certain years. In all cases, the effect remains 
statistically significant, with a minimum effect size of 0.01.  
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Table II.1: Panel Fixed-Effects Linear Probability Models of effect of media salience on 
concerns about immigration, and effect heterogeneity by education and party. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Main model Education 
interaction 
Party preference 
interaction 
Media salience,  past 21 days 0.050*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
    Party preference (ref.: no preference)    
    CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    SPD (Social Democrats) -0.007+ -0.007+ -0.007+ 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    Gruene (Greens) -0.012+ -0.012+ -0.019** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
    Linke (Left) -0.005 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    FDP (Free Democrats) 0.019* 0.020* 0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
    Others and mixed 0.015 0.015 0.014 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
    Radical right 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
    Interest in politics (ref.: very strong)    
    Strong -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Not so strong -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Not at all -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    Income satisfaction categories (ref.: low)    
    1 -0.012+ -0.012+ -0.012+ 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    2 -0.015* -0.015* -0.015* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    3 -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    high -0.020** -0.020** -0.021** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    Worries German economy (ref.: not concerned)    
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Somewhat concerned 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
    Very concerned 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    Worries own economic situation (ref.: not concerned)    
    Somewhat concerned 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
    Very concerned 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    Age categories (ref.: <25)    
    25-34 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    35-49 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    50-64 -0.014 -0.015 -0.014 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
    >65 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
    Employment status (ref.: not working)    
In training/apprentice -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    Registered unemployed -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
    Pensioner -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
    Working 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Month of interview (ref.: January)    
    Feb. 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    Mar. 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    Apr. 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
    May 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
    Jun. 0.015** 0.015* 0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    Jul. 0.002 0.002 0.003 
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 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
    Aug. 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
    Sep./Oct./Nov. -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
    Monthly in-migration/1000 (imputed before 2006) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Elementary X Media salience (ref.)    
    Secondary I X Media salience  0.005  
  (0.003)  
    Secondary II (FHR) X Media salience  -0.008  
  (0.006)  
    Secondary II (Abitur) X Media salience  -0.020***  
  (0.004)  
    Other degree/no degree X Media salience  0.000  
  (0.009)  
    In school X Media salience  -0.023**  
  (0.007)  
    No party preference X Media salience (ref.)    
    CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) X Media salience   0.008* 
   (0.003) 
    SPD (Social Democrats) X Media salience   -0.006+ 
   (0.004) 
    Gruene (Greens) X Media salience   -0.036*** 
   (0.006) 
    Linke (Left) X Media salience   -0.012+ 
   (0.007) 
    FDP (Free Democrats) X Media salience   -0.004 
   (0.010) 
    Others and mixed X Media salience   -0.005 
   (0.014) 
    Radical right X Media salience   -0.025+ 
   (0.015) 
    Constant (as calculated by Stata’s xtreg , fe) 0.191*** 0.191*** 0.191*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
No. person-years 190,049 190,049 190,049 
No. persons 25,073 25,073 25,073 
Min. no. person-years per person 2 2 2 
Max. no. person-years per person 15 15 15 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Data: SOEP v32.1. April 2001–2015 and media data from Lexis.  
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01; ****p < 0.001 
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II.7.3   Who Is Prone to Media-induced Concerns? 
To investigate the conditionality of the media salience effect, we interact the 
variable with the share of foreigners on the district level, controlling for all context 
characteristics depicted in Figure II.4 clearly supports our reasoning: the marginal 
effect of media salience (y-axis) gets substantially smaller as the percentage of 
foreigners in one’s district increases. This means the concern increasing effect of 
media salience is most substantial for inhabitants of areas with a relatively small 
to medium share of foreigners. Since the ethnic composition of one’s district is a 
rather stable characteristic in our data, the interaction effect is likely primarily due 
to the within-variation of the media salience variable. Our results support 
Information Substitution-Hypothesis, proposing that obtaining information about 
immigrants from contextual sources prevents fears caused by increasing media 
attention. One should note, however, that the effect of media salience is still 
statistically larger than 0 also for individuals living in districts with many 
foreigners. Hence, it seems that even for those who are used to immigrants in their 
day to day life, this firsthand information does, on average, not completely 
substitute the information coming from mass media. 
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Figure II.4: Marginal effect of media salience on concerns about immigration conditional 
on the local share of foreigners (x-axis), with 95 per cent confidence interval 
(based on models in Table II.A2). 
 
We also hypothesized that the effect of media salience differs with individual 
characteristics because media information is less important for those holding a more 
liberal world view or having more political knowledge. The former should apply 
mainly to natives with a preference for the Green or the Left Party, and the latter 
to those with higher education. 
And indeed, the effect of media salience is substantially lower for natives who favour 
more liberal parties, as Figure II.5 indicates (also see Model 2 of Table II.1). 
Relative to individuals without party preference, the differences for those adhering 
to the Social Democrats or the Left party are moderate, but preferring the Green 
Party is clearly associated with a smaller effect of media salience. In contrast, the 
media effect is strongest for those preferring the Christian Democrats. This is in 
line with our Party-Hypothesis and with previous findings indicating that voters 
converge to the position of their preferred party when exposed to media 
information, independent of the toning of this information (Bechtel et al. 2015).20 
Finally, the effect of media salience on individual concerns primarily holds for 
respondents with low or medium education, but it is close to 0 for those with higher 
education, as can be seen in Figure II.6 (or Model 3 in Table II.1). This supports 
our Education-Hypothesis. 
                                      
20 We refrain from making inferences about the interaction between radical right party preference 
and media salience because the number of observations is too small. The category is hence not 
included in Figure I.5 (but it is included in the underlying model). 
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Figure II.5: Marginal effects of media salience on concerns about immigration conditional 
on party preference, with 95 per cent confidence intervals (based on Model 2 in Table 
II.1). 
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Figure II.6: Average marginal effects of media salience on concerns about immigration 
conditional on education, with 95 per cent confidence intervals (based on Model 3 in Table 
II.1). 
FHR: Fachhochschulreife. 
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Figure II.7: Predicted probabilities from an RE ordered logistic regression. 
Variables set at means. 
II.7.4   Robustness Checks 
We intensively tested the robustness of our findings. First, we restricted the analysis 
to years with similar distributions of media salience to check whether results are 
driven by excessively high media salience in single years. Second, we restricted the 
sample to oral interviews to ensure that the date of the interview is not biased due 
to wrong dates for postal questionnaires. Third, we checked whether our results are 
affected by the construction of our media salience measure, generating other 
versions based on 7, 14, or 28 days before each interview instead of 21. Fourth, we 
checked whether replacing the factor with a weighted count variable changes the 
results (for past 21 days’-treatment: dailies divided by 18, weeklies by 3). Fifth, we 
ran panel random effects-(RE) and FE-ordered logistic regression models to see 
whether the regression link function affects results (for results of RE logistic 
68 
 
regression model see Figure II.7). Sixth, we included the moderate left Frankfurter 
Rundschau to the media salience variable.21 Finally, we allowed for effect 
heterogeneity of media salience between years and calculated the average effect 
over all years. In all cases, the results are similar to the ones of our main analyses 
(see the Online Appendix in II.10 for selected robustness checks, all further results 
are available upon request). 
II.8 Summary and Discussion 
Investigating a period of 15 years, we find that public concerns about immigration 
in Germany vary systematically with the amount of media attention on this issue. 
The probability of being very concerned about immigration is about 13 percentage 
points higher when immigration was vividly discussed before an interview compared 
to times when the issue played a minor role in the press. Moreover, we have shown 
that media attention varies considerably on a short-term basis. Hence, we suggest 
that it is very well suited to explain fluctuation in public opinion, adding theoretical 
and statistical explanatory power beyond general immigration rates. 
Deeper analyses reveal that individuals who live in districts with a higher share of 
ethnic minorities are much less likely to be concerned in times of high media 
salience. These findings are contrary to the realistic group threat paradigm 
according to which feelings of ethnic competition should increase in contexts with 
high or increasing shares of out-group members, particularly when this outgroup is 
made salient (see Hopkins 2010). These different findings might be due to the 
comparatively stable regional share of foreigners within districts in our data, 
pointing to the importance of familiarization with ethnic minorities. 
                                      
21 We did not include this outlet in our final analysis because data from the Frankfurter Rundschau 
is only available from 2003 onwards and because its distribution is limited. 
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Furthermore, the negative impact of media salience diminishes for natives with 
higher education and those who prefer the Green Party. Hence, it seems that prior 
knowledge and more stable attitudes as well as a liberal ideology can be effective 
barriers for such media effects (cf. Bechtel et al. 2015). 
We stated that we are interested in analysing a universal effect of general issue 
salience over a long time span covering various debates. While we stressed our 
motivation behind this above, it is of course also associated with shortcomings, 
reflecting a general dilemma between the identification of generalizable, universal 
effects and an in-depth understanding and identification of effects of particular 
discourses. 
First, we did not differentiate the toning of our news measure. It is reasonable to 
assume that negative news have a stronger negative effect than neutral or positive 
ones. However, recent research on media effects suggest that reports in high-quality 
print media are actually too balanced to classify as primarily negative or positive 
(Lawlor 2015). Hopkins (2010) even argues that one “cannot draw conclusions 
about whether the tone of coverage matters above and beyond the fact that there 
is coverage at all” (Hopkins 2010: 58). Moreover, the fact that we find a statistically 
significant and robust effect using an undifferentiated measure actually strengthens 
the general importance of mass media as a determinant of individual concerns about 
immigration. Put differently, finding an effect of negative news on negative 
attitudes may also be seen as more trivial. 
Second, we also neither differentiate topics nor aspects of our attitudinal outcome. 
Again, this is also due to data restrictions. But specifying which types of debates 
(e.g. McLaren et al. 2017) affect which kinds of attitudes (e.g. Czymara and 
Schmidt-Catran 2017) would certainly be a promising endeavour for future 
research. 
Moreover, individuals differ in their media consumption habits. Although we 
understand our media measure as a proxy of both direct individual exposure and 
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the indirect information environments, frequent consumption most probably 
increases the media effect. Unfortunately, there is no measure of individual media 
consumption available in the GSOEP. 
Finally, we investigated the impact of print media outlets only. First, this misses 
the dominating medium for political news: TV. Second, with the growing supply of 
(free) online news, sales of print media are decreasing steadily. Social media are of 
increasing importance as platforms for political debates. How these developments 
affect public opinion and the political culture is hardly known yet, although there 
are pioneering studies (e.g. Bakshy, Messing, and Adamic 2015). The increasing 
availability and comprehensiveness of media data provides many promising 
opportunities for more nuanced research regarding the impact of such media in the 
future. 
We see our study as a step towards a more fine grained, yet generalizable 
understanding of mass media effects on public opinion. We aimed at developing a 
nuanced design that extends previous research by drawing on within individual 
variation and fluctuations in the media on a daily basis. Yet, our observational 
“real-world” approach complicates the identification of the causal media effect (see 
Online Appendix in II.10). To obtain a picture of the impact of media, our results 
are, thus, ideally complemented by (quasi-)experiments (e.g. van Klingeren et al. 
2017; Legewie 2013). 
While we believe that the general effect of media salience is highly interesting, we 
certainly do not deny the additional insights a more differentiated media measure 
could bring. As manual coding with such a large number of articles is impossible, 
the rapidly growing field of text as data in the information sciences should be of 
great help here, offering methods like topic modelling or sentiment analysis (similar 
to, for example, Greussing and Boomgaarden 2017). Such quantitative 
investigations of the media discourses on immigration over such a long time span, 
however, would already be a study on its own. Still, adding such information to our 
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approach could lead to further insights and, thus, deepen the understanding of the 
relationship between mass media and public opinion formation. 
II.9 Study I Appendix 
Table II.A1. Descriptive statistics of sample of analysis. 
Continuous Variables Mean No. person years 
Monthly in-migration/1000  66.05 190049 
   Categorical Variables % No. person years 
Very concerned about immigration 
Not/somewhat concerned 70.79% 134527 
Very concerned 29.21% 55522    
Party preference  
No party preference 54.38% 103351 
CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) 18.27% 34730 
SPD (Social Democrats) 16.05% 30509 
Gruene (Greens) 4.80% 9117 
Linke (Left) 3.09% 5876 
FDP (Free Democrats) 1.77% 3355 
Others and mixed 0.92% 1755 
Radical right 0.71% 1356    
Interest in politics  
Very strong 7.64% 14518 
Strong 31.15% 59209 
Not so strong 48.52% 92208 
Not at all 12.69% 24114    
Household income satisfaction on 10 point scale, five categories 
low 3.25% 6171  
9.41% 17893  
21.74% 41309  
32.01% 60831 
high 33.59% 63845    
Concerns general economic development 
Not concerned 10.96% 20832 
Somewhat concerned 54.31% 103218 
Very concerned 34.73% 65999    
Concerns own economic situation 
Not concerned 27.70% 52641 
Somewhat concerned 51.73% 98304 
Very concerned 20.58% 39104    
Age, five categories  
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<25 7.61% 14463 
25-34 12.83% 24382 
35-49 29.55% 56152 
50-64 25.33% 48147 
>65 24.68% 46905    
Employment status  
Not working 5.84% 11103 
In training/apprentice 5.70% 10825 
Registered unemployed 5.43% 10315 
Pensioner 27.99% 53196 
Working 55.04% 104610    
Month of interview  
Jan. 7.27% 13821 
Feb. 33.10% 62908 
Mar. 27.64% 52531 
Apr. 14.54% 27639 
May 7.39% 14048 
Jun. 4.38% 8325 
Jul. 3.06% 5809 
Aug. 1.73% 3279 
Sep./Oct./Nov. 0.89% 1689    
State of Residence  
Schleswig-Holstein 3.06% 5825 
Hamburg 1.49% 2833 
Lower Saxony 9.18% 17447 
Bremen 0.59% 1119 
North-Rhine-Westfalia 19.18% 36445 
Hessen 5.85% 11126 
Rheinland-Pfalz 4.61% 8753 
Baden-Wuerttemberg  9.77% 18573 
Bavaria  13.44% 25541 
Saarland 1.17% 2221 
Berlin 3.85% 7315 
Brandenburg 5.31% 10086 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 2.82% 5355 
Saxony 8.97% 17040 
Saxony-Anhalt 5.21% 9906 
Thuringia 5.51% 10464    
Survey year   
2001 3.64% 6921 
2002 7.72% 14673 
2003 7.72% 14669 
2004 7.54% 14327 
2005 7.21% 13696 
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2006 7.61% 14471 
2007 7.42% 14106 
2008 7.04% 13384 
2009 6.58% 12514 
2010 6.02% 11444 
2011 6.30% 11977 
2012 6.67% 12678 
2013 6.56% 12466 
2014 6.22% 11812 
2015 5.74% 10911 
N  190,049 
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Table II.A2 Moderating effects of district level share of foreigners. 
Variable 
FE-LPM FE-LPM with 
time stable 
contextual 
covariates 
FE-LPM with categorical 
share foreign variable 
    
Share foreign 0.011*** 
  
Media salience factor 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 
    
Share foreign X media salience 
factor 
-0.001** 
  
    
Share foreign 2001 X media 
salience factor 
  
-0.001*** 
    
Share foreign categorical 
   
  2-6% 
  
0.015 
  6-10% 
  
0.027* 
  10-15% 
  
0.033* 
  15-35% 
  
0.035* 
    
Share foreign categorical X 
media salience factor 
   
  2-6% 
  
-0.005 
  6-10% 
  
-0.001 
  10-15% 
  
-0.012** 
  15-35% 
  
-0.020*** 
    
Contextual controls: 
   
  Unemployment rate 0.005*** 
 
0.005*** 
  Vocational training positions  -0.002*** 
 
-0.002*** 
  Number of students -0.000 
 
-0.000 
  Av. household income 0.000*** 
 
0.000** 
  Population density 0.000 
 
0.000 
    
Constant 0.127* 0.191*** 0.183*** 
    
Number person-years 166,399 166,399 166,399 
Number persons 22,487 22,487 22,487 
Min. observations per person 2 2 2 
Max. observations per person 15 15 15 
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Results from FE LPMs. All models control for the full 
set of individual level covariates (not shown), plus additional district level controls (unemployment 
rate, training positions, number of students, average household income, population density). The 
sample is restricted to those who had no changes in district over time to rule out individual 
selection into contexts. Complete table available upon request. 
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II.10 Study I Online Appendix 
Table II.O1: Mean values of various established correlates of migration attitudes 
for original three valued ordinal item and the dichotomous operationalization 
Correlates of migration attitudes Migration concerns 
 
Migration concerns 
 School degree 
 
Elementary 2.188 0.360 
Secondary I 2.090 0.317 
Secondary II (FHR) 1.856 0.204 
Secondary II (Abitur) 1.683 0.142 
Other degree/no degree 2.089 0.342 
In school 1.788 0.199 
Total 2.031 0.292    
Party preference 
 
No party preference 2.077 0.310 
CDU/CSU (Christian Democrats) 2.126 0.329 
SPD (Social Democrats) 1.943 0.24 
Die Grünen (The Greens) 1.456 0.07 
Die Linke (The Left) 1.928 0.267 
FDP (Free Democrats) 1.916 0.259 
Others and mixed 1.952 0.288 
Radical right 2.786 0.824 
Total 2.031 0.292 
  Political left-right self-placement 
 
[0] 0 very left 1.949 0.288 
[1] 1 1.843 0.232 
[2] 2 1.803 0.205 
[3] 3 1.821 0.202 
[4] 4 1.887 0.224 
[5] 5 2.120 0.334 
[6] 6 2.117 0.332 
[7] 7 2.263 0.433 
[8] 8 2.424 0.523 
[9] 9 2.573 0.637 
[10] 10 very right 2.572 0.650 
Total 2.058 0.313 
 
Study I Online Appendix O1: What does our outcome measure? 
In line with usual findings from the literature on attitudes towards immigration 
and immigrants, our measure is highly associated with education, party preference, 
and political ideology as Table O1 shows. This favours the argument that SOEP 
respondents interpret this item similar to other items on attitudes towards 
immigration and relate the question to negative consequences of immigration. 
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Study I Online Appendix O2: Is the Effect of Media Salience Causal? 
Considerations on Reverse Causality and Unmeasured Confounding 
Our design assumes no effects of aggregate concerns in the population on media 
salience and that the effects of external events are mediated through mass media. 
If we do not allow for these assumptions, however, causal inference is complicated 
by two interrelated issues: feedback between aggregate concerns and media salience 
and unmeasured period effects. 
Feedback mechanisms are present if the media increases aggregate public concerns, 
which, in turn, fuels interest in migration related topics, which then prompts 
journalists to write even more about the topic. Aggregate concerns sometimes even 
may precede media reports. If aggregate concerns also affect individual concerns, e. 
g. through social networks, they may confound our relationship of interest. In other 
words, it is hard to separate the effects of media salience and the aggregate mood 
in the population on individual concerns if these factors themselves correlate. To 
adjust for potential feedback mechanisms, we include a variable measuring the 
lagged mean concerns of respondents, covering the period of 42 to 22 days before 
each interview in Model 1 in Table O1. The coefficient of the LPM is clearly reduced 
but still substantial at 0.02. 
As an additional analysis, we restrict the sample to years with no large fluctuations 
in media salience. The assumption behind this analysis is that feedback mechanisms 
between public opinion and media reports are mainly present in those debates which 
result in peaks in salience. In those years where there were no peaks in media 
salience we assume that there were no major reinforcing mechanisms of public 
opinion on media salience, or at least they were quite small. In addition, this 
restriction ensures that we compare years which are more similar in terms of media 
salience. The results are shown in Table O3. We find that such restrictions do not 
change our overall conclusions. 
The second causal issue is that external events are assumed to have no direct 
additional influence on individual concerns given media salience and conditional on 
the variables in our model. We think this assumption is reasonable because most 
of the topics discussed among the public do not fall out of thin air due to some 
event which is not visible in media reports. Rather the issues are present in people’s 
minds because the media reported about them in the first place.  
These period events might, however, confound the relationship if their effects on 
individual concerns are not primarily channelled through media reports but for 
example through private communication or social networks. To account for periodic 
idiosyncrasies of certain years, we completely net out all variance between years by 
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including year fixed-effects (Model 2) or include a restricted cubic spline 
specification of the date variable (Model 3). In both models, the effect of media 
salience remains statistically significant, but the effect size is substantively reduced 
when year fixed effects are included in Model 2. Year dummies are commonly 
employed to adjust for unmeasured macro-level trends. By definition, netting out 
all variance between years adjusts for everything that could possibly confound the 
relationship between media salience and individual concerns that is related to each 
year. However, an alternative interpretation of such modelling is that the year 
dummies capture similarities between individuals within each year which are caused 
by media salience in this year. In that case, the inclusion of year fixed-effects leads 
to over-control bias, which results in an underestimation of the “true” effect of 
media salience because variation that is actually caused by media salience is 
partialled out. 
Generally, identifying the correct model for the media effect over a range of 
temporal contexts depends on the assumptions about the theoretical emergence of 
the media effect: is it the effect of merely the media itself or does it also include the 
public discussion surrounding it? What exactly one assumes to be part of such a 
media effect influences the strength of the association between media salience and 
individual concerns. While we opted for the most general (and arguably easiest to 
interpret) media effect for our main analyses, we offer some additional, more 
conservative, specifications in the models presented here. In the end, we believe 
that what matters is that even under strict conditions, the media salience effect 
remains statistically and substantively significant. 
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Table II.O2: Possible adjustment strategies for feedback mechanisms and 
unmeasured confounding through period effects. Dependent variable: concerns about 
migration. Main independent variable: linear specification of media salience factor 
(Welt, TAZ, Spiegel, Stern) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Aggregate concerns1 Year dummies Date splines 
Media salience, past  0.02*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 
21 days (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Control Variables:     
Party preference (ref.: no 
preference) 
   
CDU/CSU (Christian  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    SPD (Social  -0.01+ -0.01 -0.01 
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Die Grünen (The  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Greens) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Die Linke (The Left) 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FDP (Free  0.02* 0.03** 0.02* 
Democrats) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Others and mixed 0.02 0.02+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Radical right 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Interest in politics (ref.: 
very strong) 
   
Strong -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Not so strong -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Not at all -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Income satisfaction 
categories (ref.: low) 
   
1 -0.00 -0.01+ -0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    2 -0.01 -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    3 -0.01* -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    high -0.01* -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
 
   Concerns about German 
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economy (ref.: not 
concerned) 
Somewhat concerned 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Very concerned 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Concerns about own 
economic situation (ref.: 
not concerned) 
   
Somewhat concerned 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Very concerned 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Age categories (ref.: <25) 
   
25-34 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    35-49 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    50-64 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    >65 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Employment status (ref.: 
not working) 
   
In training/apprentice -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Registered  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
unemployed (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Pensioner 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Working 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Month of interview (ref.: 
January) 
   
Feb. 0.02* -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Mar. 0.02** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Apr. 0.03*** 0.01+ 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
    May 0.05*** 0.01** 0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Jun. 0.05*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Jul. 0.04*** -0.00 -0.01+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Aug. 0.06*** 0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Sep./Oct./Nov. 0.05*** 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
    Monthly in- 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00*** 
migration/1000 (imputed 
before 2006) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    Aggregate concerns 0.57***   
 (0.02)   
    Survey year (ref.: 2001)  
 
 
2002  0.04***  
  (0.01)  
    2003  0.00  
  (0.01)  
    2004  0.06***  
  (0.01)  
    2005  0.13***  
  (0.01)  
    2006  0.08***  
  (0.01)  
2007  0.08***  
  (0.01)  
    2008  0.04***  
  (0.01)  
    2009  -0.01+  
  (0.01)  
    2010  -0.01  
  (0.01)  
    2011  0.03***  
  (0.01)  
2012  -0.02**  
  (0.01)  
    2013  0.01  
  (0.01)  
    2014  0.06***  
  (0.01)  
    2015  0.09***  
  (0.01)  
    Date spline term 1   -0.00*** 
   (0.00) 
    Date spline term 2   0.00*** 
   (0.00) 
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    Date spline term 3   -0.01*** 
   (0.00) 
    Date spline term 4   0.02*** 
   (0.00) 
    Date spline term 5   -0.01*** 
   (0.00) 
    Date spline term 6   -0.00* 
   (0.00) 
    Date spline term 7   -0.00 
   (0.00) 
 
Constant 0.00 0.18*** 0.99*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) 
No. person-years 149945 190049 190049 
No. persons 24747 25073 25073 
Standard errors in parentheses. Data: SOEP v32.1. April 2001 to 2015. ¹ Calculated as mean 
concerns in period 42 days to 21 days before interview with at least 15 observations (hence the 
reduced sample size). + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table II.O3: Restricting the analysis to subsets of years does not change the results. 
Dependent variable: concerns about migration. Main independent variable: linear 
specification of media salience factor (Welt, TAZ, Spiegel, Stern). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Without 
refugee 
crisis 
year 
2015 
Excluding 
years with 
most 
salient 
debates 
(2004, 06, 
10, 15) 
Excluding 
years with 
most and 
relatively 
salient 
debates 
(04 to 06, 
10, 14, 15) 
Low 
salience 
years only 
(2003, 11, 
12, 13) 
Restrict to 
years with 6 
quantiles of 
media 
salience 
Media salience, past 21 days 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
      Party preference (ref.: no preference)      
CDU/CSU (Christian  0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02+ 0.03*** 
Democrats) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      SPD (Social Democrats) -0.01+ -0.01+ -0.01 -0.00 -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Die Grünen (The Greens) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Die Linke (The Left) -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      FDP (Free Democrats) 0.02+ 0.02* 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Others and mixed 0.02 0.02 0.02+ 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
      Radical right 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
      Interest in politics (ref.: very strong)      
Strong -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.03** -0.01+ 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Not so strong -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Not at all -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Income satisfaction (ref.: low)      
1 -0.01* -0.02* -0.01+ -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      2 -0.02** -0.02* -0.01+ -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      3 -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02* -0.04* -0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      high -0.02*** -0.02** -0.02* -0.03* -0.02+ 
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 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Concerns about German economy 
(ref.: not concerned) 
     
Somewhat concerned 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Very concerned 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Concerns about own economic 
situation (ref.: not concerned) 
     
Somewhat concerned 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01* 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Very concerned 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Age categories (ref.: <25) 
25-34 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      35-49 -0.01 0.00 -0.02+ -0.02 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      50-64 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      >65 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
      Employment status (ref.: not 
working) 
     
In training/apprentice -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Registered unemployed -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Pensioner -0.01+ -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Working 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Month of interview (ref.: January)      
Feb. 0.01*** 0.03*** -0.00 0.02+ 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Mar. 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Apr. 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      May 0.02** 0.03*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Jun. 0.01 0.02** -0.00 0.03* 0.00 
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 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
      Jul. -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04** -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Aug. 0.02* 0.03** 0.01 0.05** 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Sep./Oct./Nov. -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
      Monthly in-  0.00*** 0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00+ 0.00*** 
migration/1000 (imputed before 
2006) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Constant 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
No. person-years 179138 138896 113388 51790 100363 
No. persons 25073 25060 24650 22537 24110 
Standard errors in parentheses. Data: SOEP v32.1. April 2001 to 2015. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
85 
 
Table II.O4: Regression models of concerns about immigration. Dependent variable: 
concerns about migration. Main independent variable: linear specification of media 
salience factor (Welt, TAZ, Spiegel, Stern). 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FE linear 
probability model 
FE ordered logit¹ RE ordered logit 
Media salience, past  0.050*** 0.428*** 0.432*** 
21 days (0.002) (0.009) (0.009) 
    
Party preference (ref.: no 
preference) 
   
CDU/CSU (Christian  0.027*** 0.236*** 0.294*** 
Democrats) (0.005) (0.029) (0.025) 
    
SPD (Social  -0.007 0.006 -0.136*** 
Democrats) (0.004) (0.028) (0.025) 
    
Die Grünen (The  -0.012* -0.205*** -0.919*** 
Greens) (0.006) (0.054) (0.048) 
    
Die Linke (The Left) -0.005 -0.013 -0.211*** 
 (0.009) (0.057) (0.056) 
    
FDP (Free  0.019* 0.145* 0.043 
Democrats) (0.009) (0.066) (0.063) 
 
Others and mixed 0.015 0.072 -0.052 
 (0.010) (0.072) (0.069) 
    
Radical right 0.144*** 1.075*** 1.861*** 
 (0.015) (0.128) (0.128) 
Interest in politics (ref.: 
very strong) 
   
Strong -0.020*** -0.099** -0.018 
 (0.005) (0.034) (0.031) 
    
Not so strong -0.026*** -0.110** 0.120*** 
 (0.006) (0.038) (0.034) 
    
Not at all -0.025*** -0.152*** 0.153*** 
 (0.007) (0.045) (0.041) 
    
Income satisfaction (ref.: 
low) 
   
1 -0.012+ -0.050 -0.096* 
 (0.007) (0.043) (0.044) 
    
2 -0.015* -0.049 -0.099* 
 (0.007) (0.044) (0.044) 
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3 -0.021** -0.091* -0.184*** 
 (0.007) (0.045) (0.046) 
    
high -0.020** -0.077+ -0.215*** 
 (0.008) (0.046) (0.047) 
Concerns about German 
economy (ref.: not 
concerned) 
   
Somewhat concerned 0.037*** 0.612*** 0.819*** 
 (0.003) (0.026) (0.027) 
 
Very concerned 0.120*** 1.091*** 1.437*** 
 (0.004) (0.029) (0.032) 
Concerns about own 
economic situation (ref.: 
not concerned) 
   
Somewhat concerned 0.019*** 0.270*** 0.368*** 
 (0.003) (0.019) (0.018) 
    
Very concerned 0.062*** 0.508*** 0.700*** 
 (0.004) (0.027) (0.026) 
    
Age categories (ref.: <25)    
25-34 -0.001 -0.155** -0.063 
 (0.008) (0.052) (0.045) 
    
35-49 -0.009 -0.323*** 0.040 
 (0.010) (0.067) (0.047) 
    
50-64 -0.014 -0.425*** 0.179*** 
 (0.011) (0.076) (0.049) 
    
>65 -0.014 -0.487*** 0.250*** 
 (0.013) (0.086) (0.057) 
    
Employment status (ref.: 
not working) 
   
In training/apprentice -0.010 -0.027 -0.252*** 
 (0.008) (0.057) (0.051) 
  
 
  
Registered  -0.009 -0.022 0.007 
unemployed (0.007) (0.048) (0.044) 
    
Pensioner -0.009 -0.027 0.139** 
 (0.008) (0.052) (0.043) 
    
Working 0.001 0.046 -0.021 
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 (0.006) (0.039) (0.033) 
    
Month of interview (ref.: 
January) 
   
Feb. 0.016*** 0.063* 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.026) (0.028) 
    
Mar. 0.017*** 0.083** -0.006 
 (0.005) (0.027) (0.029) 
    
Apr. 0.019*** 0.090** -0.008 
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.031) 
    
May 0.022*** 0.100** -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.035) (0.036) 
    
Jun. 0.015* 0.006 -0.091* 
 (0.007) (0.040) (0.041) 
    
Jul. 0.002 -0.049 -0.152** 
 (0.007) (0.046) (0.046) 
    
Aug. 0.022* 0.144* 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.057) (0.056) 
    
Sep./Oct./Nov. -0.005 -0.035 -0.224** 
 (0.011) (0.080) (0.073) 
    
Monthly in- 0.001*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
migration/1000 (imputed 
before 2006) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    
Constant 0.191***   
 (0.015)   
Cut-off 1   -0.123 
   (0.090) 
Cut-off 2   3.251*** 
   (0.090) 
No. person-years 190049 209509 190049 
No. persons 25073  25073 
Min. no. person-years per 
person 
2  2 
Max. no. person-years per 
person 
15  15 
Standard errors in parentheses. Data: SOEP v32.1. April 2001 to 2015. ¹Panel Fixed-Effects ordered logit 
model (BUC estimator) according to (Baetschmann, Staub, and Winkelmann 2015). + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Study I Online Appendix O3: Results for different periods of measuring media 
salience before date of interview 
We assessed whether changing the number of days before the individual interviews took 
place changes our results. The results showed to be very similar for periods of 7 days, 14 
days, 21 days and 28 days before the interview. 
 
Figure II.O1: Additional operationalizations of media salience and their assocation with 
concerns about immigration. The four media salience variables vary by the time span 
before the interview in which a day’s media salience was measured.  
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Study I Online Appendix O4: Using counts of articles as treatment variable 
(weighted by days of weekly publication frequency) 
 
Figure II.O2: Association between a weighted count of articles in the past 21 days 
(instead of the factor variable) and concerns about immigration. 
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III. Study II: Parental White Flight? Neighborhood 
Ethnic Composition, Children and Residential 
Mobility in Germany 
III.1 Abstract 
The mobility of ethnic majority households out of areas with sizable shares of ethnic 
minorities in Western countries, or “White Flight”, has been discussed as a driver 
of ethnic segregation and might contribute to less cohesion in diverse 
neighborhoods. This paper analyzes one explanation for White Flight, namely, 
whether households leave ethnically concentrated areas when having children. 
There is a clear lack of longitudinal studies on the interconnection between children, 
ethnic composition and residential mobility. Even less is known about whether 
households with migration background leave ethnically diverse neighborhoods once 
they have children, and whether Parental White Flight can be found in Germany. 
This paper closes these gaps by drawing on the German Socio-Economic Panel from 
2007 to 2016, merged with fine-grained neighborhood data and by employing a 
fixed-effects design. Results indicate that the probability of ethnic majority 
households to leave neighborhoods after having children is substantially higher 
when they live in neighborhoods with higher shares of ethnic minorities. Both native 
households with newborn and pre-school children are likely to move out, which is 
tentative evidence against school choice as sole explanation of Parental White 
Flight. I do not find such mobility patterns for households with migration 
background. Furthermore, after leaving ethnically diverse neighborhoods, native 
Germans tend to settle in less diverse areas. Overall, this study indicates that 
children might be one reason for White Flight, but more studies are needed to guide 
policies which help to understand the individual reasons behind these moves and 
the overall extent of White Flight in Germany. 
  
III.2 Introduction 
Two empirical observations about ethnic diversity in European cities are 
noteworthy. On the one hand, research demonstrates a considerable extent of ethnic 
segregation in European countries (e.g. Glitz, 2014; Musterd, 2005). This might be 
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problematic if spatial ethnic segregation limits inter-group contact in everyday 
situations and can thus contribute to worsening group relations (Pettigrew and 
Tropp 2008; Windzio and Trommer 2017). On the other hand, scholars have 
repeatedly shown that social cohesion  is lower in ethnically diverse neighborhoods 
than in homogenous areas (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2014). Beyond 
these empirical regularities, public discourse on ethnic segregation in Europe often 
attributes existing segregation to a low willingness to assimilate on part of the 
minority population, for example featuring stories on so-called "parallel societies", 
but neglects the residential choice behavior of the ethnic majority (Phillips 2010).  
Against the background of these research findings and public debates, this study 
contributes to knowledge about a type of residential mobility behavior that is of 
importance to both segregation and neighborhood cohesion, namely “White Flight”, 
the tendency of ethnic majority households to leave areas with high shares of ethnic 
minorities.22 In particular, I investigate whether households are likely to “flee” after 
having children, or when their child is of pre-school age (Goyette et al. 2014). By 
comparing the tendency to leave ethnically diverse areas when having children 
between households with migration background and native German households, I 
furthermore show whether it is only German natives who “flee” or whether 
immigrant households show similar behavior.  
The out-mobility of families with children can have severe consequences for both 
cities and single neighborhoods. If fundamental assumptions of theoretical models 
of ethnic segregation hold, the out-movement of few ethnic majority members can 
trigger cascades of out-mobility and future avoidance of a neighborhood which leads 
to high aggregate segregation (Schelling 1971). Even if those models were incorrect, 
“Parental White Flight” has the potential to erode local social cohesion. Research 
shows that families with school-aged children are less mobile (Michielin and Mulder 
                                      
22 I will use the terms share minorities, ethnic concentration and ethnic diversity or simply diversity 
interchangeably to refer to this neighborhood characteristic. 
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2008), making it more likely that they have interest to develop ties to their 
neighbors. Furthermore, children have been found to facilitate ties between 
members of different ethnic groups (Schaeffer 2013b). Families with children are 
thus likely to contribute to social cohesion of neighborhoods which is typically lower 
in ethnically concentrated areas (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2014). 
The out-movement of families with children might also be detrimental for 
immigrant integration because of lacking ethnic majority peers for minority 
children, most notably in school (Windzio and Trommer 2017).  
I theorize that parents evaluate neighborhoods differently once having children, and 
move to neighborhoods with lower shares of ethnic minorities to fulfil these changed 
expectations. Empirically, my strategy is first to isolate the effect of children on 
the probability to leave a neighborhood conditional on the share of ethnic minorities 
in the neighborhood using a fixed-effects design. I then investigate whether the 
neighborhoods of destination after moving display lower levels of ethnic 
concentration than the neighborhood of origin. My findings lend credibility to the 
assertion that life course events on part of the ethnic majority population should 
be given more consideration by researchers explaining mobility out of diverse areas.  
This study advances previous research in three ways. First, this paper goes beyond 
cross-sectional perspectives (Drever 2008) by longitudinally analyzing changes in 
the presence of children by comparing the same households before and after they 
have children (see also Goyette et al. [2014]). Second, extending research by Goyette 
and colleagues (Goyette et al. 2014), this paper compares households with migration 
background and native households. Third, this study extends knowledge about 
mobility from ethnically diverse neighborhoods to the German context which is 
largely under-studied in comparison to the U.S. or Northern European countries. 
Germany is characterized by relatively low overall levels of ethnic segregation 
(Musterd 2005; Schönwalder and Sohn 2009), despite its sizable migrant population; 
and residential mobility is not as prevalent as in other countries (Caldera Sánchez 
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and Andrews 2011). Based on these contextual characteristics one could thus see 
Germany as a least likely case for White Flight. Thus, should “Parental White 
Flight” be a phenomenon in Germany, it might be even more so in other countries. 
 
III.3 Theory 
This paper brings together two research traditions on residential mobility decisions 
of households in an attempt to understand mobility out of ethnically concentrated 
areas. Researchers interested in ethnic segregation naturally focus on the association 
between neighborhood ethnic composition and moving propensity (Crowder 2000). 
Another line of research explains individual mobility decisions with life course 
events like getting a new job, marriage or having children (Clark 2013). I combine 
both approaches by assuming that life course events, in this case having children, 
change individual perceptions: These may be towards the ethnic composition per 
se, or demands for amenities in their neighborhood, that are less likely to be fulfilled 
in neighborhoods with sizable minority populations. This focus on changes in 
evaluations of neighborhoods adds to research on ethnic segregation by considering 
the household level dynamics that underlie ethnically connoted mobility streams. 
 
III.3.1 Ethnic Segregation and the Importance of Life Course 
Events 
Research on out-mobility of White households from ethnically concentrated, most 
often Black, neighborhoods (“White Flight”) has a long tradition in the U.S. to 
explain the persistence of high levels of ethnic segregation between Blacks and 
Whites (seminal, Crowder [2000]). It has long been debated as one major source of 
residential segregation and found substantial support in U.S. studies (Crowder, 
Hall, and Tolnay 2011; Hall and Crowder 2014; Quillian 2002).  
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Studies in Europe mostly support the White Flight thesis also, with “White” 
describing the “native” majority population moving out of areas with high share of 
ethnic minorities which migrated to Europe from non-Western countries. Skifter 
Andersen (2017) analyzes residential mobility of ethnic majorities and minorities in 
Denmark and concludes that White Flight contributes to residential segregation. 
Bolt, van Kempen, and van Ham (2008) similarly find that native Dutch are more 
likely than non-Western immigrants to move out of ethnically concentrated areas 
and settle in less concentrated neighborhoods. In line with these findings, wishes to 
leave neighborhoods are associated with neighborhood concentration of ethnic 
minorities (van Ham and Feijten 2008). Swedish studies rather find evidence for 
White Avoidance (the tendency of majority household to avoid ethnic 
neighborhoods when moving) when explaining the production and maintenance of 
ethnically concentrated areas, e.g. for the largest cities (Bråmå 2006) or the case of 
Stockholm in particular (Andersson 2013).  
The main focus of studies on White Flight is the association between ethnic 
composition and moving. Some of these studies are rather descriptive (Bråmå 2006), 
showing the extent of White Flight in comparison to other ethnic mobility patterns. 
Other studies adjust the association between ethnic composition and moving 
propensity for a variety of confounding variables, most notably socio-economic 
neighborhood and household characteristics (Hall and Crowder 2014; Skifter 
Andersen 2017). Since the association prevails after controlling for these variables 
they conclude that it is the ethnic compositions of the neighborhood, and not 
proxies of ethnic composition, that drives ethnic majority individuals out.  
 
III.3.2 Life-Course Events, Children and White Flight 
While the reviewed studies above present evidence for the existence of White Flight 
as an aggregate residential mobility flow, some of their authors note that individual 
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reasons for White Flight are not well known (Bolt et al. 2008: 1381; Skifter 
Andersen 2017: 298). The present study aims at deepening our understanding about 
household level dynamics behind White Flight by focusing on life course events like 
having children (Goyette et al. 2014) which might trigger a change in neighborhood 
perceptions and preferences of individuals who live in ethnically diverse areas.  
This change in perception is important because the current inhabitants in ethnically 
diverse areas are the product of selection processes that took place before the start 
of a given empirical investigation. For example, White Avoidance, the reluctance 
of Whites to move into ethnically concentrated areas, plays a large role in 
explaining residential segregation (Bråmå 2006; Quillian 2002; Skifter Andersen 
2017). If this avoidance is associated with certain individual characteristics, like 
being less open towards ethnic diversity (Schlueter et al. 2018), those living with 
ethnic minorities can be expected to be somewhat more tolerant towards ethnic 
minorities than the rest of the population. This prompts the question, what makes 
them leave? 
A promising research agenda for the analysis of White Flight thus asks which 
household level events trigger changes in the assessment of the neighborhood, which 
then leads to an out-movement of established diversity dwellers. This line of 
argument fits with research on the contradiction between liberal attitudes and 
behavior, exemplified e.g. by Dutch majority individuals who favor diversity, but 
are reluctant to invest in social ties in ethnically mixed neighborhoods (Blokland 
and van Eijk 2010), or highly educated Whites in the U.S. who choose alternative 
schooling when living in neighborhoods with high share of Blacks (Sikkink and 
Emerson 2008).  
One such event might be having children. Having children is a fundamental life 
course event for research on residential mobility. Whereas the presence of children 
in households is seen as an inhibitor of residential mobility, the event of having 
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children is associated with a higher probability of residential moves (Clark 2013; 
Michielin and Mulder 2008).  
There is cross-sectional evidence that ethnic majority families with children are less 
likely to live in neighborhoods with other ethnic groups than other ethnic majority 
families for the German case (see also Iceland et al., 2010, for the U.S.). Drever 
(2008) finds that the proportion of Germans with school-aged children living in 
postal code areas with high shares of foreign born is lower compared to Germans 
living in neighborhoods with low shares of foreign born. Similarly, Teltemann and 
colleagues find substantial ethnic segregation in major German cities for families 
with 15 year old children (Teltemann, Dabrowski, and Windzio 2015). Note that 
these findings leave open the question where this lack of school-aged children comes 
from, that is, whether natives really move out when they have children or because 
of other reasons. 
Goyette, Iceland and Weininger are among the few who apply panel regressions to 
study the effects of transitions into parenthood and having school aged children on 
out-mobility of White families (Goyette et al. 2014). Using the data for the U.S., 
their results show that White households’ probability to move with children below 
the age of six increases with the neighborhood share of Blacks and diversity in a 
neighborhood, thus providing evidence for the “Parental White Flight” thesis. My 
study has a similar scope, but extends their work by distinguishing between 
different age groups of children and by analyzing both migrant and native 
households.  
Several potential mechanisms can explain why the propensity to leave areas when 
having children should vary with ethnic composition of the neighborhood (Goyette 
et al. 2014; Krysan 2002). First of all, perceptions of neighborhood ethnic 
composition might change because individuals start to associate the ethnicity of 
their neighbors with negative consequence for their children. These subjective 
preferences might be affected by media portrayals of crime in ethnically diverse 
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areas or worries about ethnic closure on part of the migrant population (for example 
in schools) and involve some degree of prejudice or perceived threat (Krysan 2002).  
Second, other conditions that are often found in ethnically concentrated 
neighborhoods but are not caused by the ethnic composition itself (Krysan 2002) 
might be given more significance after having children. Certain amenities of 
neighborhoods gain importance after having children, kindergartens and medical 
services (e.g. pediatricians) and the quality, size, and availability of housing. Studies 
also find higher pollution levels in ethnically concentrated neighborhoods 
(Rüttenauer 2018). In addition, parents might pay more attention to the socio-
demographic composition of neighborhoods than non-parents and areas with high 
concentrations of households with immigration background are often socio-
economically disadvantaged (Drever 2004, 2008; Schönwalder and Sohn 2009).  
These considerations lead me to the first hypothesis which applies to native families 
after having children: 
H1: The probability to leave a given neighborhood after having a child (in contrast 
to before having a child) of native households increases with the share of ethnic 
minorities in the neighborhood (Parental White Flight Hypothesis).  
The same can be assumed for households with migration background. However, 
immigrant households typically face additional challenges when looking for new 
dwellings. For example, they often face discrimination on the housing market 
(Auspurg, Schneck, and Hinz 2018). Furthermore, some migrant households might 
also want to stay in neighborhoods with ethnic concentrations to stay near co-
ethnics (Boschman and van Ham 2015). Both mechanisms could detain migrant 
households to move when having children. Since it is unclear what to expect for 
households with migration background, and there is reason to believe that the 
problems faced in specific neighborhoods are the same for both families with and 
without migrants, I remain with the following working hypothesis, which expects 
the same as for native households: 
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H2: The probability to leave a given neighborhood after having a child (in contrast 
to before having a child) of households with migration background increases with 
the share of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood (Parental Flight Hypothesis). 
Whereas the above hypotheses expect a rise in the probability to leave a 
neighborhood when having children to remain constant after the child is born, there 
is reason to expect that parents are particularly susceptible to move out of diverse 
areas when their children are of pre-school age (defined here as three to five years 
of age). Often the quality of schools is referred to as an essential cause of White 
Flight (Owens 2017; Schindler Rangvid 2009). This can also be expected in the 
German case. In most German states, children are assigned to primary schools close 
to their parents’ place of residence based on catchment areas. Though it is 
sometimes possible to sidetrack this assignment by applying for private or 
integrated schools (Breidenstein, Krüger, and Roch 2014; Noreisch 2007), the large 
majority of pupils still visit public schools (Statistisches Bundesamt 2017). In this 
institutional context, parents might be especially inclined to base their residential 
decisions on the availability and perceived quality of schools in that neighborhood.  
Assuming that these considerations are particularly prevalent for parents when 
their children are of pre-school age, this leads me to the “school flight” hypothesis, 
which is an extension of H1 with a focus on the timing of moves with respect to 
the age of the children:  
H3: The interaction between the presence of children and neighborhood share of 
ethnic minorities from H1 is particularly pronounced for native households when 
children are of pre-school age, as compared to shortly after birth (School White 
Flight Hypothesis). 
The same can be assumed for households with migration background: 
H4: The interaction between the presence of children and neighborhood share of 
ethnic minorities from H1 is particularly pronounced for households with migration 
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background when children are of pre-school age, as compared to shortly after birth 
(School Flight Hypothesis). 
 
III.4 Data and Methods 
III.4.1 Data 
To address my research question I use data on households from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) from 2007 to 2016, merged with geo-coded data on the 
neighborhoods of SOEP households from the microm-SOEP dataset (Goebel et al. 
2014).  
The SOEP is a Germany-wide panel study that is conducted since 1984 (Wagner 
et al. 2007), where each individual above the age of 18 in a sampled household is 
interviewed annually. Panel data allows researchers to follow the household’s 
residential choices over time and to study the effects of the event of having children, 
as households are observed before and after children of specific age are present. In 
addition, the SOEP provides rich information on the living conditions of 
respondents and thus allows for the adjustment of a comprehensive set of 
confounding factors.  
Information on SOEP respondents’ neighborhoods comes from microm, a private 
company which gathers data mostly for marketing purposes (microm 2015). Microm 
relies on sources like the German postal service, official administrative data and 
real estate services. More and more scientific studies make use of this unique data 
source (Dittmann and Goebel 2010; Lancee and Schaeffer 2015; Lersch 2013) 
because it offers information on fine-grained, neighborhood-like contextual units 
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(Goebel et al. 2014) and thus greatly exceeds possibilities of German administrative 
data for neighborhood research.23 
Neighborhoods are represented by so-called “Marktzellen” from 2007 to 2010, an 
own regional classification by microm, which are then replaced by "Postleitzahl 8" 
regions from 2011 onwards, which are fine-grained subdivisions of German postal 
code areas. These classifications aim at encompassing homogeneous areas in terms 
of spatial and building related characteristics. On average 500 households live in 
one PLZ8 region (microm 2015).24 In additional analyses both neighborhood 
classifications show to encompass similar numbers of inhabitants and there are no 
major breaks in average ethnic composition between 2011 and 2012.  
I restrict the sample to household years where the youngest woman is between 18 
and 45 years old (in single households the same rule is applied to men), and 
households which were at least interviewed twice. In addition, I restrict the analysis 
to areas which are classified as “urban” by the German Federal Institute for 
Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development to have a more 
homogenous sample.25 Furthermore, my empirical analyses are stratified by 
migration background of the household members. Households of migration 
background are defined as having either, zero native German members and at least 
one of migration background, or one native member and more members of migration 
background. The reverse definition applies for native households. Migration 
background in the SOEP encompasses individuals who themselves migrated to 
Germany, or whose parents migrated to Germany (indirect migration background). 
                                      
23 The microm-SOEP dataset is provided by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in 
Berlin (Goebel et al. 2014), and is only accessible at site for reasons of data protection. 
24 Own analyses show that the average population density of SOEP households’ neighborhoods is 
higher, presumably a result of the SOEP’s random sampling process (where naturally higher 
populated areas are over-represented). 
25 Even though this restriction affects many observations, it does not change the overall conclusions. 
The information on urban areas is provided in the hbrutto dataset. 
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I will provide more information on migrant households in the section “Descriptive 
Results”. 
 
III.4.2 Variables  
The primary outcome variable indicates whether a household moved between this 
and the next measurement occasion. A move is defined as encompassing (a) having 
a new address and (b) having a new neighborhood identifier, which means a change 
in neighborhood.26  
My main independent variables are based on indicators for the presence of children 
in the household. To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I use a variable which stays unity 
once a new born child entered the household (the post-child or post-treatment 
indicator). I consider the first transition from not having a new born child into 
having a new born child that I can observe in each household panel as my 
treatment. That is, there needs to be at least one measurement occasion within 
household panels where there is no new born child before a child enters the 
household to qualify as my treatment. The reason for only considering one possible 
transition into having a child within household panels is that it indicates a clear 
before and after, which is preferable for the kind of fixed-effects design that I aim 
at.  
Note that I do not restrict the sample to childless households for my main analyses. 
This means that some households that already have children get treated when they 
experience a transition into having a new child. I am aware of the fact that this is 
not an ideal solution because some households already got treated in the past. 
However, it is prompted by the low number of households that have their first child 
in my sample which limits statistical inference. As robustness check I still restrict 
                                      
26If there is missing information whether a household crossed neighborhood boundaries when moving, 
I treated condition (a), having a new address, as sufficient to classify as a move. 
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the sample to childless households to check whether the results largely deviate from 
my main models. 
I further add two variables that capture whether the first transition in having a 
new born child occurred either in two years or in the next year (e.g. during or 
shortly before pregnancy) to capture anticipation effects in all models (Michielin 
and Mulder 2008). To test hypotheses 3 and 4, I refine the treatment indicator into 
three periods: one period up to 2 years (new born), one from 3 to 5 years (pre-
school age), and 6 years or later (school age) after the first transition in having a 
new born child occurred.  
The third main variable which I expect to moderate the effect of children on 
residential mobility is the percentage of ethnic minorities in a neighborhood, or 
“ethnic concentration”. Information on the cultural origin of inhabitants of certain 
neighborhoods comes from a name analysis which traces the linguistic origin of 
household heads living in PLZ8 regions (microm 2015). For the German case, I 
consider ethnic minorities as those of African, Asian, Balkan, Eastern European, 
Turkish and non-European Muslim origin.27 For my main models I interact a time-
stable operationalization of this variable with the children variables of interest (see 
“Statistical Models and Analytic Strategy”). I also use the share minority in the 
destination neighborhood for those households which moved to study where the 
households in my sample move.  
For some analyses I also use a categorical version of the share minority variable. 
The cut-off points are informed by the mean minority share within categories of an 
item asking for the perceived share of “families who are not from Germany” which 
was asked in the SOEP 2014. Household heads responding “none” have a mean of 
                                      
27 See also Goebel and Hoppe (2015) for a double check comparison of the microm data on ethnic 
minorities with the German census in 2011. Furthermore, in the SOEP there is a strong relationship 
between the subjectively perceived share of minorities in a neighborhood in 2014 and the minority 
share variable obtained with the microm data (own analyses, available upon request). 
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around 3 on the percent minority variable which is then chosen as a cut-off for the 
first category (0-3% minorities). The other categories are 3-7% (“less than a 
quarter”), 7-10% (“about a quarter”) and 10-64% (“about half” and “most”).28 The 
thresholds 3%, 7% and 10% seem rather low when thinking of diverse 
neighborhoods, but a number of studies show that relevant tipping thresholds that 
trigger out-mobility might be located at seemingly low levels of minority shares (see 
Aldén, Hammarstedt, and Neuman [2015] for the case of Sweden; and Card, Mas, 
and Rothstein [2008] for the U.S.).  
The SOEP includes measures for a variety of variables that might confound the 
relationship between children and moving out of a neighborhood. Especially 
competing life course events within households might affect the probability to have 
children and to move. I include measures of whether at least one individual within 
a household is not working, in training, unemployed, working or experienced a job 
transition; whether singles, couples, or spouses live in the households; how many 
adults live in the household (to capture household composition); whether other 
children are present; homeownership; household post-government income (an 
imputed version from the SOEP pequiv data file, I also add an indicator for the 
share of household income that was imputed); and a categorical age specification 
to capture unmeasured life-course effects. Additionally, I add dwelling related 
variables: a subjective assessment of the appropriateness of its size (5 point scale 
with responses “far too small”, “somewhat too small”, “about right”, “somewhat 
too big” to “far too big”), and an indicator of room stress (number of persons 
divided by number of rooms). I also control for the time a household spent at a 
certain address to compare those households that spend the same time in a 
neighborhood but do not have children with those that have children. This variable 
                                      
28 Original wording: “Wie viele Familien hier im Wohngebiet stammen nicht aus Deutschland?”. 
There is also a response “all”, which was chosen only by extremely few household heads. In the 
German context it also makes little sense to speak of neighborhoods where “all” neighbors are of 
migration background, so I dropped this category. 
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is based on information on the year a household moved into a certain address, and 
after the household enters my sample, increases by one year with each successive 
year until a household moves. This variable is added as a cubic term in all regression 
models to allow for a flexible functional form. 
 
III.4.3 Statistical Models and Analytic Strategy 
My design aims at comparing households before and after having children. Effects 
estimates are obtained via Fixed-Effects Linear Probability Models (FE-LPM). The 
main advantage of these models is that they account for all time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity (Allison 2009). In my set-up, this means that I adjust for 
all stable household and neighborhood characteristics that might affect having 
children and residential mobility. For example, stable household preferences to live 
in neighborhoods with certain shares of ethnic minorities are controlled. This is a 
powerful approach for social science research where unmeasured characteristics are 
ubiquitous. In contrast to non-linear alternatives, Linear Probability Models have 
the advantage of being easily interpretable and their coefficients can be compared 
between groups. All reported standard errors are clustered within household panels. 
Linear Probability Models might give appropriate estimates of marginal effects in 
many empirical settings (Breen, Karlson, and Holm 2018). However, note that in 
the face of low outcome probabilities, which can be expected with a rare outcome 
like moving, the caveat of the FE-LPM to not bound probabilities between zero 
and one could nonetheless be problematic. I adopt two strategies to rule out that 
my final conclusions are mainly driven by inconsistent estimation of the FE-LPM: 
(1) I estimate FE-LPMs without controls. These turn out to predict almost no 
values below zero, but overall lend support to similar conclusions as my full models. 
Note also, that, should the FE-LPM overestimate the true effect, this should be the 
case for both migrants and natives and thus we might still learn from comparing 
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results between the two groups. (2) I run Random-Effect probit regressions (“RE-
probit”) and calculate Average Marginal Effects from these. Unfortunately, these 
do not control for unobserved heterogeneity, but might help to make my results 
more plausible when considering the direction of the effect.  
I additionally censor household panels after their first move, resulting in a sample 
that comprises only one neighborhood for each household. This might seem like a 
loss of information, but is prompted for two reasons. First, it takes full advantage 
of the fixed-effects models. As every household lived in just one neighborhood for 
the period of observation the fixed-effects regressions also control all time-invariant 
neighborhood characteristics that a household experiences within the time in my 
sample. This may include many local conditions, like the broader housing market 
or the socio-economic make up of a neighborhood, which usually do not change in 
the short run.29 Second, it allows for the estimation of the effect of interest within 
the outlined methodology, as it assures that the share of minorities, with which the 
children variable is interacted, clearly pertains to the neighborhood where the child 
is born. I define this stable pre-treatment minority share variable as the mean 
minority share of households within a neighborhood over time. One might add that 
causal models in which moderators are allowed to vary over time require more 
complex methods (Robins, Greenland, and Hu 1999), which do not naturally control 
for unobserved confounders. I discuss shortcomings of the design in the final section. 
 
                                      
29 The potential of fixed-effects models to account for unobserved characteristics is limited to the 
degree in which the (unobserved and dynamic) household history of neighborhood characteristics 
affects the current outcome and treatment. This information is for the most part not available due 
to left-censoring. That is, I assume that residential mobility histories before the onset of this study 
do not affect fertility decisions. This assumption is almost always made in the social sciences when 
dealing with panel data and new data is needed to relax it. 
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III.5 Results 
I will present the results in three sections. The first is descriptive, giving information 
on my sample of analysis and the neighborhood conditions of those living in 
neighborhoods of different diversity. I then present my main models of the effect of 
children on the probability to leave neighborhoods, dependent on the share of 
minorities. In the third section, I descriptively show where those households that 
leave certain neighborhoods move to. 
III.5.1 Descriptive Results 
Table III.1 and table III.2 report household-year statistics for my sample of analysis, 
stratified by categories of neighborhood minority share and by migration 
background. Most of the results are in line with expectations and findings from 
other studies. Table III.1 shows the variables that are used in my regression models. 
Among other things, it shows that both native and migrant diversity dwellers are 
more likely to be unemployed, primarily rent their dwelling and earn lower incomes 
than those living in less diverse areas. For natives, one can clearly see that they 
stay in diverse neighborhoods for shorter time periods and have a higher probability 
to move (van Ham and Clark 2009).  
Table III.2 shows additional information on the living conditions and household 
composition of households living in diverse and less diverse areas. Inhabitants of 
diverse areas also live in areas with higher unemployment rate and lower purchasing 
power. Interestingly, among the native households we can also see drastically lower 
percentages of school-aged children in the neighborhoods that are more diverse than 
in the less diverse neighborhoods, lending first support for the overall thesis of this 
study (Drever 2008). The percentage of households with newborn children is about 
the same in categories of high concentration of ethnic minorities, compared to the 
lower concentrated neighborhoods.  
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As already noted in “Data and Methods”, an ideal sample for the research question 
at hand would include only childless households. In table III.2 we can clearly see 
why: the low percentage of households with school aged children might be due to 
the fact that many households moved away before the beginning of my study when 
they had children, leaving me with a less clear cut effect estimate of having children. 
If this selection account is true, the effect estimates found in this paper are likely 
to be lower than in a sample of individual that do not have any children.  
Table III.1 also shows children variables, but this time they indicate the transition 
which is of relevance for the regression models below. Of particular relevance is the 
fact that in each of the categories of neighborhood ethnic diversity, the probability 
of having a transition into entering the period after having a child is relatively 
similar, which makes it the more interesting whether households move away after 
having a child.  
The overall distribution of the percent minority variable is heavily skewed to the 
left with a mean of 5.31 in the sample of native households and 8.36 for migrant 
households. These seemingly low values are due to two reasons. First, the SOEP is 
a random sample of the German population does not sample many individuals from 
very diverse neighborhoods. Thus, the most diverse of neighborhoods are not 
represented well in my data. Second, my operationalization of ethnic composition 
is restricted to certain ethnic groups which might result in a lower value of minority 
share than if one would use all non-natives. 
Finally, I want to note that my sample of households with migration background 
presents a very heterogeneous sample in terms of country of origin. The individuals 
living in households with migration background in my sample are primarily from 
Turkey (19%), Russia (11%), Kazakhstan (11%), Poland (10%), Kosovo (5%) and 
Italy (4%). Despite this heterogeneity, it is of prime interest to compare results 
between natives and households of migration background to give first indications 
about whether a White Flight pattern exists. This information on the composition 
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of the migrant sample might help researchers to make their own assessment about 
possible generalizations from this sample. 
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Table III.1: Sample descriptives, mean values of variables by categories of neighborhood share of ethnic minorities for native and migrant 
households. 
 Native Households Migrant households 
 0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-64% 0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-64% 
Outcome variable:         
Move out neighborhood until next year 0.025 0.048 0.051 0.070 0.039 0.054 0.047 0.052 
Post-child indicator:         
Child variable, post-treatment indicator 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.17 
More differentiated age of child transitions:         
New born, up to 2 years 0.088 0.090 0.086 0.100 0.13 0.10 0.092 0.14 
Pre-school age, 3 to 5 years 0.038 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.040 0.032 0.021 0.032 
School age and beyond 0.0062 0.0050 0.0038 0.0034 0.0053 0.0039 0.0032 0.0014 
Control variables:         
More than one child 0.40 0.37 0.29 0.29 0.48 0.42 0.42 0.47 
Homeownership 0.57 0.44 0.34 0.24 0.44 0.38 0.30 0.16 
Family relations in HH:  - No partner 0.37 0.39 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.35 
 - Partner in HH (ref. no partner) 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.22 0.071 0.049 0.059 0.035 
 - Spouse in HH (ref. no partner) 0.49 0.49 0.41 0.36 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.61 
Mean HH age, five categories:  - <25 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.13 
 - 25-29 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.16 
 - 30-39 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.46 0.54 0.54 0.56 0.58 
 - 40-45 0.26 0.29 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.13 
At least one HH member not working 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.30 
At least one HH member in training 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.18 
At least one HH member unemployed 0.069 0.064 0.090 0.093 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.19 
At least one HH member working 0.67 0.68 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.58 0.54 0.48 
At least one HH member changed jobs 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.29 
Household income in EUR 44312.6 45780.8 40183.7 38429.4 41017.2 37629.6 35792.1 30510.4 
HH income imputation flag 0.12 0.12 0.100 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.085 0.096 
No. of adults in HH 2.15 2.00 1.96 1.91 2.17 2.10 2.15 2.14 
Persons per rooms 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.95 1.02 1.13 
Dwelling size assessment 2.85 2.78 2.78 2.69 2.78 2.67 2.62 2.49 
Years at current address  10.7 9.06 9.55 8.50 8.65 8.22 8.45 8.14 
Observations 5611 6198 1847 1784 749 1804 933 1468 
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Table III.2: Neighborhood and child composition of households in sample of analysis. These variables are not used in the statistical models 
and just serve the purpose of describing the sample. 
 Native Households Migrant households 
 0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-64% 0-3% 3-7% 7-10% 10-64% 
 mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
Household children composition  
(not transition): 
        
Child of age 0 to 2 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.21 
Child of pre-school age 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Child of school age 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.56 0.51 0.53 0.54 
No. children 1.24 1.15 0.95 0.93 1.49 1.30 1.32 1.49 
Neighborhood characteristics:         
Type of housing:  - Rural housing 0.040 0.014 0.0055 0.015 0.020 0.0028 0.0022 0.0027 
 - Detached one or two family house 0.44 0.26 0.19 0.12 0.36 0.19 0.10 0.028 
 - One or two family terrace house 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.25 0.17 0.096 0.073 
 - Residential building 3-4 dwellings 0.091 0.12 0.14 0.098 0.13 0.16 0.089 0.14 
 - Residential building 5-8 dwellings 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.36 0.13 0.31 0.36 0.40 
 - Residential building 9 or more dwellings 0.072 0.15 0.23 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.31 0.27 
 - High-rise 0.011 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.022 0.031 0.082 
Unemployment rate 5.48 6.30 8.88 12.8 4.35 6.22 9.12 13.3 
Number of inhabitants 1233.8 1456.5 1512.1 1388.0 1358.4 1512.3 1531.5 1371.6 
Purchasing power 21342.0 22188.4 20697.0 18842.4 22228.0 22359.8 21018.1 18691.9 
Number of houses 350.8 330.5 257.5 174.6 391.4 336.7 255.4 170.0 
Observations 5611 6198 1847 1784 749 1804 933 1468 
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III.5.2 Leaving the Neighborhood 
In the following, I will first present my findings about the association between 
leaving a neighborhood and being in the period after the first transition into having 
a new born child that I can observe in a houshold panel (post-child indicator) for 
varying values of the share of minorities in the neighborhood. I will do so in detail, 
showing results for both natives to test H1 and migrants to test H2, and also discuss 
additional model specifications. I then turn to models that consider the succession 
of different age stages of the first newborn child to test H3 and H4. 
Figure III.1 shows the marginal effects of the first newborn child that enters the 
household in the period of observation (post-child indicator) conditional on the 
neighborhood share of ethnic minorities for both native and migrant households. 
The underlying regression models, shown fully in table III.A1, all include an 
interaction term between three child variables (the two anticipation indicators and 
the post-child indicator) and a time-stable version of neighborhood share minorities. 
This interaction is of prime interest because it signals whether those in diverse 
neighborhoods react differently when they have children. Note that I chose a 
quadratic minority share specification with the post-child indicator because further 
data analysis suggests a declining effect of having children at upper values of the 
minority share variable. 
The left part of figure III.1 shows the effect of children for native households on the 
probability to move, conditional on share minorities. Of the native group, 590 
experienced a transition into having children. Figure III.1 clearly shows that the 
probability to move when having children steadily and substantially increases with 
the share of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood. To better understand these 
results, note that the probability of moving due to children is about 19 percentage 
points when living in a neighborhood with 14% minorities (the 95% percentile in 
the sample of native households), as compared to almost no effect when living in a 
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neighborhood with 1% minorities (the 5% percentile). Especially when considering 
that moving is a rare event in the German population, these effects are substantial.  
Furthermore, model 1 in table III.A1 indicates a significant interaction with the 
one year and two year anticipation effect, suggesting that households move out of 
the more diverse areas during or shortly before pregnancy more often than out of 
less diverse areas. This also hints at violations of the parallel trend assumption as 
the interaction of minority share with the two year lead is also quite strong.  In 
further models (not shown), I also include a three year lead of the treatment dummy 
whose coefficient does not display a higher probability to move. This is reassuring, 
as it indicates that the probability to move increases around the time a child is 
born, and not before. However, when interpreting these results it should be kept in 
mind that having children is often planned in advance which makes estimating 
effects of precise events like birth or pregnancy difficult. Still, these models show 
that compared to households of similar mean age and length of residence (and other 
covariates), those that have or are about to have children are by far more likely to 
leave diverse neighborhoods.  
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Figure III.1: Marginal effect of post-children indicator on probability to move out of a 
neighborhood from Fixed-Effects Linear Probability Models for native (left) and migrant 
background (right) households with 95% Confidence Bands. 
In order to claim that there is “White Flight”, and not just “Parental Flight”, I 
also show that households with migration background do not display similar 
residential mobility behavior. I run the same models as with native households in 
a sample of households with migration background. The marginal effects of having 
children conditional on share minorities are shown in the right panel of figure III.1 
(from model 4 in table III.A1). It turns out that in my sample, households with 
migration background are less likely to move out when having children, the higher 
the share of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood. 
Precise statistical inference for households with migration background over the 
whole range of the share minority variable is difficult, which is also apparent from 
the large confidence intervals in the right panel of figure III.1. This is also due to 
the small sample and small number of transitions into having a child: Only 287 
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households with migration background experience such a transition. Thus, the exact 
size of this effect should not be over interpreted, and it might be likely that there 
is a null effect (the interaction terms are also not significant in table III.A1). 
However, taking into consideration the large effect I found for native households 
(left panel of figure III.1), I propose that we can learn from the comparison of the 
two models by concluding that native households show more substantial out-
mobility behavior when having children than households of migration background. 
To check the robustness of these results, I also estimate models similar to those 
underlying figure III.1 with probit link function and random household intercepts 
(“RE-probit”). The left panel of figure III.2 plots the corresponding average 
marginal effects for native households. In line with the previous findings, the higher 
the percentage of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood of origin, the higher the 
probability of moving out of this neighborhood when having children. It suggests 
that newborn children increase the probability to leave a neighborhood by around 
10 percentage points in areas with 12 percent minorities, whereas in less diverse 
areas with 1 percent minorities the increase is about 4 percentage points. For 
households with migration background I find, again, a decreasing effect of children 
on the probability to move with increasing share of minorities in the neighborhood. 
The increase of the average marginal effect of children on moving with increasing 
minority share from the RE-probit is far less substantial than in the FE-LPM case, 
which could be due to two reasons. First, the RE-probit does not control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. Should unobserved heterogeneity have a large influence, 
the RE-probit would be biased. Second, it could be because the RE-probit bounds 
the probabilities correctly between zero and one, in which case the FE-LPM may 
give biased effect estimates. A conservative interpretation suggests that the true 
effect might lie somewhere in between.  
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Figure III.2: Average marginal effect of post-children indicator from Random-Effects probit 
(RE-probit) regression models for native (left) and migrant background (right) households 
with 95% Confidence Bands. 
An often noted reason why parents leave ethnically concentrated neighborhoods is 
the availability of high quality schools. Under the assumption that parents make 
schooling decisions once their children are about to be in school and not shortly 
after birth, we can expect that they move away when their children are of pre-
school age. Indeed, model 3 in table III.A1 shows that an interaction term between 
a dummy variable which turns one when the child turns into pre-school age and 
share minorities, is larger than for new born children. However, model 3 also 
indicates that new born children trigger out-movement out of the more diverse 
areas, suggesting that the search for schools alone does not suffice as an explanation 
for Parental White Flight. The data thus reject hypothesis H3: Parental White 
Flight does not happen primarily when children are of pre-school age. 
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As an important robustness checks, I run models with an interaction between 
children and a categorical share minorities variable with similar categories as in 
table III.1 which showed descriptive statistics (see table III.A2 in the appendix). 
Interestingly, these models show that main fluctuations of families with children 
out of neighborhoods occur in mildly diverse areas, and not only in the most diverse 
areas in my sample. Additionally, in table III.A3, I report models with households 
which have no children in their first household year. Here again, the main 
conclusions remain the same.  
To sum up, the findings presented show a substantial increase in mobility for native 
households living in neighborhoods with high shares of ethnic minorities when 
having children. I do not find such a pattern for migration background households. 
In the next section, I will describe the destination of mobile native households. 
 
III.5.3 Moving into a New Neighborhood 
After establishing a robust association between having children and mobility out of 
diverse neighborhoods, I now turn to the destination of those native households 
that move. To understand whether the higher probability to move has the potential 
to impact ethnic segregation, it is necessary to know whether those that move also 
settle in neighborhoods with fewer minorities. I am focusing on native households 
since the former analyses suggest that it is those households that move out of 
diverse areas when children are present. 
Figure III.3 shows the share of minorities in the neighborhood of origin and 
destination for native households before and after a move, separately for household 
years in which households did not transition into having a newborn child (dark 
grey bars) and household years after a household transitioned into having a new 
born child (light grey bars). It indicates that both movers with and without children 
from origin neighborhoods in the upper two categories of share minorities end up 
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in areas with lower share of minorities than their neighborhoods of origin. It is 
important to note that the results from the previous section still apply: Households 
with children from diverse areas have a higher probability to move than those 
without children. Even if they end up in similarly diverse areas as those that move 
without children, they have higher potential to add to segregation by leaving 
neighborhoods more often than those without children. 
Concerning the destination neighborhoods of German ethnic majority households, 
we can thus conclude that they do not only leave neighborhoods with high shares 
of ethnic minorities when they have children with a higher probability than those 
that do not have children, but also settle in new neighborhoods with a lower share 
of ethnic minorities than where they lived before. 
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Figure III.3: Mean share minorities for native households before and after move, by 
categories of share minorities of origin neighborhood and before and after first transition 
into having a child within household panels  
(households having no child in the period of observation fall in the “before child” category). 
 
III.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study tests the “Parental White Flight” thesis which states that ethnic 
majority families move away from ethnically diverse areas when having children for 
the case of Germany. I extend prior studies (Goyette et al. 2014) by investigating 
whether households with migration background display similar mobility behavior 
as native households, and by distinguishing two different age categories of children 
at which households are theoretically expected to move (before and after birth; and 
at pre-school age). My fixed-effects design controls for all time-constant effects of 
stable unobserved neighborhood or household characteristics that could affect both 
having children and moving.  
119 
 
Results from a variety of models show that the effect of children on moving out of 
neighborhoods substantially increases with the share of ethnic minorities in the 
neighborhood. This effect is evident for newborn children and children of pre-school 
age. I do not find evidence for such effects for households with migration 
background. Furthermore, native movers more often settle in neighborhoods with 
a lower share of ethnic minorities than their neighborhood of origin.  
This paper thus demonstrates the significance of young children for ethnic majority 
families’ mobility behavior out of ethnically concentrated neighborhoods (Goyette 
et al. 2014). It also matches findings from other studies that show that preferences 
for isolation are more pronounced among Whites than minorities (Van Der Laan 
Bouma-Doff 2007). 
My findings point to several possible consequences for neighborhoods and cities. 
The consequences for aggregate ethnic segregation are difficult to assess, as those 
households that have children are only a small fraction of all majority households 
and knowledge is needed about who replaces those who left. Nonetheless, children 
are a plausible channel through which segregation might take place and further 
studies about aggregate mobility patterns are needed (Skifter Andersen 2017) to 
assess the overall impact on segregation. In addition, detrimental effects for social 
cohesion in a neighborhood as noted in the introduction might still occur, and the 
readiness of young native parents to leave might be the expression of a greater 
unawareness of the effects of their individual mobility decisions for the 
neighborhood. Tragically, it is particularly families with children who could 
stabilize such neighborhoods (Schaeffer 2013b). My findings also have implications 
for theoretical models of ethnic segregation in the wake of Schelling (1971), where 
neighborhood preferences are assumed to be stable. My results suggest that 
neighborhood preferences change with specific events and thus, depending on the 
precise assumptions about group-specific behavior, a segregated state is attained 
120 
 
faster because those leaving trigger cascades of out-mobility, or no equilibrium state 
of segregation may be attained if other households fill in the vacant place. 
Despite the robust results, this study has several shortcomings. First, the sample 
size of young households, whose inhabitants are about to become parents and live 
in diverse neighborhoods is naturally relatively small in random samples like the 
SOEP. This does not allow me to relax parametric assumptions of my statistical 
models or to restrict the sample to childless households in all analyses.  
A second, and related, problem certainly pertains to the undifferentiated migration 
background variable that is used to stratify the analyses between native and 
migrant households. Further differentiation between the origins of immigrant 
households is necessary to see whether certain minority groups show specific 
mobility behavior. 
Third, though fixed-effects approaches are a powerful approach for the social 
sciences in the presence of unmeasured confounders, my design is also quite 
restrictive as it only looks at a small part of individual life courses. If the aim would 
be to assess effects of whole fertility histories on residential mobility (for example, 
mobility after the first and the second child), data over the whole life course is 
needed to avoid left-censoring, and more sophisticated models are in order. One 
statistical method of choice to deal with time-varying moderator variables (share 
minorities), which change with the outcome event moving, and time-varying 
confounders could be Structural Nested Models (Robins et al. 1999), but these 
methods do not naturally adjust for unmeasured cofounders. 
Fourth, concerning generalization, the German-wide scope of this study does not 
allow me to investigate how having children affects mobility under specific local 
circumstances. For example, in areas with competitive housing markets or 
neighborhoods undergoing gentrification one might expect White Flight to be less 
pronounced. In addition, my findings mainly apply to neighborhoods with low to 
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medium shares of ethnic minorities, though it can be expected that the effect of 
children is even stronger in the most diverse of neighborhoods in Germany. 
It also needs to be stressed that this study leaves open whether ethnic composition 
per se or other neighborhood or household characteristics that are correlated with 
ethnic composition drive families away once they have children. Most likely 
candidates are quality of schools and the socio-economic make up of neighborhoods. 
However, before endeavors of identifying further causes that interact with 
parenthood are undertaken, it makes sense to first establish the effect of children 
dependent on share minorities. This is because the potential detrimental 
consequences of mobility out of diverse neighborhoods of native families occur 
irrespective of the actual individual reasons. Certainly however, to guide policies to 
counter Parental White Flight, we need more studies on the specific individual 
reasons of those who “flee”.  
These shortcomings are natural implications of a sample that is not perfectly 
designed for the research question at hand. Still, it is of importance to assess the 
plausibility of the “Parental White Flight” thesis with existing data before engaging 
in new costly data collection. Given the robust and substantial association between 
children and mobility out of diverse areas, the differences between native 
households and those of migration background, my results demonstrate that this 
might be a worthwhile endeavor. I thus hope that future studies investigate further 
how life course events, residential mobility and diversity interact, and in how far 
they contribute to ethnic segregation and affect social cohesion. 
 
III.7 Study II Appendix 
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Table III.A1: Fixed-Effects linear probability models and Random-Effects probit models of move until next survey year.  
Share minorities is entered as a time-invariant variable, therefore no coefficients of share minorities can be estimated in the Fixed-Effects 
models. The main coefficients of interest are indicated by bold letters.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE-LPM: Native 
households: after 
having child 
indicator 
RE probit: Native 
households: after 
having child 
indicator 
FE-LPM: Native 
households: 
newborn and pre-
school indicator 
FE-LPM: Migrant 
households: after 
having child 
indicator 
RE probit: Migrant 
households: after 
having child 
indicator 
FE-LPM: Migrant 
households: 
newborn and pre-
school indicator 
       
Child born, t+2 -0.016 -0.047 -0.018 0.074 0.478+ 0.073 
 (0.026) (0.162) (0.026) (0.061) (0.268) (0.061) 
       Child born, t+2 X Neighb. 
share minorities 
0.009* 0.033* 0.009* -0.006 -0.034 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.004) (0.025) (0.004) 
       Child born, t+1 0.005 0.233+ 0.002 0.151* 0.463* 0.148* 
 (0.026) (0.134) (0.026) (0.061) (0.192) (0.061) 
       Child born, t+1 X Neighb. 
share minorities 
0.009* 0.017 0.010* -0.006 -0.013 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) (0.015) (0.004) 
       After child born -0.057* 0.436***  0.171* 0.786***  
 (0.028) (0.127)  (0.068) (0.199)  
       After child X Neighb. 
share minorities 
0.024*** 0.034  -0.008 -0.022  
 (0.006) (0.029)  (0.007) (0.033)  
       Neighb. share minorities²  -0.002**   0.000  
  (0.001)   (0.000)  
       After child X Neighb. 
share minorities² 
-0.001* -0.001  -0.000 -0.000  
 (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.001)  
       New born, up to 2 years   -0.020   0.173** 
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   (0.026)   (0.062) 
       New born, up to 2 years X 
Neighb. share minorities 
  0.012**   -0.009* 
   (0.004)   (0.004) 
       Pre-school age, 3 to 5 years   -0.067*   0.131+ 
   (0.031)   (0.076) 
       Pre-school age, 3 to 5 
years X Neighb. share 
minorities 
  0.019***   -0.005 
   (0.005)   (0.006) 
       School age and beyond    -0.026   0.221+ 
   (0.054)   (0.116) 
       School age and beyond X 
Neighb. share minorities 
  0.007   -0.025* 
   (0.007)   (0.011) 
       More than one child -0.015 -0.488*** -0.013 0.001 -0.410*** 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.062) (0.011) (0.024) (0.090) (0.024) 
       Owns home (ref. rents 
home) 
-0.026* -0.651*** -0.026* 0.004 -0.565*** 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.064) (0.011) (0.026) (0.101) (0.027) 
       Partner in HH (ref. no 
partner) 
-0.018 -0.032 -0.019 0.003 0.142 0.002 
 (0.016) (0.074) (0.016) (0.050) (0.149) (0.050) 
       Spouse in HH (ref. no 
partner) 
-0.001 0.017 -0.000 0.018 0.203+ 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.074) (0.014) (0.036) (0.105) (0.036) 
       25-29 0.036** 0.117 0.035** 0.004 0.141 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.076) (0.012) (0.023) (0.129) (0.023) 
       30-39 0.049*** -0.102 0.049*** 0.007 -0.123 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.078) (0.014) (0.030) (0.130) (0.030) 
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       40-45 0.021 -0.305** 0.020 -0.012 -0.201 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.094) (0.016) (0.033) (0.158) (0.033) 
       At least one HH member 
not working 
0.013+ -0.197** 0.012+ 0.005 -0.301** 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.075) (0.007) (0.013) (0.097) (0.013) 
       At least one HH member in 
training 
-0.016* -0.093 -0.016* -0.007 -0.079 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.076) (0.008) (0.015) (0.112) (0.015) 
       At least one HH member 
unemployed 
0.017+ -0.244** 0.016+ -0.012 -0.164 -0.012 
 (0.010) (0.087) (0.010) (0.017) (0.116) (0.017) 
       At least one HH member 
working 
0.011+ -0.066 0.010 0.011 -0.049 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.063) (0.007) (0.014) (0.091) (0.014) 
       At least one HH member 
changed jobs 
0.009 -0.025 0.008 0.012 0.106 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.060) (0.006) (0.013) (0.088) (0.013) 
       Household income 0.000** 0.000* 0.000** 0.000 0.000+ 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       HH income imputation flag 0.002 -0.031 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.010) (0.089) (0.010) (0.017) (0.139) (0.017) 
       No. of adults in HH -0.010 -0.281*** -0.010 -0.020 -0.176** -0.019 
 (0.007) (0.053) (0.007) (0.018) (0.063) (0.018) 
       Persons per rooms 0.040+ 0.160+ 0.041+ 0.074+ 0.171 0.076+ 
 (0.021) (0.083) (0.021) (0.039) (0.121) (0.039) 
       Dwelling size assessment -0.016** -0.178*** -0.017** -0.005 -0.137** -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.034) (0.006) (0.010) (0.051) (0.010) 
       Years at current address  0.045*** 0.003 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.029 0.045*** 
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 (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.007) (0.027) (0.007) 
       Years at current address² -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002 -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
       Years at current address³ 0.000*** 0.000+ 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
              Constant -0.199*** -0.623*** -0.203*** -0.262*** -1.082*** -0.270*** 
 (0.030) (0.170) (0.030) (0.064) (0.262) (0.064) 
No. household-years 15440 15440 15440 4954 4954 4954 
No. households 3693 3693 3693 1471 1471 1471 
Min. no. person-years per 
person 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
Max. no. person-years per 
person 
9 9 9 9 9 9 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Data: German Socio-Economic Panel 2007 to 2016 and microm neighborhood data (microm 2015). X indicates interaction 
terms.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table III.A2: Fixed-Effects linear probability models of move in next time period with categorical 
share of ethnic minority specification. 
Share minorities is entered as a time-invariant variable, therefore no coefficients of share 
minorities can be estimated in the Fixed-Effects models. The main coefficients of interest are 
indicated by bold letters. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Native households: 
categorical share 
minor., no 
covariates 
Native households: 
categorical share 
minor., covariates 
Migrant 
households: 
categorical share 
minor., no 
covariates 
Migrant 
households: 
categorical share 
minor., covariates 
Child born, t+2 0.061* 0.005 -0.001 -0.032 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.086) (0.086) 
     
3-7% Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
7-10% Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
10-64% Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
Child born, t+2 X 0-3% Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
Child born, t+2 X 3-7% -0.003 0.003 0.152 0.144 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.115) (0.115) 
     
Child born, t+2 X 7-
10% 
0.112+ 0.119+ -0.016 -0.037 
 (0.065) (0.064) (0.095) (0.094) 
     
Child born, t+2 X 10-
64% 
0.097 0.093 0.049 0.031 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.100) (0.100) 
     
Child born, t+1 0.068** -0.016 0.092 0.031 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.069) (0.070) 
     
Child born, t+1 X 0-3% Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
Child born, t+1 X 3-7% 0.083* 0.093* 0.211* 0.204+ 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.106) (0.108) 
     
Child born, t+1 X 7-
10% 
0.098 0.110 0.019 -0.013 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.090) (0.091) 
     
Child born, t+1 X 10-
64% 
0.182** 0.174* 0.018 -0.005 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.081) (0.082) 
     
After child 0.114*** -0.040+ 0.193** 0.061 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.068) (0.072) 
     
After child X 0-3% Ref. Ref Ref. Ref. 
     
After child X 3-7% 0.095** 0.108** 0.192+ 0.175 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.106) (0.108) 
     
After child X 7-10% 0.155* 0.165** -0.056 -0.093 
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 (0.063) (0.062) (0.090) (0.091) 
     
After child X 10-64% 0.209** 0.207** 0.006 -0.019 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.081) (0.083) 
     
More than one child  -0.016  0.002 
  (0.011)  (0.024) 
     
Owns home (ref. rents 
home) 
 -0.026*  0.007 
  (0.011)  (0.026) 
     
Partner in HH (ref. no 
partner) 
 -0.018  0.008 
  (0.016)  (0.049) 
     
Spouse in HH (ref. no 
partner) 
 -0.001  0.019 
  (0.014)  (0.036) 
     
25-29  0.037**  0.003 
  (0.012)  (0.023) 
     
30-39  0.050***  0.004 
  (0.014)  (0.030) 
     
40-45  0.021  -0.015 
  (0.016)  (0.033) 
     
At least one HH member 
not working 
 0.012+  0.006 
  (0.007)  (0.013) 
     
At least one HH member 
in training 
 -0.016*  -0.006 
  (0.008)  (0.015) 
     
At least one HH member 
unemployed 
 0.017+  -0.011 
  (0.009)  (0.016) 
     
At least one HH member 
working 
 0.011+  0.011 
  (0.007)  (0.014) 
     
At least one HH member 
changed jobs 
 0.009  0.013 
  (0.006)  (0.013) 
     
Household income  0.000**  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
HH income imputation 
flag 
 0.003  0.005 
  (0.010)  (0.017) 
     
No. of adults in HH  -0.010  -0.023 
  (0.007)  (0.018) 
     
Persons per rooms  0.041+  0.079* 
  (0.021)  (0.040) 
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Dwelling size assessment  -0.016**  -0.007 
  (0.006)  (0.010) 
     
Years at current address   0.045***  0.044*** 
  (0.003)  (0.007) 
     
Years at current address²  -0.002***  -0.002** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
     
Years at current address³  0.000***  0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
     
Constant 0.010** -0.201*** -0.001 -0.259*** 
 (0.003) (0.029) (0.008) (0.064) 
No. household-years 15440 15440 4954 4954 
No. households 3693 3693 1471 1471 
Min. no. person-years per 
person 
2 2 2 2 
Max. no. person-years per 
person 
9 9 9 9 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Data: German Socio-Economic Panel 2007 to 2016 and microm 
neighborhood data (microm 2015). X indicates interaction terms.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table III.A3: Regression with families without children in first household year only. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Native 
households: after 
children indicator 
Native 
households: 
newborn and pre-
school 
Migrant 
households: after 
children indicator 
Migrant 
households: 
newborn and pre-
school 
Child born, t+2 -0.070 -0.075 0.131 0.132 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.179) (0.178) 
     Child born, t+2 X Neighb. 
share minorities 
0.014+ 0.014+ -0.014 -0.014 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) 
     Child born, t+1 -0.027 -0.047 0.273 0.274 
 (0.053) (0.054) (0.185) (0.183) 
     Child born, t+1 X Neighb. 
share minorities 
0.019* 0.022* -0.022+ -0.021+ 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
     After child -0.167**  0.443+  
 (0.059)  (0.245)  
     After child X Neighb. share 
minorities 
0.062***  -0.021  
 (0.015)  (0.029)  
     After child X Neighb. share 
minorities² 
-0.002***  -0.000  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  
     Owns home (ref. rents home) -0.073** -0.077** 0.139 0.169 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.115) (0.125) 
     Partner in HH (ref. no partner) 0.032 0.031 0.040 0.038 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.084) (0.084) 
     Spouse in HH (ref. no partner) 0.035 0.038 0.082 0.076 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.065) (0.065) 
     25-29 0.027+ 0.024 0.032 0.033 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.032) (0.032) 
     30-39 0.021 0.016 0.035 0.045 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.053) (0.053) 
     40-45 -0.023 -0.029 -0.045 -0.032 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.065) (0.065) 
     At least one HH member not 
working 
-0.008 -0.016 0.027 0.034 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.040) (0.039) 
     At least one HH member in 
training 
-0.035* -0.037* 0.007 0.011 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.030) (0.030) 
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At least one HH member 
unemployed 
0.008 0.010 0.019 0.023 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.040) (0.041) 
     At least one HH member 
working 
0.015 0.012 0.052 0.056+ 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.032) (0.032) 
     At least one HH member 
changed jobs 
-0.003 -0.007 0.045 0.049 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.031) (0.031) 
     Household income 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     HH income imputation flag -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.040) (0.040) 
     No. of adults in HH -0.008 -0.011 -0.064 -0.064 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.058) (0.058) 
     
Persons per rooms -0.004 0.004 -0.035 -0.022 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.108) (0.106) 
     
Dwelling size assessment -0.022* -0.023* -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023) 
     
Years at current address  0.069*** 0.072*** 0.104*** 0.103*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) 
     
Years at current address² -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Years at current address³ 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
New born, up to 2 years  -0.050  0.497* 
  (0.055)  (0.204) 
     New born, up to 2 years X 
Neighb. share minorities 
 0.023*  -0.031* 
  (0.009)  (0.014) 
     Pre-school age, 3 to 5 years  -0.159**  0.292 
  (0.059)  (0.269) 
     Pre-school age, 3 to 5 years X 
Neighb. share minorities 
 0.023*  -0.015 
  (0.010)  (0.021) 
     School age and beyond   0.039  -0.140 
  (0.216)  (0.373) 
     School age and beyond X 
Neighb. share minorities 
 -0.011  0.008 
  (0.030)  (0.028) 
     Constant -0.206*** -0.212*** -0.329* -0.357* 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.144) (0.146) 
No. household-years 6321 6321 1534 1534 
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No. households 1632 1632 490 490 
Min. no. person-years per 
person 
2 2 2 2 
Max. no. person-years per 
person 
9 9 9 9 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Data: German Socio-Economic Panel 2007 to 2016 and microm 
neighborhood data (microm 2015). X indicates interaction terms.+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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IV. Study III: Neighborhood Ethnic Composition and 
Individual Neighborhood Embeddedness: The Role 
of Length of Residence 
 
IV.1 Abstract 
The association between local ethnic diversity and social cohesion has received 
widespread scientific attention. However, empirical studies on this topic are mostly 
cross-sectional and hypotheses are formulated statically. This study advances this 
field of research by taking a longitudinal perspective on how households get 
embedded, that is, form contacts with neighbors and perceive the density of ties 
among neighbors, in dependence of neighborhood ethnic diversity. I first derive 
hypothetical trajectories of embeddedness from canonical theories in the field. I 
then test these predictions by using panel data from the German Socio-Economic 
Panel study. I follow households that recently moved into a neighborhood for a 
period of five years, comparing their embeddedness at the beginning and at the end 
for different levels of neighborhood ethnic diversity. In addition, I propose a 
methodological approach to deal with potential selective out-mobility between the 
two time points. I find substantial increases of embeddedness after staying five 
years in both diverse and non-diverse areas. This suggests that network formation 
processes unfold which are not easily explained by either anomie or threat theories. 
However, the probability to perceive close-knit relations among neighbors stays at 
a relatively low level in diverse areas. I end by pointing to possible effects of past 
neighborhood experiences of long term inhabitants that might explain loose 
networks in diverse neighborhoods.  
 
IV.2 Introduction 
For over a decade there has been widespread social scientific interest in the stylized 
fact that higher local ethnic diversity is associated with lower social cohesion 
(seminal, Putnam [2007]). The debate is still far from reaching a consensus about 
the substantive importance and causal implications of this association. However, 
on the very local level of the neighborhood, diversity has been shown to be robustly 
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associated with less local embeddedness (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2018; van der 
Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2014).  
Putnam (2007), one of the seminal contributors to this debate, made two claims: 
First, the “hunkering down” thesis states that individuals retreat from social life in 
diverse settings. Second, immigration societies are able to overcome these negative 
effects of ethnic diversity in the long run by forming new forms of identities and 
solidarity. While the “hunkering down” claim received a great deal of attention, 
the second claim is less debated. This study translates Putnam’s (2007) second 
claim to the neighborhood level by asking whether households living in diverse 
neighborhoods can achieve a level of embeddedness which is comparable to those 
living in less diverse areas with increasing length of residence.  
This study’s main goal is to draw attention to the temporal dynamics of network 
formation in diverse neighborhoods as an important future way of research on the 
effects of diversity on neighborhood cohesion, both in theory and empirical analysis. 
This is because tie formation between groups divided by salient ethnic boundaries 
might potentially be slower and more uncertain than building up ties with similar 
others (Windzio 2018). From this dynamic perspective, the question of interest is 
whether embeddedness increases or stays low with length of residence in diverse 
areas or whether inhabitants can reach similar levels as in homogeneous areas.30  
Neighborhood embeddedness, which presents the outcome under investigation in 
this study, is here understood as the closeness of contact with neighbors, and how 
individuals perceive the density of relations among their neighbors. Neighborhood 
embeddedness is directly related to other forms of neighborhood cohesion: A certain 
                                      
30 The importance of length of residence has occasionally been noted or at least implicitly assumed, 
but did not receive a more elaborate empirical and theoretical treatment yet. In most studies an 
indicator of length of residence is included in the models as control variable or used for robustness 
checks. For example, in his famous U.S. study, Putnam (2007: 168) restricted the analysis to 
individuals who lived in neighborhoods for a long time as a robustness check, but these analyses are 
not described in detail. Dinesen and Sønderskov (2015: 563) find that the effect of diversity on 
generalized trust remains constant over the time lived in small scale contexts. 
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density of networks is considered a pre-requisite to establish trust and cooperation 
(Schaeffer 2013: 41f, Coleman, 1988) and collective efficacy (Sampson 2004: 161) in 
the neighborhood. In ethnically diverse neighborhoods dense networks are able to 
overstretch ethnic boundaries, stimulating intergroup contact which might reduce 
prejudice (Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). Note that the benefits of effective 
neighborhood ties are probably highest for the most marginalized societal groups: 
Ethnic minorities benefit from contact with majority individuals, single parents 
from higher social control in the neighborhood and elderly people from everyday 
support. Focusing on the connectedness of individuals with others also presents a 
direct way of testing Putnam’s (2007) “hunkering down thesis”, which suggests 
that individuals retreat from social life and thus should form fewer ties with both 
in- and out-group members in diverse settings. 
This study extends research on neighborhood diversity effects in several ways. First, 
by analyzing the development of embeddedness with the length of residence in 
diverse and less diverse neighborhoods, it helps to make a better assessment of the 
relevance of diversity for local cohesion. For example, if forming ties in diverse 
neighborhoods requires more time than in less diverse areas and households stay 
shorter in diverse areas on average, previous studies that do not distinguish stayers 
by their length of residence might overstate the effect of diversity. However, 
differentiating individuals by their length of residence brings a second problem to 
the fore: selective residential sorting out of neighborhoods. Households might not 
only stay shorter in diverse neighborhoods, it might also be households with specific 
traits that leave. Some of these traits might in turn affect future embeddedness into 
the neighborhood. To adjust for this kind of selective out-mobility, I propose a 
methodological approach based on the logic of Inverse Probability of Censoring 
Weighting (Robins et al. 2000). 
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IV.3 Previous Research and Theoretical Mechanisms 
In the following two sections, I first review studies on ethnic diversity effects on 
indicators of social cohesion. I then put forward my theoretical assumptions and 
hypotheses. The review focuses mainly on research with a scope similar to this 
study. This includes the measurement of diversity on the neighborhood level and 
outcomes that can be subsumed under the relational aspect of social cohesion 
(Schiefer and van der Noll 2017). The sole focus on the neighborhood is motivated 
by the assumption that neighborhood level processes, which involve everyday 
interactions and exposure to neighbors, are quite distinct from processes that link 
ethnic diversity and social cohesion on higher levels of aggregation, such as the 
nation state (e.g. Janmaat 2011).31  
 
IV.3.1 Prior Research on Diversity and Neighborhood Social 
Cohesion 
There is much supportive evidence for Putnam’s (2007) “hunkering down” claim 
on the neighborhood level. Several systematic reviews note that the majority of 
studies that measure ethnic diversity within small scale, neighborhood like, units 
yield negative associations between diversity and various indicators of social 
cohesion (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2014). This is particularly the 
case when those indicators are targeted at the neighborhood, that is, involve trust 
or contacts with neighbors or attachment to the neighborhood (Gundelach 2017; 
van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). The general observation that neighborhood 
diversity is related to less neighborhood cohesion is also found in German data. For 
                                      
31 I use the term “ethnic diversity” to refer to the ethnic composition of a neighborhood which I use 
to describe the ethno-social context a person lives in. I treat diversity in terms of the number of 
groups and the mere share of groups as interchangeable. Please refer to the data section for more 
information on how to operationalize ethnic diversity. 
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example, there is evidence that neighborhood diversity is associated with less 
connections with neighbors, lower satisfaction with the neighborhood and lower 
collective efficacy (Koopmans and Schaeffer 2016). 
Moreover, there is quasi-experimental evidence which sustains the causal 
implications of the association. Algan et al. (2016) make use of a natural experiment 
in the French public housing sector where applicants are assigned in a random 
fashion to their dwellings. They find lower social cohesion, measured indirectly as 
housing quality measures caused through vandalism or lacking cooperation, in more 
ethnically diverse blocks.  
Even though the general connectedness is lower in diverse neighborhoods, they still 
present an opportunity structure for casual inter-ethnic contacts. Considering 
German neighborhoods, Schönwalder and colleagues (2016: 61ff) find that 
neighborhood diversity, as measured by the share of inhabitants not having German 
citizenship, is positively related to casual face-to-face contacts with out-group 
members within neighborhoods. These findings are complemented by another recent 
study, which measured diversity in the proximity of native Dutch at different 
neighborhood scales and found a positive association with contacts with non-
Western immigrant neighbors and a negative association with contact with Dutch 
neighbors up to a scale of 2000 meters (Sluiter et al. 2015). Close inter-group 
contact, in contrast, is not robustly predicted by neighborhood ethnic composition. 
For example, in the case of Germany, no association was found between the 
proportion of foreigners and weak or strong ties with out-groups in overall ego-
networks when controlling for other factors (Schönwälder et al. 2016: 83ff).  
Note that most of these studies are cross-sectional and there is still a huge gap in 
the literature concerning longitudinal studies. In one of the few longitudinal studies, 
Laurence and Bentley (2016) employ a panel fixed-effects design and British data 
over almost 3 decades (with attachment measured in 1991, 2001 and 2009) to study 
how changes in neighborhood composition for both stayers and movers affect 
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neighborhood attachment, which is measured by a dichotomous variable. They find 
that increasing diversity is associated with less attachment for stayers. For movers, 
they find that moves into diversity are not associated with a decline in attachment, 
but moves from diverse to homogeneous areas experience a rise in attachment.  
To sum up, previous research suggest that measures of neighborhood attachment 
and “trust-related sentiments” (Schaeffer 2014), like perceived embeddedness 
within the neighborhood, are negatively associated with neighborhood ethnic 
diversity. My study aims at refining these findings by taking a longitudinal 
perspective. It departs from Laurence and Bentley (2016) by analyzing how social 
cohesion indicators develop with the length of residence in neighborhoods of 
differing diversity, instead of analyzing how changes in neighborhood composition 
relate to changes in social cohesion indicators. Furthermore, I use a broader set of 
embeddedness measures.  
 
IV.3.2 Theorizing Trajectories of Neighborhood 
Embeddedness 
A variety of theoretical approaches have been proposed to explain diversity effects 
on social cohesion, with most studies referring to either conflict dynamics through 
perceived threats or theories stressing cultural differences between ethnic groups 
(for a review, see Schaeffer [2014]). However, these theories have mostly been used 
to derive static hypotheses. In the following, I will derive hypotheses about how the 
development of neighborhood embeddedness of individuals or households should 
differ between diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods under different theoretical 
assumptions.  
As vantage point, I assume that individual integration into a neighborhood requires 
a period of familiarization after moving in, a period in which individuals get 
acquainted or form close relations with their neighbors. From the review above we 
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know that diverse areas have lower connectedness. This prompts the question what 
precludes individuals in diverse areas from forming more ties with their neighbors? 
To study the dynamics of individual embeddedness, it is helpful to distinguish the 
period shortly after moving in from later points in time. From a social exchange 
and network perspective, the initiation of ties is more based on the assessment of 
uncertainty of success of an exchange than sustaining the tie (Windzio 2018). Initial 
exchange across ethnic boundaries (Wimmer 2013) is to some degree more uncertain 
than ties with persons of similar ethnic background, because both partners might 
anticipate differences in shared norms and interpretations of behavior (Windzio 
2018). Once a successful exchange occurred however, it can trigger positive 
emotions (Lawler 2001) and obligations of reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) which are 
able to extend and sustain the relationship (Windzio [2018], and see Carlin & Love 
[2013] for exchange over ideological boundaries). In accordance with this, social 
network studies often find strong reciprocal tie formation, also between ethnic 
groups (Munniksma et al. 2017; Windzio 2018).  
When applied to neighborhood networks, such processes of reciprocating social 
exchange should foster individual integration into the neighborhood, which can get 
further strengthened when other neighbors get involved. This in turn creates the 
conditions to establish mutual trust and general trust in neighbors (Coleman 1988). 
Particular kinds of exchange can then lead to positive emotions towards the 
relationship or the larger social unit (Lawler 2001), in this case the neighborhood, 
leading to further integration attempts. Thus, what Putnam (2007) envisages on 
the country level, an inclusive identity, could be created on the neighborhood level 
through the interaction of individuals. 
However, according to “conflict theory” (van der Meer and Tolsma [2014]: 463; see 
also Schaeffer [2014]: 38f), the size of an ethnic out-group leads to perceived threats 
on part of members of different ethnic groups. These threats might stem from 
competition over scarce resources and translate into prejudice or discrimination 
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against other ethnic groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Quillian 1995). The 
neighborhood can be seen as arena of such conflicts if there is competition for 
example for housing or public space, but negative contact experiences (Koopmans 
and Veit 2014) and discriminatory practices in the neighborhood could also be 
motivated by perceived conflict at higher levels (for example for symbolic resources 
or political power, see Bobo & Hutchings [1996]). 
If neighborhoods were the arena of such conflicts, the strong ethnic boundaries 
characterized by prejudice would lead newcomers to be less likely to engage in inter-
group interactions. This would lead to a lower embeddedness into the neighborhood 
in comparison to homogeneous areas, simply because not so many same ethnic peers 
are available. In addition, the avoidance of inter-group encounters might spill-over 
to others with the same ethnic background, because of low neighborhood 
attachment and general distrust in neighbors that results from overall 
disorganization in the neighborhood (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). If conflict 
aggravates over time, it could even mean that long term stayers are less integrated 
in the neighborhood than newcomers because they have gone through a downward 
spiral of conflict and thus shun neighborhood life even more.  
In addition to conflict theory, another prominent set of explanations sees cultural 
differences as a cause of low social cohesion in ethnically diverse areas. This might 
include differing cultural preferences for certain public goods, which make finding 
a common denominator more difficult, or coordination problems between 
inhabitants because of language differences or symbolic behaviors (Schaeffer 2014: 
43ff). In a similar fashion, van der Meer and Tolsma (2014) note that cultural 
diversity could lead to anomie through a lack of consensus on shared norms and 
lack of communication, which negatively relates to embeddedness. These shared 
feelings of anomie should affect both relations to majority and minority individuals 
due to a felt lack of common ground with others (Algan et al. 2016). This suggests 
that individuals in diverse areas are generally more uncertain and reserved towards 
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their neighbors and thus less ready to engage in contact with newcomers. The 
cultural accounts thus leads us to expect constant low levels of individual 
embeddedness in diverse areas.  
A third argument is particularly concerned with the link between small scale 
contextual diversity and social cohesion. According to Dinesen and Sønderskov 
(2015) encountering cues that are associated with untrustworthiness reduces 
generalized trust. In this framework, visible ethnicity of others is assumed to be a 
marker of untrustworthiness, for example through internalized stereotypes (Dinesen 
and Sønderskov 2015). As cumulative exposure to cues of untrustworthiness is at 
the core of this explanation, we would expect that the more time an individual 
spends in ethnically diverse areas the less it trusts others.  
The above leads me to the following hypotheses. In the absence of both conflict and 
anomie, the increase in embeddedness with length of residence should be similar in 
diverse and less diverse areas:  
Hypothesis H1: The level of neighborhood embeddedness increases substantially 
after staying in the same neighborhood for a similar period of time in both diverse 
and less diverse neighborhoods.  
Hypothesis H1 allows for different scenarios. For example, the level of 
embeddedness shortly after moving into a neighborhood could be lower in diverse 
neighborhoods but these households could improve their neighborhood relations 
with the time of residence and even catch-up with those in less diverse areas. This 
is what we would expect if there is some natural limit of the number of 
neighborhood ties for all individuals, for example caused by limited resources like 
time.32 In contrast, under the conflict and anomie assumptions, individuals in 
                                      
32 This implies that individuals reach a plateau of contacts with neighbors. This plateau could be 
reached sooner by those living in homogenous areas. 
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diverse neighborhoods will stay at low levels of embeddedness compared to 
homogeneous areas: 
Hypothesis H2: The level of neighborhood embeddedness is substantially lower after 
staying in a diverse neighborhood than after staying in a less diverse neighborhood 
for a similar period of time.  
 
IV.4 Data and Methods 
IV.4.1 Data and Measurement of Diversity and 
Embeddedness  
This study uses data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP; Wagner, 
Frick, & Schupp, 2007) from the years 2009 to 2014, combined with neighborhood 
data provided by the private company microm (Goebel et al. 2014).33 In 2009 and 
2014 three neighborhood embeddedness indicators are available, thus 2009 is 
treated as the baseline year and 2014 constitutes the endpoint. Neighborhood 
embeddedness is only assessed by one respondent per household (the household 
head), leaving me with one observation per SOEP household. Neighborhoods are 
captured by small scale geographical areas, so-called “Marktzellen” (microm 2015), 
which encompass on average 1305 inhabitants in my sample. I restrict my analyses 
to ethnic majority households (defined as those households without members with 
direct migration background) to avoid a color-blind analysis which mixes the 
experiences of different ethnic groups uncritically (Abascal and Baldassarri 2015).  
To measure ethnic diversity I use the share of ethnic minorities in a neighborhood. 
As most of the mechanisms are related to either ethnic categorization or cultural 
                                      
33 SOEPlong v33.1: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), data for years 1984-2016, version 33.1, SOEP, 
2018, doi: 10.5684/soep.v33.1. The microm-SOEP dataset is provided by the German Institute for 
Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin (Goebel et al. 2014), and is only accessible at site for reasons 
of data protection. 
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differences between ethnicities, I focus on groups that are likely to be perceived of 
as foreign by the native German population and are thus able to trigger the types 
of mechanisms outlined above. I consider ethnic minorities as those of African, 
Asian, Balkan, Eastern European, Turkish and non-European Muslim origin. 
Information on the origin of inhabitants of certain neighborhoods comes from a 
name analysis which traces the linguistic origin of household heads living in the 
“Marktzellen” (Kruse, Kruse, and Dollmann 2017; microm 2015). I will include this 
variable as a linear continuous variable in all models for the sake of comparability 
with the results of most other studies in the field.  
Diversity is often seen as consisting of the dimensions variety and balance 
(Koopmans and Schaeffer 2015), and this study focuses on ethnic minority group 
size and thus the balance dimension. As Schaeffer notes for the German case, 
different indices of diversity that tap these different dimensions are almost 
indistinguishably correlated with each other and most of the times measure high 
concentrations of ethnic minorities vis-à-vis majorities (Schaeffer 2013a). This is in 
line with the observations that high concentrations of single minority groups are 
rare in Germany (Schönwalder and Sohn 2009), and German natives most often 
represent the majority within local contexts.  
The embeddedness measures used in this study are confined to the neighborhood 
and targeted at the perception of social ties with and between neighbors irrespective 
of their ethnic group. They are measured in the 2009 and 2014 wave of the SOEP. 
These measures have benefits and drawbacks. On the one hand, the fact that there 
is no reference to the ethnic belonging of the neighbors allows us to compare 
behavior that is guided by trust and senses of belonging, the main concepts behind 
what is typically conceived of as social cohesion (Schiefer and van der Noll 2017), 
between homogeneous and diverse areas more easily. Consider in contrast a 
question that asks for contact with out-group members. This would confound the 
theoretical mechanisms listed above with a mere opportunity structure effect and 
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it would not be surprising to find that those living with few minorities have few 
contacts with them in their neighborhood. On the other hand, these items do not 
allow us to test in how far the local networks are ethnically segregated, which might 
be important to test the conflict account. I will return to these issues in the 
discussion. 
Table IV.1 shows the three different measures with their respective questionnaire 
items. The first item refers to the respondent’s closeness of contact with others in 
the neighborhood. This is a promising measure of neighborhood cohesion, as it 
involves trust in neighbors and has a behavioral aspect. Stating to have close 
relationships with neighbors implies that the respondent trusts her neighbors, and 
also a certain frequency of interaction. The second item asks for an assessment of 
the relations between neighbors, irrespective of the respondent’s own contact with 
her neighbors. It is informative on how tight the networks within the neighborhoods 
are perceived by the respondent, beyond her own ego network. The response 
categories for this item include four items (see table IV.1). I merged the categories 
“people barely know each other” and “varies/can’t tell” into the lowest category 
since both responses signal either unfamiliarity with the neighborhood or low 
cohesion. This allows me to run ordered logistic regression with this outcome which 
requires less data than a multinomial logit model.34 The third item asks whether 
the respondent visits her neighbors. Thus, it is about the behavioral aspect of social 
cohesion and indicative of close relationships with neighbors.  
 
  
                                      
34 Coding “varies/can’t tell” as missing does not change the results. Furthermore, a multinomial 
logistic regression of the original four category variable yields similar results as well, though precision 
suffers markedly compared to the ordered logistic regressions. 
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Table IV.1: Measures of social ties in the neighborhood employed in this study. 
Dimension of Social 
Cohesion 
SOEP Item Item responses and coding Statistical 
model used 
Perception of closeness of 
own contact with neighbors 
“How close is your contact with 
your neighbors in this building 
or in this neighborhood?” 
-2. Fleeting 
-1. No contact  
0. Moderate 
1. Close 
2. Very close 
OLS linear 
regression 
Perception of relations 
among neighbors 
“How would you evaluate the 
relationships among people in 
this neighborhood? 
Which statement fits best?” 
1. “People barely know each 
other”; plus: “It varies widely / 
unable to comment on this” 
(former fourth response option) 
2. “People talk to each other 
occasionally” 
3. “It’s a fairly close-knit 
neighborhood” 
Ordered logistic 
regression 
Neighborhood visits “Do you have neighbors who 
you get along with so well that 
you visit each other at home?” 
1. “yes” 
0. “no” 
Binary logistic 
regression 
IV.4.2 Analytical Strategy and Controls 
To ideally address my research question, one would track respondents from the day 
when (or even before) they move into a neighborhood, following them over a long 
period, regularly measuring neighborhood integration and time-varying factors that 
could both lead to out-mobility and affect social integration. I approach such a set-
up by preparing the data in the following manner. 
I restrict my sample to households who moved into their dwelling no longer than 
four years ago in 2009. I chose four years because of a tradeoff between having a 
sufficient number of cases for statistical inferences and a theoretically sound sample 
of households that recently arrived. These newcomers in 2009 constitute my 
baseline sample, and I will follow them until they either drop out due to out-
mobility (see below), get lost due to panel attrition or are interviewed in 2014, 
where they are again asked about their embeddedness.  
As the covariates measured in 2009 are measured around the time of the move into 
the dwelling I consider them as informative about selective residential sorting into 
the neighborhood. In addition, these variables measured at baseline might affect 
future embeddedness. To capture the social context, I control for unemployment 
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rate, log number of residents, the type of building a household lives in (measured 
in five categories), self-reported distance to the next bigger city center (in 
categories), and the type of residential area (mere residential, business/industrial, 
or mixed). Additionally, I control for German state fixed-effects.  On the household 
level, I control for the presence of new born children, children of pre-school age, 
children of school-age; homeownership; family status (single, married or 
cohabiting); mean age of household members; whether at least one household 
member is either not working, in training, unemployed or working; log household 
income35; a subjective assessment of the appropriateness of the size of the dwelling 
and an indicator of the maximum educational degree in the household. 
Furthermore, the SOEP offers attitudinal indicators that ask respondents about 
their worries about immigration to Germany, about hostility towards immigrants 
in Germany, and about their own economic situation (on a three point scale: “not 
at all worried”, “somewhat worried” and “very worried”). The first two might be 
indicative of openness toward diversity and thus an often discussed driver of 
residential selection into diverse areas. I aggregate these worries-indicators within 
the household by taking the mean of all household members per year. Note that I 
mostly use household characteristics instead of characteristics of the household head 
since it is the household context which usually matters for moving decisions. Table 
IV.A1 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics of these baseline variables and 
the outcomes in 2009 and 2014. 
Second, because I am interested in neighborhood integration after a household 
stayed in the same neighborhood for five years, I censor individuals after they 
moved out between 2009 and 2013. The reason is that I cannot observe their 
neighborhood embeddedness within this neighborhood if they moved away. Of the 
2,401 households which are present in 2009, 761 were censored because they moved 
                                      
35 Income is used as an imputed version from the SOEP pequiv data file. Leaving income out of the 
regression did not change results substantively. 
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before 2014 (864 are lost due to panel attrition, see also table IV.A2 in the 
appendix). 
To account for possible selection bias through mobility out of areas due to 
household characteristics that both affect staying in a neighborhood and the 
outcome, I apply the logic of “Inverse Probability of Censoring Weighting” (Robins 
et al. 2000: 557). This involves estimating the probability of being censored (in my 
case, due to moving out) and then constructing weights out of these probabilities 
to adjust for selection bias. To estimate probabilities of out-mobility I run a pooled 
logistic regression of moving out in the period from 2009 to 2013, treating each 
household year as a unit of analysis (Hernán, Brumback, and Robins 2002; Robins 
et al. 2000). These probabilities are then used to construct what I will call “inverse 
probability of out-mobility weights” (IPOW). Applying these weights in the 
outcome regressions for observations in the year 2014 up-weighs households with 
characteristics that make them likely to have moved away between 2009 and 2014, 
such that out-mobility is independent of those variables that were used to estimate 
the probabilities. This procedure implies that even though individuals who are 
censored due to moving out are not included in the outcome regression in 2014, 
these observations add information to the estimation of the weights. Further 
information on the logic of this method can be found in the appendix. 
To avoid overfitting, I keep the mobility models simple and only include factors 
that are often discussed to drive this sort of selection process. These include a 
measure of the share of minorities in 2009 and neighborhood contacts in 2009 to 
account for mobility based on past values of the outcome itself, a yearly varying 
measure of whether a newborn child entered the household in a given year, whether 
there was a change in employment for persons within a household, and the three 
worries indicators. I interact neighborhood contacts in 2009, having a child and 
concerns about immigration with the share of minorities in 2009. See the appendix 
for regression tables (table IV.A3) of these selection models, descriptive statistics 
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of the time-varying variables (table IV.A2) and for further elaboration on the 
methods. 
Concerning the composition of individuals who recently moved in, I need to make 
the same assumptions as other studies in the field: in order to interpret the 
coefficient of minority share as causal, all confounding variables must be included 
in the outcome regression. Due to the panel data structure, I can measure these 
confounders shortly after moving into the neighborhood, and thus clearly before the 
measurement of the outcome in 2014, respecting the timely succession of events. 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level to account for both the 
weighting procedure and correlations within households. Please refer to the 
appendix for further justifications for the model used.  
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IV.5 Results 
 
Figure IV.1: Predicted values of closeness of neighborhood contacts, results from OLS 
regressions. Full models are shown under (1) and (3) in table IV.2. 
The first outcome under study is an indicator of the quality of neighborhood contact 
which I analyze by Ordinary Least Squares regressions. In the left panel of figure 
IV.1 I plotted predicted values from a regression model just including the minority 
share in 2009, a dummy indicating whether the observation is in 2009 or 2014, and 
their interaction (see model 1 in table IV.2). This figure shows that (a) the closeness 
of neighborhood contact increases substantially over the course of the five years 
(comparing the red and blue line), and (b) that closeness to neighbors is negatively 
associated with the percentage of ethnic minorities in the neighborhood (indicated 
by the steep negative slope). Both the strong negative association with minority 
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share and the increase with five years of stay get substantially smaller once baseline 
variables and selective out-mobility are adjusted for (model 3 in table IV.2). 
However, most important with respect to my hypotheses, the increase within the 
five years is still visible, showing that in both diverse and non-diverse areas 
individuals get more embedded into the neighborhood over time. Further analyses 
show that the contrast between the two years is significant at the p=0.05 level over 
the range of values of share minorities (not shown). These results favor hypothesis 
H1. There is even a tendency that individuals staying in more diverse areas catch-
up with the households living in homogenous areas (the red slope is slightly more 
horizontal than the blue one, meaning that the differences between diverse and less 
diverse areas are smaller five years later). However, the wide confidence bands 
indicate that we should not overemphasize such trends and more research is needed.  
As a second outcome variable, I consider an item asking about perceived 
neighborhood relations to measure perceptions of community. Again, I show 
adjusted and non-adjusted predictions in figure IV.2. Since my outcome is ordinal, 
I plot predicted probabilities for all three possible outcome categories from an 
ordered logistic regression. The upper row of figure IV.2 shows unadjusted 
predictions and the lower row predictions which were adjusted for baseline 
differences between households and for their probability to move out between 2009 
and 2014. Even after adjustment for baseline variables and selective out-mobility 
the probability to perceive relations among one’s neighbors as “barely knowing each 
other” or “varying/can’t tell” has a substantial positive association with the share 
of ethnic minorities, whereas a negative association is visible with the probability 
to perceive a close-knit community. In addition, although staying in the 
neighborhood for five years marginally raises the probability to perceive a close-
knit community, this increase is not enough for residents in ethnically diverse areas 
to reach similar levels as in non-diverse areas after five years. This is indicated by 
the negative slope of the red lines and substantiates hypothesis H2. Further analysis 
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also shows that the average marginal effect of minority share is significant for the 
probability of barely knowing ones neighbors and the probability to perceive a close-
knit community in 2014, which indicates significant differences between diverse and 
non-diverse areas, even after five years of residence (not shown). As a final note 
concerning this outcome of perceived neighborhood relations I want to stress that 
the category “people talk occasionally” is the option which is chosen most often 
with no differences between areas of different ethnic diversity. 
 The final outcome under study, visiting neighbors, is negatively predicted by the 
share of ethnic minorities (left panel in figure IV.3), though after covariate 
adjustment this association gets rather small (see the right panel of figure IV.3). 
Further analysis substantiate the visual impression: the average marginal effect of 
share minorities is insignificant for both years (not shown). In addition, the 
probability to visit neighbors rises substantially with five years in the neighborhood 
in both diverse and non-diverse neighborhoods. This contrast in probabilities to 
visit neighbors in 2014 compared to 2009 is statistically significant over almost the 
whole range of values of minority share (not shown). Thus, these results 
substantiate hypothesis H1. 
Note that visiting neighbors, to an even larger degree than the two other outcome 
measures, is likely to capture ties within ethnic groups in diverse areas (i.e. bonding 
social capital). If ethnic boundaries are strong, these visits might be primarily with 
co-ethnics even in ethnically diverse areas. Even if this was true, it is important to 
note that this finding shows that inhabitants of diverse areas have similar 
probabilities of visiting others as in homogeneous areas, thus providing evidence 
against the strong hunkering down claim by Putnam (2007) which relates to both 
in-group and out-group ties. 
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Figure IV.2: Predicted probabilities of perceived neighborhood relations (variables fixed at their empirical values). Results from ordered logistic 
regression models. Full models are shown under (4) and (6) in table IV.2. 
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Figure IV.3: Predicted probabilities of visiting neighbors. Results from binary logistic 
regression models. Full models are shown under (7) and (9) in table IV.2. 
 
Before discussing these results in more detail, note that inclusion of baseline 
variables greatly reduces the association between neighborhood diversity and all 
three social cohesion indicators. Additional analyses show that particularly 
variables on the neighborhood level and on the built environment (the type of 
building) strongly decrease the effect of ethnic diversity (this is in line with Letki 
[2008]).   
Furthermore, adjustment for potential selective out-mobility does not largely 
change the results after baseline variables are adjusted by weighting with the 
inverse probability of out-mobility. This can be seen by comparing the second model 
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with the third model of each outcome in table IV.2. This is an interesting finding 
in its own right, as I included factors that are often discussed to trigger selective 
out-mobility (see appendix A2). Evidence against selection out of diverse 
neighborhoods based on the social cohesion measure itself is also in line with other 
studies (Dinesen and Sønderskov 2015; Havekes, Coenders, and Van der Lippe 
2014). 
To test the robustness of my results I conducted two series of robustness checks. 
First, for each outcome I ran a corresponding random-effects regression model in a 
sample of households that are present at both 2009 and 2014 and without weighting 
to adjust for out-mobility. The results were mostly similar to the ones reported. 
Through the inclusion of random effects, clustering at the household level is 
explicitly modeled. Thus, the fact that there is no large deviation from my original 
results suggests that my main results are not influenced by the hierarchical 
structure of my data. Furthermore, these analyses also show that my main results 
are most likely not affected by selective panel attrition as the results from the full 
household panels (both years) are similar to the ones from my main sample which 
includes some households only in 2009. Second, to see whether observations with 
high values on the skewed minority share variable substantially influence my 
results, I truncated minority share at 20 percent and 15 percent and run the same 
models as in table IV.2 (3), (6) and (9). The results are mainly similar to the ones 
reported. 
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Table IV.2: Outcome regressions of three measures of neighborhood embeddedness. Standard errors clustered within households (in parentheses). Table 
continues over several pages. 
 Contact closeness with neighbors (OLS) Perceived relations among neighbors 
(ordered logit) 
Neighborhood visits (binary logit) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 without 
covariates 
with 
covariates 
with 
covariates 
IPOW-
weighted 
without 
covariates 
with 
covariates 
with 
covariates 
IPOW-
weighted 
without 
covariates  
with 
covariates 
with 
covariates 
IPOW-
weighted 
          
Neighb. share minorities, 2009 -0.021*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.071*** -0.028* -0.027* -0.050*** -0.014 -0.015 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
          
Survey year=2014 0.169*** 0.112** 0.100* 0.360** 0.242* 0.208+ 0.384*** 0.300* 0.287* 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.115) (0.106) (0.107) (0.111) (0.117) (0.117) 
          
Survey year=2014 X Neighb. share minorities, 
2009 
0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.000 -0.006 -0.005 0.013 0.008 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
          
Baseline controls measured in 2009:          
          
Unemployment rate, 2009  -0.008+ -0.008+  -0.009 -0.009  -0.019* -0.019* 
  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.010) (0.010) 
          
log(No. of inhabitants), 2009  -0.074* -0.075*  -0.262*** -0.264***  -0.224** -0.222** 
  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.078) (0.078)  (0.077) (0.077) 
          
One or two family terrace house  0.030 0.033  0.056 0.051  0.321* 0.324* 
  (0.056) (0.056)  (0.145) (0.145)  (0.143) (0.143) 
          
Residential building 3-4 dwellings  0.000 -0.003  -0.351* -0.360*  0.163 0.166 
  (0.062) (0.062)  (0.146) (0.146)  (0.140) (0.140) 
          
Residential building 5-8 dwellings  -0.130* -0.129*  -0.627*** -0.632***  -0.207 -0.200 
  (0.054) (0.054)  (0.119) (0.118)  (0.132) (0.132) 
          
Residential building 9 or more dwellings  -0.315*** -0.317***  -0.888*** -0.898***  -0.115 -0.117 
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  (0.061) (0.061)  (0.135) (0.135)  (0.149) (0.149) 
          
Distance to next big city center, below 10km  0.112* 0.110*  0.045 0.042  0.270+ 0.263+ 
  (0.056) (0.056)  (0.119) (0.120)  (0.138) (0.138) 
          
10 to 25km  0.176** 0.170**  0.358** 0.348**  0.193 0.182 
  (0.061) (0.061)  (0.133) (0.133)  (0.147) (0.147) 
          
25 to 40km  0.221** 0.219**  0.447** 0.435**  0.379* 0.377* 
  (0.069) (0.069)  (0.155) (0.155)  (0.167) (0.167) 
          
40 to 60km  0.146+ 0.144+  0.400* 0.397*  0.197 0.191 
  (0.076) (0.076)  (0.182) (0.182)  (0.189) (0.189) 
          
60km or more  0.216** 0.217**  0.486** 0.482**  0.332+ 0.334+ 
  (0.074) (0.073)  (0.157) (0.158)  (0.180) (0.179) 
          
Mere residential area, new buildings  -0.151*** -0.152***  -0.078 -0.081  -0.105 -0.105 
  (0.042) (0.042)  (0.097) (0.097)  (0.103) (0.102) 
          
Mixed area  -0.076+ -0.075+  -0.250** -0.247**  -0.113 -0.111 
  (0.042) (0.042)  (0.092) (0.092)  (0.104) (0.104) 
          
Business/industrial area  -0.212 -0.214  -0.397 -0.395  -0.352 -0.355 
  (0.164) (0.162)  (0.292) (0.289)  (0.298) (0.297) 
          
log(household income), 2009  -0.026 -0.024  0.025 0.024  0.023 0.025 
  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.078) (0.078)  (0.077) (0.077) 
          
Homeownership, 2009  0.192*** 0.197***  0.298** 0.307**  0.373** 0.380*** 
  (0.044) (0.044)  (0.107) (0.107)  (0.115) (0.114) 
          
Child of age 0 to 2, 2009  0.018 0.018  0.291* 0.289*  0.213 0.204 
  (0.058) (0.058)  (0.144) (0.144)  (0.155) (0.155) 
          
Child of pre-school age, 2009  0.280*** 0.283***  0.560*** 0.565***  0.591*** 0.604*** 
  (0.055) (0.055)  (0.134) (0.134)  (0.135) (0.136) 
          
Child of school age, 2009  0.022 0.020  -0.057 -0.059  0.115 0.115 
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  (0.045) (0.045)  (0.098) (0.099)  (0.110) (0.109) 
          
Partner in HH (ref. no partner)  0.036 0.033  0.111 0.108  0.022 0.020 
  (0.049) (0.049)  (0.118) (0.118)  (0.121) (0.121) 
          
Spouse in HH (ref. no partner)  0.076 0.074  0.007 0.004  0.180 0.177 
  (0.048) (0.048)  (0.105) (0.105)  (0.117) (0.117) 
          
Concerns about immigration in HH, 2009  0.033 0.035  0.047 0.051  0.058 0.059 
  (0.027) (0.026)  (0.058) (0.058)  (0.061) (0.061) 
          
Concerns about hostility towards foreigners in 
HH, 2009 
 0.087** 0.085**  0.054 0.052  0.148* 0.148* 
  (0.030) (0.029)  (0.066) (0.066)  (0.069) (0.069) 
          
Mean household age, 2009  0.004** 0.004**  0.014*** 0.015***  0.006 0.006 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
          
At least one HH member in training, 2009  -0.049 -0.043  0.066 0.069  -0.263+ -0.250+ 
  (0.058) (0.058)  (0.138) (0.139)  (0.147) (0.147) 
          
At least one HH member unemployed, 2009  -0.085 -0.087  -0.168 -0.175  -0.106 -0.112 
  (0.061) (0.061)  (0.130) (0.130)  (0.139) (0.138) 
          
At least one HH member working, 2009  0.026 0.025  0.128 0.131  -0.082 -0.090 
  (0.043) (0.043)  (0.100) (0.100)  (0.103) (0.103) 
          
German state fixed-effects  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
          
Constant -0.051+ 0.232 0.233    0.016 0.443 0.421 
 (0.027) (0.404) (0.404)    (0.065) (0.954) (0.953) 
Ordered logit cut-off 1    -1.463*** -2.483* -2.511*    
    (0.070) (1.006) (1.007)    
Ordered logit cut-off 2    1.180*** 0.438 0.405    
    (0.069) (1.006) (1.007)    
No. household-years 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 3151 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Data: German Socio-Economic Panel 2009 to 2014 and microm neighborhood data. IPOW calculated with SOEP from 2009 to 2013.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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IV.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to assess the trajectories of household embeddedness 
into neighborhoods of differing ethnic diversity. The literature on diversity effects 
has reached a point where theoretical explanations abound (Dinesen and 
Sønderskov 2018; van der Meer and Tolsma 2014; Schaeffer 2014), but often these 
theories are implemented in a static fashion. In contrast, this study derives dynamic 
hypotheses from canonical theories in the field. To put these hypotheses to an 
empirical test, I focus on the dynamics of neighborhood embeddedness in the first 
couple of years after households move into a new neighborhood. I propose a 
methodological approach to take into account selective mobility out of the 
neighborhood over time, which is based on the idea of Inverse Probabiltiy of 
Censoring Weighting (Robins et al. 2000). This approach takes into account that 
many factors that lead to out-mobility are themselves affected by the neighborhood 
characteristics of interest and might affect future embeddedness, heightening the 
problem of selection bias (Elwert and Winship 2014). 
My first important finding is that embeddedness measured by neighborhood 
closeness of contact with neighbors and neighborhood visits increases after five 
years of residence in the neighborhood. These results reject the hunkering down 
claim (Putnam 2007): inhabitants of diverse neighborhoods do not retreat from 
social neighborhood life over time. Furthermore, as my findings pertain to recent 
in-movers, they are in line with a British study which suggests that those who sort 
into ethnically diverse neighborhoods are less susceptible to ethnic diversity 
(Laurence and Bentley 2016).  
Theoretically, this finding is not easily explainable by cultural differences that lead 
to disorganization of diverse areas (van der Meer and Tolsma 2014). Were 
individuals to retreat from social life due to an uncertain environment caused by 
perceived cultural differences and lack of shared norms, we would not expect that 
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households are getting more embedded with their length of stay in diverse areas. 
Likewise, there is no support for group conflict if we assume that conflict affects 
general ties in the neighborhood. The results for the cohort of diversity dwellers 
that I analyzed are rather consistent with an account that allows for the possibility 
that specific households are as able to form individual ties in diverse as in 
homogenous neighborhoods over time.   
Secondly, my results also show that the perception of community differs between 
more diverse and less diverse neighborhoods: After five years of stay individuals in 
diverse neighborhoods more often perceive that their neighbors rarely talk to each 
other compared to less diverse neighborhoods. Thus, even though households are 
able to build up individual contacts in diverse neighborhoods, the density of 
networks between neighbors still perceived less close-knit as in homogeneous areas. 
This finding shows that there are differences in neighborhood networks between 
diverse and less diverse areas which are not easily overcome by single households. 
These differences are likely due to historical developments of the networks in diverse 
neighborhoods which are already present when the households in my sample enter 
the neighborhood.  
How do these results relate with the negative association between neighborhood 
diversity and social cohesion found in the reviewed cross-sectional and quasi-
experimental (Algan et al. 2016) studies of neighborhood cohesion? Taking a clear 
focus on early changes in embeddedness after moving in, this study indicates that 
it is not the individual networks of newcomers that are negatively affected by 
diversity (Laurence and Bentley 2016). I thus propose that future research should 
take a long term view to explain aggregate cohesion in ethnically diverse areas. 
Such a view should take into account how the neighborhood historically developed 
and how changes in ethnic composition are related to the networks of long term 
stayers. The relevance of such a view is again backed by Laurence and Bentley 
(2016), who find that an increase in diversity for those who stay in a neighborhood 
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over a decade is associated with a decrease in neighborhood attachment. This also 
matches findings from a qualitative study which shows that established German 
natives show reactions of threat when their neighborhood experiences changes in 
ethnic composition (Hanhörster 2000). 
Furthermore, depending on how trajectories of embeddedness further develop for 
different cohorts of inhabitants and who moves away at which stage, my findings 
have important implications for neighborhood research on ethnic diversity and local 
cohesion. As most studies use cross-sectional data they have to rely on the 
composition of neighborhoods as it is at the moment the study is conducted. If 
inhabitants in diverse areas are slower to establish ties, but in the end are able to 
catch-up with inhabitants in less diverse areas if they would stay put, results from 
previous studies might to some extent be attributable to higher residential turnover 
in diverse areas. This issue is only solvable by tracking and correcting for selective 
out-mobility over time. To analyze trajectories of long term stayers in more detail, 
the methodology proposed here could prove useful because with longer length of 
residence the probability of out-mobility based on variables that affect the outcome 
might increase.  
Apart from panel studies on the individual or household level, other promising 
ventures for future research are analyses of neighborhood networks. More than 
other methods, this would allow researchers to investigate the segregation of 
networks within neighborhoods and assess the relative impact of ethnic homophily. 
Some limitations of this study should be kept in mind. First, the SOEP respondents 
only rarely live in the most diverse neighborhoods, whereas other studies use more 
targeted sampling strategies and thus have more variance in ethnic diversity 
(Schaeffer 2014; Schönwälder et al. 2016). Thus, I might underestimate the diversity 
effect if it is not linear because those living in high diversity neighborhoods are 
missing in my analysis. Second, though my findings speak against “hunkering 
down” (Putnam 2007) in diverse areas over time, my measures of embeddedness do 
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not rule out that individual neighborhood networks are ethnically segregated. 
Third, interpretations of the causal effect of diversity require that all important 
confounding variables are included in the models. This assumption is made by 
almost any other study in the field and my methodology is no exception. However, 
by taking a longitudinal perspective, this study draws attention to the dynamic 
relation between variables by distinguishing between variables that matter for in-
mobility and for out-mobility. Natural experiments could help to shed more light 
on whether the usual covariates that are used to adjust for possible confounding of 
the diversity-cohesion association are sufficient (Algan et al. 2016).  
To conclude, this study lends some credibility to Putnam’s (2007) long term claim 
that the negative effects of diversity give way to positive effects in the future. In a 
sample of households who recently moved into their dwelling, I find that contact 
with neighbors gets closer over time, also in more diverse areas. However, this does 
not apply for the overall perception of neighborhood relations in the neighborhood. 
Thus, certain cohorts of movers into diversity are able to increase embeddedness, 
but this does not lead to increased community-like perceptions of relations between 
neighbors. Taken together with findings from other studies, I thus propose that 
future research should take a closer look at how neighborhood networks change 
over long time periods, and which cohorts of residents might be most affected by 
changes in diversity.  
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IV.7 Study III Appendix 
IV.7.1 Descriptive Sample Statistics  
Table IV.A1: Variables in 2009 and in 2014. 
Except for the outcomes, all other variables are measured in 2009 and are time-invariant, 
changes for those variables between years are due to right censoring between 2009 and 
2014. HH=household. 
 2009 2014 
 mea
n 
sd min max mea
n 
sd min max 
Neighb. share minorities, 2009 4.8 4.7 0 53.0 4.5 4.4 0 53.0 
Outcome variables         
Closeness of contact with 
neighbors 
-0.2 0.9 -2 2 0.05 0.9 -2 2 
Perceived relations among 
neighbors:   
 - Barely know each other 
 
 
0.3 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0.2 
 
 
0.4 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 - Talk occasionally 0.6 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 
 - Relatively close-knit 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Visit neighbors 0.4 0.5 0 1 0.6 0.5 0 1 
Control variables         
Unemployment rate, 2009 8.5 6.2 0 41.6 8.1 6.1 0 41.6 
log(No. of inhabitants), 2009 7.1 0.5 1.8 8.9 7.0 0.6 1.8 8.9 
Building type, 2009:   
 - Detached one or two family 
house 
 
0.2 
 
0.4 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.3 
 
0.5 
 
0 
 
1 
 - One or two family terrace 
house 
0.1 0.3 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 - Residential building 3-4 
dwellings 
0.1 0.4 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1 
 - Residential building 5-8 
dwellings 
0.3 0.5 0 1 0.3 0.4 0 1 
 - Residential building 9 or more 
dwellings 
0.2 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
Distance to next city center, 
2009:   
 - In center 
 
0.1 
 
0.4 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.1 
 
0.3 
 
0 
 
1 
 - below 10km 0.3 0.5 0 1 0.3 0.5 0 1 
 - 10 to 25km 0.3 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 - 25 to 40km 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 - 40 to 60km 0.08 0.3 0 1 0.08 0.3 0 1 
 - 60km or more 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Type of neighborhood, 2009:  
 - Mere residential area, old 
buildings 
 
0.4 
 
0.5 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0 
 
1 
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 - Mere residential area, new 
buildings 
0.3 0.4 0 1 0.3 0.5 0 1 
 - Mixed area 0.3 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 - Business/industrial area 0.01 0.1 0 1 0.01 0.1 0 1 
log(household income), 2009 10.1 0.8 0 13.2 10.3 0.6 7.5 12.6 
Homeownership, 2009 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.3 0.5 0 1 
Child of age 0 to 2, 2009 0.09 0.3 0 1 0.09 0.3 0 1 
Child of pre-school age, 2009 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1 
Child of school age, 2009 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.3 0.4 0 1 
Family relations in HH, 2009:   
 - No partner 
 
0.5 
 
0.5 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.4 
 
0.5 
 
0 
 
1 
 - Partner in HH  0.2 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 - Spouse in HH  0.3 0.5 0 1 0.4 0.5 0 1 
Concerns about immigration in 
HH, 2009 
1.8 0.7 1 3 1.8 0.7 1 3 
Concerns about hostility towards 
foreigners in HH, 2009 
2.0 0.6 1 3 2.0 0.6 1 3 
Mean household age, 2009 39.6 13.8 19 91 43.7 13.7 19.5 85 
At least one HH member not 
working, 2009 
0.08 0.3 0 1 0.10 0.3 0 1 
At least one HH member in 
training, 2009 
0.1 0.3 0 1 0.07 0.3 0 1 
At least one HH member 
unemployed, 2009 
0.1 0.3 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1 
At least one HH member 
working, 2009 
0.6 0.5 0 1 0.7 0.5 0 1 
German state, 2009:   
 - Baden-Wuerttemberg 
 
0.1 
 
0.3 
 
0 
 
1 
 
0.1 
 
0.3 
 
0 
 
1 
 - Bavaria 0.1 0.3 0 1 0.1 0.3 0 1 
 - Berlin 0.05 0.2 0 1 0.06 0.2 0 1 
 - Brandenbrug 0.04 0.2 0 1 0.05 0.2 0 1 
 - Bremen 0.00
9 
0.09 0 1 0.01 0.10 0 1 
 - Hamburg 0.02 0.2 0 1 0.03 0.2 0 1 
 - Hessen 0.07 0.3 0 1 0.06 0.2 0 1 
 - Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.03 0.2 0 1 0.02 0.1 0 1 
 - Lower Saxony 0.08 0.3 0 1 0.07 0.3 0 1 
 - North Rhine-Westphalia 0.2 0.4 0 1 0.2 0.4 0 1 
 - Rhineland-Palatinate 0.04 0.2 0 1 0.05 0.2 0 1 
 - Saarland 0.00
8 
0.09 0 1 0.01 0.1 0 1 
 - Saxony 0.08 0.3 0 1 0.10 0.3 0 1 
 - Saxony-Anhalt 0.04 0.2 0 1 0.04 0.2 0 1 
 - Schleswig-Holstein 0.04 0.2 0 1 0.02 0.1 0 1 
 - Thuringia 0.04 0.2 0 1 0.04 0.2 0 1 
Observations 2351  800 
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IV.7.2 Addressing Selective Out-mobility 
Logic of inverse probability of censoring weighting 
Robins and colleagues provide a statistical method to estimate counterfactual 
distributions for observational studies called Inverse Probability of Treatment 
Weighting (IPTW) (Hernán et al. 2002; Robins et al. 2000). IPTW involves 
weighting observations with the inverse of their probability to receive treatment, 
thus creating a weighted population in which confounding covariates do not affect 
treatment assignment. This method is of particular interest when estimating the 
effects of time-varying treatments, because it can adjust for factors that are both 
(a) mediators on the path between prior treatment and future outcome and (b) 
confounders of treatment at a later time point and the outcome. In such situations 
standard regression models would yield biased causal estimates of treatment 
histories.  
The logic of IPTW can also be used to adjust for selection bias due to selective 
panel attrition by treating drop-out as a treatment and weight with the inverse 
probability of drop-out at each time point. These weights used to adjust for drop-
out are called “Inverse Probability of Censoring Weights” (Robins et al. 2000: 557).  
Here, I want to briefly lay out how I proceed in my application. Specifically, I do 
not use weighting to adjust for confounding of the treatment or drop-out in general, 
but to adjust for selective out-mobility. As I censored individuals after moving out 
of a neighborhood the logic is very similar to the censoring weights with the slight 
difference that I adjust for a specific type of censoring. 
The weights to be estimated take the following form: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∏ (1−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 |𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1=0, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖2009  ))𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=2009
∏ (𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖=2009 1−𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝(𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖|𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1=0, 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖2009,𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊, 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖2009  ))  
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Where i indexes households and t the year of measurement with 2009<=t<2014. 
T is the individual household year of out-mobility (afterwards the observation are 
censored). Vi2009 is a vector of time invariant variables measured in 2009 to stabilize 
the weight by inclusion in the numerator (the confounding influences of V are 
modelled in the outcome regression, for more details on stabilizing IPT weights, see 
Robins et al., 2000). Xit is the core aspect, a vector of variables measured during 
2009 and 2013 which are expected to be both affected by prior ethnic diversity, 
affect the outcome, and drive out-mobility. Xit also includes an interaction between 
the share minorities in 2009 and the neighborhood contact variable in 2009 to take 
into account baseline differences in neighborhood contact while avoiding the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the outcome regression. Since the 
probabilities in the numerator and denominator are unknown, I estimate them with 
pooled logistic regression models (Robins et al. 2000) of moving until the next 
measurement occasion as shown in table A3. Descriptive statistics of the time-
varying variables between 2009 and 2013 are given in table A2. To arrive at weights 
which correspond to the probability of being censored at the current point in time 
(Robins et al. 2000) I forward the weights by one time point for each household 
and give a weight of 1 to each household in 2009. 
Through weighting with the IPOW, the out-mobility histories over the years 2009 
to 2014 in the sub-sample in 2014 are independent of the variables Xit used to 
calculate the weights in the final regression of embeddedness on diversity.  
This procedure has several advantages for the research question at hand. First, it 
adjusts for selection bias if the moves between the two survey waves are affected 
by variables that likewise affect the outcome. This allows me to answer my research 
question about embeddedness in 2014 if the household would have stayed in the 
same neighborhood. Second, while doing so it avoids over-control bias due to 
conditioning on intermediate variables that are themselves affected by diversity in 
2009 and affect future embeddedness. This is because those time-varying variables 
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do not enter the outcome regression as predictors. Third, it allows me to make 
greater use of the information on household panels from 2009 to 2013 to plausibly 
model out-mobility, because the models used to calculate the weights use yearly 
information on households. 
 
Table IV.A2: Mean values of time-varying variables between 2009 and 2013.  
The drop in observations over the years is both due to panel attrition and censoring due to 
moving. 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Newborn child (age 0 to 1) 0.060 0.052 0.043 0.042 0.039 
At least one HH member changed jobs 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 
Concerns about immigration in HH 1.79 1.81 1.86 1.75 1.81 
Concerns about hostility towards 
f i  i  HH 
1.97 1.97 1.94 1.97 1.97 
Concerns about own economic situation in 
HH 
2.04 1.99 1.91 1.90 1.83 
Moves until next measurement 0.11 0.10 0.087 0.095 0.068 
Observations 2351 1784 1326 1081 914 
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Table IV.A3: Pooled logistic regression to predict out-mobility until next measurement for 
the years between 2009 to 2013.  
Shown are odds ratios. Predicted probabilities from these models go into the construction 
of the inverse-probability of out-mobility weights. The model that predicts probabilities for 
the numerator of the weights (2) does only include time-invariant characteristics that are 
themselves not affected by prior diversity. Probabilities from model (2) serve only to stablize 
the weight, and the outcome regression adjusts for these time-constant factors. 
 (1)  (2)  
 Denominator 
model 
 Numerator 
model 
 
Moves until next measurement     
Neighb. share minorities, 2009 1.023 (0.024)   
Closeness of contact with neighbors, 2009 0.807** (0.057)   
Neighb. share minorities, 2009 X Closeness of contact 
with neighbors, 2009 
1.007 (0.010)   
Newborn 1.576* (0.350)   
Newborn X Neighb. share minorities, 2009 1.026 (0.027)   
At least one HH member changed jobs=1 1.445*** (0.140)   
Neighb. share minorities, 2009 X Concerns about 
immigration in HH 
0.990 (0.011)   
Concerns about immigration in HH 0.883 (0.076)   
Concerns about hostility towards foreigners in HH 1.015 (0.071)   
Concerns about own economic situation in HH 1.068 (0.073)   
Survey year=2010 0.952 (0.103) 0.930 (0.100) 
Survey year=2011 0.861 (0.105) 0.826 (0.100) 
Survey year=2012 0.991 (0.124) 0.950 (0.118) 
Survey year=2013 0.706* (0.106) 0.665** (0.099) 
Unemployment rate, 2009 0.992 (0.009) 0.998 (0.008) 
Owns home (ref. rents home) 0.134*** (0.024) 0.126*** (0.022) 
Bavaria 1.130 (0.189) 1.098 (0.181) 
Berlin 0.926 (0.210) 0.944 (0.207) 
Brandenbrug 0.940 (0.254) 0.862 (0.220) 
Bremen 0.559 (0.273) 0.547 (0.269) 
Hamburg 0.830 (0.227) 0.877 (0.240) 
Hessen 1.481* (0.285) 1.467* (0.276) 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 1.482 (0.418) 1.383 (0.366) 
Lower Saxony 1.090 (0.215) 1.027 (0.197) 
North Rhine-Westphalia 1.150 (0.187) 1.104 (0.175) 
Rhineland-Palatinate 1.046 (0.245) 0.975 (0.225) 
Saarland 1.003 (0.506) 0.956 (0.493) 
Saxony 0.784 (0.174) 0.716 (0.148) 
Saxony-Anhalt 1.030 (0.270) 0.995 (0.247) 
Schleswig-Holstein 1.632* (0.402) 1.522+ (0.367) 
Thuringia 0.638 (0.186) 0.590+ (0.163) 
No. household-years 7173  7173  
Data: SOEP 2009 to 2013. Household clustered standard errors in parantheses.  
 
 
167 
 
IV.7.3 Why No Fixed-Effects Regression? 
Another common way of analyzing panel data are panel fixed-effects models. These 
are not appropriate in the context of this study for two reasons.  
First, I am interested in differences in levels of embeddedness between more diverse 
and less diverse areas over time, where diversity is treated as time-constant. A 
fixed-effects model would restrict the difference in embeddedness in diverse and 
non-diverse areas in 2009 to be equal (the main effect of minority share is not 
estimated). Thus, I would not be able to compare initial levels of embeddedness 
between diverse and homogeneous neighborhoods. These are however crucial for an 
assessment of trajectories of embeddedness, as it can be assumed that in diverse 
settings embeddedness is lower shortly after arrival.  
Second, acknowledging the first point, one could use another analytical sample and 
analyze the effects of changes in neighborhood diversity on embeddedness between 
the years 2009 and 2014, treating diversity as time-varying. However, within 
variation from changes in minority share between 2009 and 2014 is subject to severe 
measurement bias. This is because there is a change in neighborhood boundaries in 
2010 when microm introduced new spatial units. These units replaced the 
Marktzellen which I used as neighborhoods in this study. Changes in the share of 
ethnic minorities are relatively small between years within the same neighborhoods. 
This makes artificial changes in minority share like the ones caused by the change 
to new spatial units very influential.  
All this goes without saying that a big drawback of the current methodology is that 
it does not account for unobserved panel heterogeneity, and that more research is 
certainly necessary. 
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